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A precarious, restricted, and threatened life,
such was the lot of the islands, their
domestic life at any rate. But their
external life, the role they have played in
the forefront of history far exceeds what
might be expected from such poor territories.1
Those who are acquainted with the history of Shetland must
agree with the typically perceptive quote from Braudel. The
history of the Islands provides us with a valuable test for more
general ideas on social and economic development in peripheral
areas, as well as adding to our knowledge of the history of
modern Britain, indeed of modern Europe. Furthermore, within
the last twenty years, there has grown up a strong local
historiography which includes discussion of the reasons for the
structure and route that Shetland's development has taken. This
thesis sets out to assess crVtica-Lly these debates and
literatures, and through the use of new sources, add to our
understanding of the social factors that are crucial to social
and economic development. The thesis concentrates on the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for reasons that will become
clear.
Before going into detail on the theoretical and historical
background of the thesis a short statement on the position argued
in the thesis will clarify the later discussion: firstly, that
the arguments put forward in marxist theories of development are
unable to explain the historical route of Shetland's development
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; secondly, that major
writers on the social and economic history of Shetland have not
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provided an adequate explanation for that route either, because
of an over-emphasis on trade. Thirdly, the argument presented in
the thesis is that it is only through an understanding of the
social organisation of production within the Islands in relation
to the history of the changing relationship with the "external"
world that we can come to a full explanation of the form that
social and economic change took in the Islands.
By the term "the social organisation of production" is
meant both how people organise their labour to produce their
subsistence and other social and economic needs, as well as the
more general class structure. This has its origins within
Marx's materialist social philosophy but without the metaphysical
Hegelian notions of evolutionary progress and the historical
mission of social classes. Marx correctly saw that it was human
endeavour that was the start of any analysis of the world, and
that it was the way in which production was socially organised
that was the most significant. Therefore much of the thesis
deals with the nature of production in Shetland and how that
production is organised. Such an analysis emphasises the
relationships that exist between people, individuals as well as
social groups, within such a structure.
Since this thesis concerns itself both with sociology and
history (although ultimately any barriers between disciplines
within the humanities are arbitrary), it is necessary to outline
how these are conceived. It would be a simplification but still
true to say that sociology from its foundations in the work of
Ferguson and Vico through Marx and Weber up until the present has
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been the writing of the history of human society, and as such any
true sociologist has also been a historian. For a "dialogue of
2
the deaf" there is a remarkable number of works on the
relationship between sociology and history. Too many are
concerned with the old ideographic/ nomothetic distinction, or
the polemic for more theory in history or more history in
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sociology, to be of any real value to review here. In general
there is agreement with the claims of Burke and Morris that the
most fruitful area of collaboration between the subjects is
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within the field of social history. It is here that there has
been the greatest exchange in recent years. Similarly there is
personal sympathy with the argument of Philip Abrams that good
sociology and good history are in truth attempting both to ask
and answer the same questions using the same methods, and that
they should be united:
I am not talking about the need to give historical work some
"social context", nor about the need to give sociological
work more "historical background", nor even about the
desirability of each field of work being "informed" by work
in the other. What I have in mind is a more radical
recasting...a more open and thorough-going recognition of the
extent to which in some fundamental respects the two
disciplines are trying to do the same thing and are employing
the same logic of explanation to do so.5
Abrams argues that historical sociology should be the study of
the historical processes involved in the creation (and
dissolution) of social structures. Through presenting such a
theory of structuration Abrams attempts to address the dilemma of
action and structure and as such unite the features that have
traditionally been regarded as the exclusive territory of the
historian (action) and the sociologist (structure). This
concept of historical process is a powerful one and one which is
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used in this thesis, although a particular interpretation of
process is used which is located within a marxist tradition.
Why then if there is general agreement with Abrams is the
term "sociological history" preferred to that of "historical
sociology"? In the end the difference in terminology is
personal however it is felt that there remains a distinction
between the historian and the sociologist (although any one
individual can be both). "Sociological history" conveys the
sense that the thesis is a piece of detailed historical research
that is informed by historical as well as sociological debates on
the nature of social change.
Every thesis has its own history and this one is no
exception; and the final form of the thesis is itself a product
of this history. The initial impetus for this study had two
strands, the first was the personal experience of growing up in
Shetland in the 1960's and 70's, and particularly formative was
the local and national response to the coming of the oil
industry. The second was as an undergraduate student coming
into contact with the neo-marxist theories of development, in
particular the work of Immanue.l Wallerstein. Let me take each of
these separately.
The seventies saw a rapid increase of national interest in
the Shetlands, for the islands were sinking under the weight of
television crews and journalists, not to mention social
anthropologists and sociologists. The impression they gave was
of a quaint, but rather simple people, whose traditional way of
living, which had been carved out of an inhospitable environment
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over a period of centuries, was about to be destroyed by the all-
powerful multi-national oil companies. It appeared as if the
forces of modernisation were about to claim another endangered
people in its unstoppable historical mission. The natives'
response, besides that of their natural politeness to well-
meaning but otherwise ignorant outsiders, was to hide themselves
in their own petty but populist localism. There was a great
increase in interest in local history, and numerous articles,
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pamphlets, and books were published and eagerly consumed. The
quality did not seem to matter, and little based on new research
was published in that decade. The old histories written a hundred
or more years previously were being re-hashed and churned out for
a new audience (academic work discussed below). No one could
have lived through that period and not be deeply aware of their
history, but it was a history presented in such a way that did
not bring the Shetlander closer to the rest of Britain, never
mind Scotland. Little Shetlandism ruled, and there was strong
anti-EEC and anti-Scottish devolutionist sentiment in the
islands, the concrete expression of this being the formation of
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the Shetland Movement. When it seemed that the local council
had won against the oil companies and secured the finance that
guaranteed the well-being of the future of the islands all
cheered the David and the localism was only reinforced. Those
days now appear sadly naive.
When I first came into contact with neo-marxist theories of
development I was impressed by their scope and analytical power
in explaining the historical processes of social and economic
change. The work of Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank
5
were the most influential. At that time it seemed clear that
what was required was for someone, if no one else then myself, to
write the history of Shetland's social and economic development,
based on original research and using such a theoretical
perspective. It seemed obvious that the actual problem was that
the history Shetland far from being that of isolation and
seclusion from the external world was one of the relationship
with the rest of the world. To put this in marxist terminology,
the history of Shetland is the history of its relationship with
the capitalist world economy, not the lack of such a relationship.
Once the research had begun three events brought about
substantial changes in this plan. The first was reading Hance
Smith's Ph.D. thesis, The Historical Geography of Shetland's
Trade, (Aberdeen 1969), which was both too close in content, and
in theory (even if only implicitly) to that of my own research
for mine to continue in the same vein. The second was the
discovery of a rich historical source as yet unstudied which
demanded to be used, namely the papers of the Hay family, the
single most important entrepreneurial family of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. The third was increasing disillusion
with the theoretical framework chosen, Wallerstein's world-
systems theory (as my supervisors well know). The result was
twofold; first, to concentrate the thesis in topic; the second to
take a more pragmatic theoretical position influenced by wider
debates on social change and by the historical sources
themselves. Probably the single most important influence on this
change was Hance Smith's thesis. In many ways this thesis is a
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response to his work to such an extent that this thesis tests (or
in a more Popperian sense tries to falsify) his framework for
explaining development in the Islands, in particular his analysis
of the shift from lairds to merchants in control of the economy.
Furthermore, the thesis became concentrated on the role of
entrepreneurs in Shetland society and economy in the important
transition period from the late eighteenth to the early/mid
nineteenth century, an important period not only in Shetland but
also in the creation of the modern world economy. Surprisingly
this is the least understood and researched period, Smith's work
not withstanding. With this change new interests were created
and new knowledge had to be acquired.
The fact that the original research for the thesis is
primarily based on one family has its own problems (the nature of
the sources are described below), the most important of which
is their validity as a source. Their importance cannot be
doubted, for they are the only surviving merchant papers of any
value. However by their very nature they are untypical; the Hays
were the single most important mercantile family in this period
and as such are not representative. The attempt has been to
integrate the new information from this source with that from
already used sources and with what is currently known about
Shetland, in a critical manner. In places evidence has been found
to support the "old" opinions, giving them a more solid
foundation, but it has also refuted others. This has helped the
shift from an earlier very theoretical position to the present
one, where the actual evidence has pointed the way to new
insights and new ideas. This has gone a great way to creating
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the tone and feel of the thesis, as well as giving it substance.
The desire has been to unite explanation with narrative, to
combine analysis with exposition, and any failure rests with the
author alone.
As already stated the most important influences on the
theoretical position of the thesis were neo-marxist theories of
development, in particular the dependency theory mainly
associated with Andre Gunder Frank and the world-systems theory
represented in its most developed form by Immanuel Wallerstein.
This naturally lead to an interest in more general debate over
marxist theories of change which led to a revision of the
original position.
Within post-war marxist writings on development two schools
of thought can be identified, each in opposition to the other in
what they regard as the most important dynamic in determining
social change. These can be summed up under the general
headings of "externalists" and "internalists". It is worth
remembering that the disagreements are over emphases and that the
arguments are part of a continuing debate. It is also clear
that these distinctions are possible within marxism because of
ambiguities in Marx's own writings. The debate over which side
represents the 'true Marx' is sterile and non-productive and it
is suffice to say that the "externalists" follow the argument
given in the German Ideology, and the "internalists" that of
Capital Vol. 1.
The authors most associated with the "externalist" school
8
are Sweezy, Frank, and Wallerstein. In their work the central
8
dynamic is exchange relations. So in Sweezy's and Wallerstein's
studies of the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism the
importance of the role of the growth and expansion of
international commerce in breaking down feudal barriers is
emphasised. Other important factors (and this is particularly
evident in Frank and others writing on Latin America) are the
voyages of discovery leading to the conquest and exploitation of
the New World. In short the West only developed by
underdeveloping the rest of the world. The periphery is
exploited to benefit the core; surplus is extracted from the
periphery to the core first (in historical time) through imperial
and colonial control and later through the market system.
Within Wallerstein's theory the periphery is integrated in a
world-system through the processes of exchange such that the core
extracts surplus value. It is not entirely clear by which
means the market is able to break down existing social relations
and recreate new forms that are more in tune with the needs of
the international commodity markets, besides the obvious means of
conquest.
Coming nearer home there have been several works written on
Scotland using the ' above framework. There is the immediate
problem that Scotland far from being the European equivalent of a
banana republic was in the nineteenth century one of the most
advanced industrial countries in the world and in the late
eighteenth century through the Scottish Enlightenment the creator
of the ideological framework for the new capitalist world. The
Highlands is the region of Scotland which is most open to an
"externalist" analysis, and the study most relevant to Shetland
9
is Ian Carter's "The Highlands of Scotland as an Underdeveloped
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Region" Carter uses Frank's model of underdevelopment to
explain the historical development of the Highlands, arguing that
it was due to capitalism that the Highlands are in their present
social and economic condition and not because of the lack of any
relationship with capitalism. The two great industries of the
Highlands, cattle and kelp, were commercial in character and
developed by the lairds for export to markets outwith the
Highlands. When market conditions were favourable and prices
were high these industries produced large returns for the lairds.
When prices were low, as happened to the kelp industry after the
Napoleonic wars when prices collapsed as imports of barilla
resumed, rents were increasingly paid in kind and general
indebtedness of the tenantry increased. The estates that had
depended on the production of kelp found themselves in the vice
of declining income and increasing costs. In the face of these
pressures the direct control by the lairds over the tenants was
tightened up; and socially the estates took on an increasingly
feudal character. By the mid-nineteenth century most of these
estates were bankrupt and either had been or were in the process
of being sold off. Carter concludes that this shows that the
Highlands were certainly an underdeveloped region but not an
undeveloped region.
This article highlights the strengths and weaknesses of this
form of analysis. The strength lies in emphasising the
commercial nature of societies such as the Highlands and their
connection with wider market forces. The history of the
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Highlands as that of Shetland, is not separate from the rest of
the world. The main weakness is the poor definition of
capitalism, which is seen as any production destined for exchange
in markets, and as such stresses external economic relations over
internal socio-economic relations. This means that as soon as
some production in the Highlands was for external exchange, the
Highlands became capitalist. This obscures the actual internal
structure of the Highlands. In the case of the Highlands, and
as we shall see Shetland, that there is economic success allowed
the maintenance of a system of non-capitalist landholding, that
is, the tenants did not pay a money rent and the laird lived off
that rent but where the laird relied on the direct labour of the
tenant and where the tenant was unable to pay a cash rent.
These were certainly commercial societies but they were not cash
societies. These were societies in which much of the productive
effort was geared towards external markets but they were not
organised along capitalist tenancy or on free wage labour, but on
the control of labour through the system of landholding. The
important point is that a close relationship with markets did not
lead to the introduction of capitalist landholding but to the
strengthening of a localised form of pre-capitalist landholding.
The "internalist" arguments have been mainly developed by
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Dobb, Hilton and Brenner. They through their criticisms of
the "externalists" emphasise the role of social relations and the
working out of internal contradictions within a mode of
production analysis. They have been less concerned with the
position of the periphery and more with working out a general
marxist theory of social change in particular the transition from
11
feudalism to capitalism. Within such a schema the periphery-
becomes part of a capitalist system as this expands to overcome
its own internal contradictions. The power of the internalist
critique is their emphasis on social relations and on internal
social structures in shaping development. In terms of the
periphery its applicability is less clear besides this emphasis
on social relations. The nearest discussion on the role of the
periphery is Brenner's criticism of the "externalist" tendency to
reverse causality. Here Brenner argues that instead of
dependency leading to underdevelopment it is underdevelopment
which leads to dependency. In a similar vein, Smout in his
criticisms of Wallerstein's analysis of the union between
Scotland and England argues that in at least the case of Scotland
11
dependency lei to economic development.
There is also a more serious theoretical problem with using
a mode of production analysis for social formations on the
periphery, since mode of production refers to social relations
and not to any geographical unit. Marx seems to mean different
things by the concept in different parts of his writings. For
example it is not clear if mode of production refers to: an
abstraction from actual social relations; or that it is an ideal
type of social relations that does not correspond totally with
any actual set of relations found in the real world; or, that it
is an abstraction of a set of social relations found in certain
enclaves but are those which will come to dominate social
relations in that they will expand to consume all others. These
tensions within Marx's writings are never satisfactorily
12
concluded. Althusser's and Balibar's concept of the articula¬
tion of modes of production merely compounds this problem, resul¬
ting on the one hand in an expansion of different modes of produ¬
ction [why not a Shetland mode of production?] and on the other
to questions as to how abstractions can be joined and how it i&
that capitalist social relations reproduce non-capitalist social
12
relations and vice versa.
It is clear therefore that there are great difficulties in
using either an internalist or externalist perspective to explain
the route and form of development in Shetland in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. There is certainly value in both
sides. Writing on the world-systems theory Chirot and Hall
state that:
Whether or not one agrees with all of its conclusions, it is
abundantly clear that a world-wide perspective has become the
minimal requirement for the intelligent study of social
change.13
In terms of understanding the importance of relations with the
external world, this is certainly true of the history of
Shetland. But such a study needs to be tempered by an analysis
of the historically created social relations within the Islands.
What then becomes important are the historical processes of the
interrelationship between social and economic factors which
cannot be abstracted from human action but must be studied as the
historical actions of people. In Shetland we would not expect to
find "pure" forms of any social relations (it is not clear that
there ever have been any "pure" capitalist social relations) and
there is no value in establishing false categories. The problem
as conceived by the "externalists" is the examining of the
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processes by which social formations in the periphery are created
by market forces. The problem as conceived in this thesis is
somewhat different. It is the specific historical context
within which the social organisation of production is created
that is of first importance. This is analysed within the
context of changing social and economic conditions. It is
interesting that in both Shetland and the Highlands the
relationship with the wider world economy did not lead to the
introduction of capitalist forms of landholding and production,
but to the maintenance of the older form which had long-term
consequences for the social and economic development of the
regions.
Shetland has a rich historiography, too great to be
adequately covered here. Much of this interest has been due to
the Islands "Norse" heritage and the "romantic" attraction of
wild and desolate islands far in the north. More recently there
has been a significant development in this historiography, a
number of Ph.Ds theses have been completed on the history of the
Islands. These are solidly based on research and have added
immensely to our knowledge of the history of Shetland. Several
have been important to this study, in providing details and
background knowledge and pointing to the important areas of
debate and dispute. These are (to take them in chronological
order of publication or award): Hance Smith, Alistair Goodlad,
Jonathan Wills, and Frances Shaw. Of these only Frances Shaw's
was done in a history department, all the rest are historical
geography theses.
Hance Smith's The Historical Geography of Shetland's Trade
14
(Aberdeen 1969) is the most important and is dealt with in
greater detail below. This thesis was until the publication of
his most recent work, Shetland Life and Trade. 1550-1914, the
most important economic history of Shetland, and provided the
background knowledge for those that followed it. Alistair
Goodlad's thesis was published as The Shetland Fishing Saga
(Lerwick 1971) and is a detailed history of the main fishing
industries, with a recognition of the relationship between the
fishing and social factors. This thesis through the use of new
sources adds to our knowledge of the development of these
fisheries, although the present author does not pretend to have
the intimate knowledge of Shetland fishing possessed by Goodlad.
Jonathan Wills' thesis Of Laird and Tenant (Edinburgh 1975), is a
study of one of the main landed families, the Mouats of Garth,
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Through
the excellent use of their family papers Wills has added greatly
to the social history of Shetland and has been an obvious
influence on this thesis. Francis Shaw's thesis was published
as The Northern and Western Isles of Scotland: their Economy and
Society in the Seventeenth century (Edinburgh 1980), and as its
title states is work of comparative history. What is most
revealing in this study is the relatively high level of economic
activity and commercial sophistication of Shetland compared to
the Western Isles; and that this was based on the Islands'
relationship to Europe not with Scotland (or England). Mention
must also be made of the work of Brian Smith both as author of
several excellent articles and as local archivist who has done
15
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much to aid all those who have studied the history of Shetland.
These have provided a firm base for this thesis.
Of all of those writing on and about the history of Shetland
Hance Smith is by far the most important and his works require
more detailed examination than given above. This is especially
true since his works are nearest in interest to the concerns of
this thesis; and he has developed his ideas and writings over a
period of some fifteen years in both academic and popular forms.
In particular his most recent work, Shetland Life and Trade 1550-
1914 (1984) was greeted as a significant work. Brian Smith, in
his review called it:
...the most important work on the economic and social history
of Shetland yet written...Hance Smith's book is...unsurpassed
and well-nigh unsurpassable.15
Anyone who wishes seriously to discuss the history of Shetland
must address the issues raised both in this book and within
Smith's work as a whole. The following attempts to get at the
heart of understanding the historical processes at work in the
social and economic change of Shetland through criticisms of
parts of Hance Smith's work. This is not to show that his work
is poor or weak, on the contrary it is by far the best yet
written on Shetland and is likely to remain so. Rather, it is an
attempt to address the problems which require greater study and
treatment then they have received as yet. To quote Baechler:
...the critique of an already established thought is the most
convenient way to arrive at a new statement of the
problems.16
16
This analysis concentrates on Smith's three main works: his
Ph.D. thesis, The Historical Geography of Shetland's Trade. 1550-
1914 (Aberdeen 1969); the popular version of this is The Making
of Modern Shetland (1977) (first published as a series of
articles in the New Shetlander in 1974); and the recent Shetland
Life and Trade. These all have a similar structure and follow
a similar argument, although the structure and content have
improved. The thesis established the original format to which
he has been faithful, perhaps too faithful. The 1977 work set
this out in a popular* form for a non academic audience, and has
the benefit of making his argument and theoretical position more
concise and clearer than in the thesis. The 1984 work
established Smith as the single most important writer on the
history of Shetland, and shows that his work has matured, as the
work of any good academic should.
There aire important areas of agreement between the position
of this thesis and Smith's opus (see above for personal
statement). This includes the necessity of understanding the
important role of the world economy in the formation of
Shetland's history. Rather than Shetland being isolated from
the rest of the world by the North Sea, the sea was the means of
contact with the rest of the world, not a barrier:
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To the Shetlanders themselves living in the islands or
looking back to the Old Rock, the sea was more of a bridge, a
link to the world beyond, the world of ships, distant ports,
seamen, trade, politics and war. The sea was all around and
its imagery ran deep, as a provider and a highway, and as a
foundation of Shetland life itself. It is thus important to
appreciate that Shetland was and remains in reality far from
remote in the context of things British and European...The
rapid cultural development of Europe and Britain, and the
political turbulence associated with it, was ever in front of
the Shetlanders, generally on the doorstep in the form of
pirates, privateers and straightforward naval warfare, as well
as in the numerous personal and trade contacts.17
To the Shetlanders, as to the Greeks and the Norse before them
the sea is a highway to the world. To understand Shetland, its
history and its present situation, then, the important factor is
this history of the relationship with the capitalist world
economy, not the lack of such a relationship. Smith's work
takes such a form, although not as self-consciously stated as
this.
The structure and organisation of his work has remained the
same over the fifteen years. Shetland's history up to 1914 is
divided into three periods, within which a distinct social group
controlled the trade the economy of the Islands, and these are:
(1) 1550-1710 when itinerant German merchants dominated.
(2) 1710-1790 when local lairds controlled.
(3) 1790-1914 when local merchants took over from the lairds.
Smith's concern is with the historical development of Shetland's
economy, which mainly takes the form of the history of the
penetration of the market into the islands. This is viewed as
leading to material (and social) improvement for the population.
In each distinct period there is a distinct group of
"innovators" who control the economy. Smith is well aware that
this is a "whiggish" analysis:
18
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...the primary focus is upon the preoqupation of succesive
groups with material betterment, which is an important
distinguishing feature of the modern European period, and
which may even have something to do with the characterisation
of the thrust of my research preceding this book as
constituting a "Whig interpretation of history"! 18
He makes no attempt to refute this claim, indeed he seems quite
happy with the label. The various works mentioned above are
littered with "whiggish" statements; the history of Shetland is a
history of "progress", of "enterprise", of "innovators", even of
invisible "forces promoting development". The main problem with
the "whiggish interpretation of history" as identified by
Butterfield is that it "emphasise(s) certain principles of
19
progress" , and that in individual studies:
The party that is more analogous to the present is taken to
be more similar, more modern than close examination would
justify. 20
We shall see that Smith does exactly this when discussing the
transition from lairds to merchants. Furthermore this is placed
within an evolutionary theory of progress where development is
cumulative.
This can clearly be seen in his discussion of the shift of
control from the lairds controlling the economy through their
holding of land, to merchants based in the town of Lerwick.
The date given for this shift is 1790, although there had been
growing mercantile influence since the 1760's and the lairds
continued to be important afterwards. To put it in Smith's own
words:
By 1790, the spotlight was shifting away from the haaf
stations towards the Lerwick lodberries as economic and
social "progress" continued. 21
19
This economic progress is seen as economic innovation moving from
the lairds, who had in the eighteenth century established "a
22
solid foundation for Shetland's economy", to the Lerwick
merchants. These merchants are viewed as a distinct social
group and are referred to as capitalists, although it seems that
Smith is using this to mean men of capital rather than in any
strict marxist sense. The merchants built on the foundations
left by the lairds who were no longer able to develop the economy
due to their economic conservatism and lavish lifestyles. The
merchants are what Smith terms "the forces promoting continued
23
development", which were "stronger than the very considerable
24
ones tending towards the collapse of the economy". The
reasons why this shift was necessary are spelt out in detail:
Contemplation of further expansion and improvement, such as
the scheme for supplying men to the Greenland fleet, and
agricultural improvement, required further division of effort
- in short the rise of the merchant class, first alongside,
then supplanting the landlords in Trade. The position has
been perhaps most succiqtly put by Rostow, discussing the
ideas of their great contemporary, Adam Smith: "At the core
of the Wealth of Nations...is Adam Smith's perception that
surplus income derived from the ownership of land must,
somehow, be transferred out of the hands of those who would
sterilise it in the prodigal living, into the hands of the
productive men who will invest it in the modern sector, and
then regularly plough back their profits as output and
productivity rise". By 1790, accompanied by considerable
friction between landowners and merchants, this was just
beginning to happen in Shetland trade. 25
There are several problems with this distinction between
merchants and lairds. There is the immediate problem that he
presents them as being too clear cut and he qualifies his
statements by recognising that many merchants were land owners in
their own right and that several of the lairds remained
"innovating" within the local economy. For example, the "few
20
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members of the old landowning families" that Smith regards as
still being economically active: the Mouats of Garth, the Bruces
of Symbister, and the Bruces of Sumburgh, collectively owned over
27
a quarter of the land in Shetland. Certainly Mouat and Bruce
of Symbister were among the most important lairds in terms of the
haaf fishing as well as the herring fishery. More important than
this is that the merchants are forced to play a social and
historical role beyond that which they actually did or indeed
that they were capable of doing. The merchants are "A New Class
of Men" and Shetland was now under "The Rule of the
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Capitalists". This attempt to give the Lerwick merchants a
historical mission on a par with the industrial bourgeoisie just
does not hold. They are presented as agents of modernisation in
conflict with the lairds yet only one example of this conflict is
given (discussed in greater detail in chpt. 4). In a similar
vein Wills could claim that "the history of the nineteenth
century struggle between merchants and lairds is yet to be
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written" , and he was studying one of the most important landed
families in Shetland at the time of all this class conflict. If
anyone could find the evidence for the struggle surely it would
have been him. There is the crucial problem of explaining the
social regression of the mid-nineteenth century. When the Truck
Commission came to examine the Islands in 1871 what they
discovered was a social system hardly changed from that of a
hundred years previously, the only difference being that this was
organised by the so-called "merchants" as well as the lairds.
There is general agreement that there were changes in the
personel that operated certain aspects of the Shetland economy.
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There was a shift in the control in the external trade of the
Islands from the uairds to a group that can be called merchants
(and would be recognised as such by contemporaries). Also that
the traders based in Lerwick did come to play a greater role in a
whole range of commercial activities, that is accepted. The
ly
area open for arguement is, what does this actual^mean for the
historical development of Shetland? Or to put it in even simpler
terms what did it mean for the Shetland tenant?
The problem is one of forcing people into categories when
what is important is to study the processes at work. Such that
the relationship between theoretical analysis and the social
world are reversed; instead of the theory helping us to
understand and organise the complexity of social life it obscures
matters by predicting relationships that do not necessarily
exist. Such that if the merchants are the new modernising
capitalist class and the lairds are an old, worn out, class no
longer able to provide the new ideas required. And since trade
is the dynamic aspect of the Shetland economy than there must be
conflict over the control of trade. However, it is clear that it
was not merchants that were innovative but that it was certain
merchants, to quote Smith once more:
The key to understanding the period is an appreciation of the
dominating influence gained by a handful of men among the
merchants. 30
And of these "Head and shoulders above them all was William
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Hay" It was a few individuals who played the important role
that Smith has given to a social group. Just as in the early
decades of the eighteenth century it was a small number of
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innovators, again mainly with mercantile backgrounds, thus
suggesting a greater continuity in Shetland's^ It is more
important to study the social conditions within which new
developments are able to take place.
For placing such central importance on enterprise it is
surprising that Smith does not discuss it in relation to
Shetland. There are of course many difficulties in adequately
discussing enterprise and the nature of entrepreneurial activity,
not the very least of which is the sheer scope of the literature
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and the technical problem of defining entrepreneurship. The
old thordoxy that enterpreneurial talent was the prerogative of
one social class (the industrial capitalists) has come under
increasing attack. It is now clear that enterprise and
innovation was shown by members of all classes, by landowners as
33
well as the new industrialists. Some anthropological studies
have emphasised the social context for understanding the nature
of entreprenerial activity, and that entrepreneurs are in a
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constant state of "negotiation" with this social environment.
This again highlights the processual nature of human action, and
suggests that linear models of economic development do not hold.
One of the problems arising from studies of entrepreneurs is that
they concentrate on success and the successful, whereas in
reality most are at best only partially successful and then for
only some of the time. Failure is as much a part of the history
of entrepreneurship as success. Baechler in his discussion of
the origins of the entrepreneur argues that this occurred when
35
the merchant first entered the sphere of production. This
holds true for Shetland, for it was when the Hays began their
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attempts to introduce new forms and areas of production that the
economy expanded, but this was in a complex social and economic
context. When new developments occurred many of the lairds were
equally as active as any "merchant".
Towards the end of Shetland Life and Trade Smith suggests
that economic development should be seen as a social history:
Probably Shetland's economic development should be seen as
part of social change, rather than the other way around, so
that each distinctive social period had characteristic
economic attributes and impact upon land and sea. The
reason for this is the clear influence of enterprise in
guiding development.[emphasis mine] 36
At the beginning of the work he had stated that it was not a
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"social or structural history", and if he had taken this stance
his final argument would have been much closer to that in this
thesis, for by taking external economic relations as the most
important factor in development he has missed the crucial social
factors. To Smith then the history of the economic and social
development of Shetland is one of enterprise and progress where
the economic initiative shifts from one social group (class?) to
another. When the social and economic developments possible by
one group have been exhausted, a new, more dynamic, class of
innovators are required.
It has been argued that the existing interpretations of the
history of Shetland do not adequately explain the social and
economic development of the Islands in the eighteenth and
nineteenth century. It is also the case that the main marxist
theories of development are flawed when it comes to discussing
the development of the periphery. The tendency has been to
neglect both social processes and internal social relations.
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Smith's emphasis on the central role of Shetland's external trade
has placed those that organise trade as the innovators in the
economy, and he has placed this within an evolutionary model of
progress. The conclusion can be drawn that what is required is
a detailed historical study that emphasises the complex
relationship between social and economic factors. Working
within a marxist materialist tradition such a study must begin
with the structure and organisation of production. Then it must
emphasise the processual nature of historical change, for it does
not take a linear route but is contingent and is the product of
many forces. Being a work of history it lets the sources
indicate the questions to be asked and the structure as much as
any pre-ordained theory.
The concerns of this thesis are therefore rather
straightforward: firstly, to show that the existing explanations
for the history of Shetland in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries are seriously limited. This is done by examining
Hance Smith's argument for the shift in economic and social
control of the Islands from the "Lairds" to "Merchants" and that
this was a necessary part of an evolutionary development of
social and economic progress. This has been done by analysing
changes in the social and economic structure of Shetland over
this period. The thesis argues for a more complex explanation
which emphasises the relationship between internal social factors
in particular the social organisation of production and wider
economic factors. The emphasis on production reveals that the
areas of conflict were not in trade but over the control of
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tenants' labour, that is in the sphere of production. The role of
enterprise in the economic and social development is examined
through the detailed study of the fortune of the Hay family, which
highlights the complex and contingent nature of change in
Shetland. Finally it is concluded that the social and economic
history of eighteenth and nineteenth century Shetland is not one
of progress and enterprise, but of the failure of progress and
enterprise. It is not the history of the victory of the
"merchants" over the lairds but of the failure of the "merchants"
to create a new society.
The structure of the thesis is:
Chapters 2, and 3, an outline the establishment and structure of
the form of social organisation in Shetland, the "Zetland
Method", and the form of production that it was based on, the
haaf fishing, in the eighteenth century. Chapter 4 shows the
crisis in the Shetland economy and society towards the end of the
eighteenth century, a crisis which saw a restructuring of the
organisation of the external trade and commerce of the Islands.
Chapter 5 deals with the developments in trade and the growth in
wealth and power of the Hays from the 1770's to the 1820's.
Chapter 6 is on the Greenland Whaling, important for the growth
of a cash economy and an area of dispute between the agents and
the lairds since it undermined the laird's control of his
tenants.
W
Chapter 7 covers the establisment of the Herring fishery in
Shetland, for the 1820's and 30's saw a dramatic rise in the
production of cured herrings, independent of the Scottish
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fishery. It was a remarkable period of economic growth, only to
collapse in the late 1830's and early 1840's, bankrupting the
Hays in the process and ending a period of indigenously generated
growth.
Chapter 8 deals with the cod fishery. Developed at the same time
as the herring it remained secondary until the collapse of the
herring. In the 1850*s and 1860's it was an important fishery
organised on the semi-capitalist half-catch system. These
chapters show what developments there were in Shetland and the
critical role played by the Hay family in their establishment,
but also how limited they were in their long term effects.
Chapter 9 deals with the changes of the social organisation of
Shetland in the mid and late nineteenth century. After the great
developments of the 1820's and 30's the collapse of the Shetland
Bank and Hay & Ogilvy in 1842 the old system was restructured
(although it had never been completely ended) around an unholy
alliance of merchant (sic) and laird as described in the Truck
Commission report of 1872. It was not until near the end of the
century that the old bonds were finally broken by a combination
of the second coming of the herring fishery (this time under the
control of Scottish curers) and the Napier Commission.
Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 10.
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POSTSCRIPT
A NOTE ON SOURCES
Most of the original research for this thesis has been based
on the family records of the Hay family, who were the most
important mercantile/ entrepreneurial family in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Since the content of these papers has
been crucial in the structure and content of the thesis, then it
is necessary to say a little about them, their strengths and
weaknesses as a historical source. Much of their importance is
due to the fact that the main body of the papers has never been
systematically studied, and virtually the only exception has
been for details on the Shetland Bank. There are four separate
collections which make up the Hay family papers divided between
Edinburgh and Shetland.
At the National Library of Scotland there is the Hay of
Hayfield manuscripts (acc. 3250), a large collection mainly
covering the period 1760-1860, and consisting of commercial,
legal, and family papers of three generations of the Hays. At
present there is not an index, only an inventory to the
collection, in a somewhat variable internal order by chronology
and subject. This makes clear referencing difficult. To
overcome this, when referenced the box and file numbers are given
along with the date of correspondence, account etc., and further
detail which is required to give as clear a reference as
possible. It is a large collection consisting of some 118 boxes
and 180 "other items", covering all aspects of the Hays* business
and family life, but concentrating on their commercial
activities. This is the single most important collection on the
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Shetland economy from 1770 to 1820's.
In the Shetland Archives (SA) in Lerwick there are three
different collections concerning the Hays. Two of these are
well known, although one has been neglected in previous studies.
The third has never been used. The Hay of Laxfirth manuscripts
(SA D4) are a small collection of a few boxes well used. The
Hay & Co. papers (NRA 0650), although mainly cover the history
ft
of the company from its formation in 1844, does contain much
valuable material on the earlier period, in particular on the
whaling industry. J.R. Nicolson based his recent book on the
history of Hay & Co. on these. At the time that I used them
they were still walled up at the offices of Hay & Co. in Lerwick.
Luckily (for any future researcher) they are now in the Shetland
archives.
The most important source in Shetland was more of the Hay of
Hayfield collection, originally destined for the National
Library. They never quite made it. There are 36 boxes of
material in no order, much of it in poor condition, and it has
never been studied. This fills many of the gaps in the
collection in Edinburgh. Where referenced, the date and as much
details as possible have been given. However since much of the
thesis has been collated from several of the collections i.e.
fish prices, it would be prohibitive to give full referencing as
this would require a separate volume in itself. Much of the
detail on the Hays has come from this "distillation" of the
material, sometimes several hundreds of letters or accounts have
led to only one paragraph or point.
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Taken together, these collections, especially the two Hay of
Hayfield collections, represent the finest sources on the history
of Shetland at a critical time in its history. Much has been
claimed for this period, but only through these documents does it
become clear what actually occurred at that time. Without using
these sources every previous study has been greatly weakened,
although the sheer size and scope and state of disorganisation
means that they require a thesis in themselves. There is one
further problem in these documents; they have very little on Hay
& Ogilvy. Hay & Ogilvy was the largest mercantile concern in
Shetland from the 1820's until their bankruptcy in 1842, and they
led all the economic advances of the period and had a near
monopoly on trade, operated the Shetland Bank, and were the main
agents for the Greenland whalers. When they went bankrupt
almost all of the records of the firm were sent to the interim
factor in Edinburgh. This is a great loss to the history of the "
islands, and to the thesis. It can only be hoped that they have
not been destroyed and await discovery, and that in the future a
thesis will be based on them. The result of this has been
further to concentrate the thesis on the period 1770 to 1820, and
to concentrate on James Hay over that of William. Every attempt
has been made to overcome this defect. However all history must
be written within the confines of the sources, all history can
only be partial, and all history hopes to add to our knowledge
which will never be complete. With these sources, mainly
business records, a great deal has been attempted perhaps too
much. It tries to be a social, economic, and business history all
in one; it attempts to unite theory, analysis, and description
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within the narrative. The failings are the author's alone.
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THE HAY FAMILY
Although this thesis is concerned with more general aspects
of the history of Shetland it is both necessary and worthwhile to
give a short "potted history" of the Hay family. This is not
only because the main sources used are their family records but
also for their importance in the period of study. The following
concentrates on the main figure in each of the three generations:
William, James, and William Hay. The Hays were in many ways a
typical middle class mercantile family of the time, in terms of
business organisation, education, employment (for those outside
the business), and marriage patterns. An alternative thesis
could have been based around these aspects of their history.
WILLIAM HAY: 1723-1804
The first mention of the Hay family in Shetland is in the
early eighteenth century, when two brothers were ministers in the
north isles. These were Thomas Hay, minister for Mid and South
Yell (1717 to 1745), and John Hay, minister of Unst (1720 to ?).
In 1737 two of their nephews, William and Thomas Hay came to
Shetland. This is in a long tradition of Scots coming to
Shetland first as ministers then other members of their family
following. The boy's father (brother of the two ministers),
James Hay, had been a farmer in Netherinch near Kilsyth, he died
in 1726. Their mother remarried and the two boys had a
"Dickensian" relationship with their step-father. On William
reaching the age of fourteen they left (The contract of marriage
had stipulated that the boys had to be educated until fourteen).
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William went to stay with his uncle Thomas in Yell.
His uncle's position allowed William to enter into Shetland
society and he was soon involved in mercantile activities in mid-
Yell. Then in 1743, again helped by his uncle, he received the
tack some land in Turhoull (Unst). He was to spend most of the
rest of his life as a tacksman and general merchant and trader,
and as such was typical of many of the middle rank in eighteenth
century Shetland, although William perhaps was a bit more
ambitious than most, a character trait that his son was to share.
After Turhoull he had the tack of pant of the Windhouse estate in
north and mid-Yell, 1751 to 1754, followed by the tack of West-
sandwick (Yell), 1754 to 1761. Then he had the tack of Nicolson
of Lochend's lands in Papa Stour, 1761 to 1774/5 after which he
returned to Westsandwick where he died in i.804.
In Shetland in the eighteenth century for a tacksman to pay
his duties to the laird required him to be involved in all
aspects of fish curing and trade. The rents rarely covered the
amount of the tack, and the tenants paid their rents in produce;
fish, fish oil, and butter. It was through the trading in these
and the other produce of the islands that the tacksman made his
money; in this Hay was no different from any other. We know
that in the 1750's William Hay was dealing directly with Hamburg,
even going there himself, and in the 1760's with William Bruce
dealing with London merchants. But Hay was more ambitious than
to carry on in this manner. While in Papa Stour he was
interested in developing the linen'industry to the extent of
apprenticing his son to the trade (see chpt.4). Also while in
Papa the inherent problem of the tacksman system became apparent;
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the only way to make any money was to squeeze the tenantry for
all their worth. This reached such a point in Papa Stour that
the tenants went to Nicolson to have Hay removed. Hay left in
fear of his life, accusing the tenants of attempting to murder
him.
In 1748, William married Margaret Neven, daughter of Charles
Neven of Windhouse, bringing Hay into the social world of the
Shetland gentry. He however had a stormy relationship with his
in-laws, and brought proceedings against the estate on the death
of his wife's father. Through the marriage the Hay family first
became connected with the Ogilvys. Charlotte Neven, Margaret's
sister married Thomas Ogilvy. For the next two generations the
families were to be connected in business.
JAMES HAY: 1750-1831
James Hay is probably the single most important figure in
the history of the economic development of Shetland in the period
of study, his importance being not so much what he actually
achieved, which was much, but in what he attempted to achieve,
and the foundations that he laid for his son, William, to build
on. Much of the content of this thesis is concerned with the
economic activities of James, and do not need to be elaborated
here, but a general outline will set the context for the later
content. James was determined and obstinate in character, common
enough in Shetland, but he also suffered throughout the most of
his life from a mental disorder, "my disease", as he refered to
it. At times in his life this would almost cripple him
preventing him from running his business concerns, and was often
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brought on by commercial failures.
The early career of James did not take the form of his
father. Instead of becoming a petty tacksman, James, on
completion of his education, was apprenticed to the linen trade.
On his return to Shetland he managed the ill-fated linen works at
Catfirth, which failed in 1777. After this he turned to
mercantile activities, basing himself in Lerwick. While at
Catfirth he had been involved in trade to a small scale, and now
turned to it with a vengeance. He soon became the single largest
buyer of fish in the islands, buying not only on orders from
southern merchant houses, but also on his own behalf. He was
also an important smuggler, a highly profitable if risky
activity. Within a few years he was in a position to invest his
wealth in an attempt to establish a herring fishery in the
islands. It was at this point that he came into greatest
conflict with the social system created by the lairds. James
was a vocal opponent of the Zetland Method, and never gave up the
attempt to establish both a herring and cod fishery that would
break the monopoly of the lairds.
After the failure of this he returned to smuggling and the
fish trade, investing his money first in property in Lerwick,
then land, and also ships. His health was never too good, and
from 1804 he was increasingly helped by his eldest son William.
It is safe to say that from the 1780's onwards he was the most
innovative figure in the Shetland economy; his experiments made
the developments of the 1820's and 1830's possible. Besides
William it is worth mentioning another two of James' sons, Andrew
and James. Andrew after being in a Liverpool merchant house
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which failed, became an important merchant in Singapore,
returning to Shetland towards the end of his life. James was
involved in the timber trade in New Brunswick, and later a
merchant in New York.
WILLIAM HAY:1787-1858
William is perhaps the best known of the Hays, mainly
because of his involvement in Hay & Ogilvy, and its successor Hay
& Co. (is still an important company in the Islands today). He
benefited from the wealth accumulated by his father, which
enabled him to be well educated and enter Shetland society on a
more equal footing to the lairds. Indeed he was to become an
important landowner in his own right. He was educated at Kings
College Aberdeen, followed by a mercantile apprenticship in Hull,
before returning home to aid his father.
William, first in partnership with his father then on his
own account, built up the family fortune. There were
significant developments in the herring and cod fisheries, and in
the supplying of labour for the Greenland whaling industry, but
the greatest achievements was in the establishment of the
Shetland Bank (1820) and with the same partners the forming of
Hay & Ogilvy (1821). This placed the Hay family at the centre
of the economic developments of the 1820's and 1830's, the
company being the single largest operator of ships in both
fisheries, and curers, and having a near monopoly of the trade of
the islands.
The personal fortune of the family grew from this successful
economic activity. There was substantial investments in land;
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the creation of an estate at Laxfirth (Tingwall), with the laying
out of a farm and general encouragement of farming techniques
among the tenants. William due to his social and economic
standing was member of all the important political and social
committees, his name alongside that of the most important of the
lairds. William did not have the same intensity of dislike of
the Zetland Method which possessed his father, and he was willing
and able to carry on his business activities within the social
environment that existed in Shetland. It is possible that this
was due to William never actually wishing to be a businessman,
but he was forced into it by the conventions of the time.
William was close to his father, and James, as a carparent
wished his sons to be established in mercantile careers.
When Hay & Ogilvy went bankrupt in 1842, William had to
struggle to regain the family's social and economic position.
It embittered him against Charles Ogilvy, whom he blamed for the
company's misfortune. But working through the name of his son
Charles (William was a bankrupt and could not use his own name in
business), and with substantial help from family and friends (not
all given willingly) much of the property was bought back and the
firm of Hay & Co. established. This was not to be the
innovative company which^its predecessor had been.
Over the generations the Hay family had become linked with
several other important families in Shetland through marriage.
The original William Hay had married into the Neven of Windhouse
family. There were also close connections with the Umphrey
family; James Hay married Ann Umphrey, and William's daughter
married Andrew Umphrey. William's sister married Arthur Gifford
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of Busta, and the Hays had a close relationship with the
Giffords. The most important connection was with the Ogilvy
family; there had been links from the day of the first William
Hay, which were cemented with the marriage of the second William
to Margaret Ogilvy in 1811. The partners of the Shetland Bank
and of Hay & Ogilvy were her father, Charles snr., two brothers,
John and Charles jnr.
The social background and social relationships that the Hays
were involved in were typical of a mercantile family of their
social standing. Similarly their economic activity was typical
of a general merchant's business, although the range was greater
than was usual. Where they are untypical is in the degree that
they influenced the life and history of one community. If the
terms "enterprise" or "innovative" mean anything then they must
apply to the Hays during this period.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ZETLAND METHOD: THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF
SHETLAND SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Cod, ling and torsk furnish cargoes to ...
adventurers. I wish I could speak with the
same satisfaction of this as of the free
fishing of the herring; but in these distant
islands the hand of oppression reigns
uncontrolled. The poor vassals, (in defiance
of laws still kept in bondage) are compelled
to slave, and hazard their lives in the
capture to deliver their fish to their lords
for a trifling sum, who sell them to
adventurers from different parts of a high
price.1
Your Committee think themselves bound to
observe, that no particular Reflection can, in
their Opinion, justly be cast upon the Land
Owners of Shetland; as from every Thing that
has appeared to your Committee, their conduct
towards their Fishers and Tenants in such as
naturally arises from the actual State of the
Islands, and is probably such as their present
Situation who ever had the property, would
unavoidably require.2
In the late eighteenth century the Shetland landlords,
convinced by their own re-writing and re-interpretation of
Shetland's history, argued that the relationship between
themselves and their tenants was a natural one, a relationship
which had organically risen from the necessary requirements of
living in an isolated group of islands. At the centre of their
argument was the mutual dependence between laird and tenant. A
sceptic may say that this was a desperate attempt to rationalise
the social organisation of production at a time when it was
coming under extensive criticism (dealt with in chpt.4 below).
Such an explanation takes no account of the history of the
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establishment and development of the "Zetland Method", as a
social system, around which the whole of Shetland society was
based. This shows at what an early stage in the modern history
of Shetland (and of the modern world economy) its social
organisation was geared to production for external markets, that
it was effectively following a Ricardian policy of comparative
advantage. This chapter sets out to clarify the historical
background to the introduction of the system of "Fishing
Tenures", and their development in the eighteenth century. To
do this it will be necessary to go back before the eighteenth
century, in particular to deal with the important role played by
German merchants in Shetland's historical development. Before
this a description of the general nature of the "Zetland
Method", and an explanation of the importance of landholding in
Shetland will help to clarify the later discussion.
THE ZETLAND METHOD
The method of social organisation of Shetland was that of
"Fishing Tenures", a system of land holding in which the tenant
fished for his laird. This was more than rent being paid in
produce (part of rents were paid in produce but as we shall see
below, this was for particular forms of taxes), for the rent was
not equated with a certain amount of a particular product.
Rents were given monetary values as were the fish caught by the
tenant, and it was these values that were related. The desire
was not for rents to be paid in money, since the laird made
fishing a compulsory part of the leasing of land and could have
set an "economic" money rent (although we shall see that this is
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a meaningless term as far as Shetland was concerned and given the
economic position of the Islands a financial impossibility), but
for the laird to involve himself in the trading of the fish,
since it was in the trading of the fish that the laird made his
money.
The actual operation of the system was quite straight
forward, at least in the abstract. The tenant had to give to
his laird the product of his summer fishing. For this he was
credited a nominal sum for each fish. This was not a market
price, or even a mutually agreed price, but one set by
"tradition". It was a set figure that had been used for a long
period of time, and it had the authority of history. This was
nominal in as much the tenant/fisher did not actually receive
this figure but it was entered into his account with his laird.
Against these credits were debited the various advances made by
the laird to the tenant. For the fishing these included the
cost of the boat (shared between the crew of four or six men),
the lines, hooks etc. Also included were the advances of food
for the tenant's family; at this time holdings were too small to
produce enough to feed the family for the whole year. At the
end of the season the ledgers were balanced, the traditional date
for settling all debts, payment of rents etc., being Martinmas
(11th of November). Since much of the tenant's debt was in
relatively expensive capital goods, the boat and all its gear,
this could take many years to pay off. This was certainly a
relationship of interdependence but not one between equals. The
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laird relied on the produce of his tenants and the tenant on the
credits and advances of the laird. The power and authority of
the laird came from his ownership of land; from the possession
of land, all social, economic and political power flowed.
This system had, like all systems, an internal logic. In
this case it was for the lairds to increase the number of
tenants. Since the source of wealth for the laird was the
product of the tenant's labour, it was in the laird's interest to
increase that product as much as possible. Given the economic
and technological limitations of this form of production
(discussed in the next chapter), the only way to increase the
amount of product was by increasing the number of tenants.
Since Shetland had never had the clan system, there was no basis
for emotional ties to the laird based on kinship (real or
imaginary) and the best way to make sure that the tenants would
continue to fish was for them to be tied to the laird through
debt, debt which had to paid off in products. The laird was
willing to extend credit and advances. This, plus the
ecological factors of poor harvests and low catches, relentlessly
drove the tenant into a position of debt-bondage. The barrier to
this was the amount of land available, which was restricted by
both physical limitation of being an island and the general poor
quality of agricultural land (most land was of hill land fit only
for grazing animals). In time, with a rising population, this
led to the sub-division of existing holdings, making them smaller
and therefore more marginal for the production of food for the
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increasing population. At the beginning of the eighteenth
century this potential "Malthusian crisis" was either not
recognised or was deliberately rejected.
This form of social organisation could only work in a rural
society where the peasantry required land and there were no
alternatives open to them. This was the case in Shetland.
Until the late eighteenth century there were few alternative
sources of employment, and those were of a restricted and limited
nature such as the Royal Navy in time of war. There was no
urban centre of any size; Lerwick was little more than a small
village. Nor was there any manufacturing in the Islands; there
was an unsuccessful attempt to establish a linen industry in the
1770's. Neither did emigration appear to be common (there are
records of only one large emigration, when some 200-300 left in
3
1774 ), either because of emotional ties or due to the active
discouragement of the lairds, who could use the local courts to
prevent a tenant who was in debt from leaving. All the
Shetland lairds enforced the system, showing at least one area of
unity (it was not until the 1780's that the first laird "freed"
his tenants). In the end it needs to be recognised that
Shetlanders were farmers first and foremost, that their desire
was for land, and that they lived in a rural society where an
individual's social position came from their relationship to
land. The lairds' monopoly on the supply of land gave them a
source of power over the people. Shetland was therefore a
landed society with a social structure based on the ownership of
land, a localised society that operated within the wider landed
46
society of Scotland/Britain where power and privilege was in the
hands of the "Landed Interest". Land was at the centre of these
societies. Therefore some discussion of the peculiarities of
land holding and organisation is required, since this will make
the later elaboration of the establishment and development of the
"Zetland Method" somewhat clearer.
LAND IN SHETLAND SOCIETY
There is only room here to give an outline of Shetland's
complex history of landholding. Where this is seen as being
more relevant for understanding the form that the Shetland
society was to take in the eighteenth century, this has been
elaborated. The distinctiveness of Shetland landholding comes
from the relationship between its two great historical
influences, Scandinavia and Scotland. A further complication is
that of the "Crown Estate", which held the privileges of both the
Scandinavian and Scottish crowns concerning the collecting of
taxes, and was one of the largest estates in the Islands, giving
it great social and economic importance.
Shetland was under Scandinavian rule until 1469 and under
Norwegian law until 1611. The Norse form of landholding was
called udal, originally a form of freehold. Those who held
their land under this system were called udallers. Although
they were freeholders they had to pay a series of taxes to the
crown, in particular scat a form of land tax similar to cess.
This was paid in produce: butter, fish oil, and wadmel (a rough
cloth), at fixed rates, based on traditional weights. The udal
inheritance was different from the Scottish primogeniture system.
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The land and moveable possessions, was divided between all the
children, female as well as male, although not in equal shares.
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries these
udallers came under increasing social and economic pressures, and
were forced to become tenants to landlords, losing their tra¬
ditional rights as freeholders. For a number of reasons they
lost their freedom, the most significant of these being
increasing indebtedness. Their method of passing on land led
to greater pressure on land resources and the probable decline in
the average size of holdings. However, without accurate details
on population and farm sizes this must remain somewhat
speculative. We are on firmer ground concerning the general
rise in the burden of taxes imposed upon the Islanders. There
was the introduction of new taxes. Cess was introduced at the
end of the sixteenth century, meaning that the Shetlanders paid
4
two land taxes on the same land. The weights in which the
taxes were paid were increased. This was the lispund which was
originally 12 pounds. During the reign of the Stewarts this was
increased, and continued to do so even after Patrick Stewart's
5
execution in 1611: by 1659 it was 28 pounds. These factors
combined with fines, the arbitrary imposition of new payments,
and the often ruthless seizing of land, made the position of the
udallers increasingly marginal. It has been argued by some,
that by the late seventeenth century, the udallers as a distinct
6
social group had virtually died out and they had become tenants.
Although in some areas it does seem that a few survived as free¬
holders, even in the nineteenth century there were a number of
petty lairds, owning a few acres, who possibly could trace their
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ownership of the land to an udal holding several centuries
earlier. Therefore the basic social structure of tenant and
laird had been created by this time.
There is a distinction between udal tenure and udal land.
It was the former that declined; the latter term continued to be
used. Most of the land in Shetland was termed udal, even up to
the nineteenth century. This merely referred to its historical
origins and not to its legal form of tenancy.
With the increasing influence of Scotland after 1469,
Shetland society took on more and more of the characteristics of
Scottish landed society, which included the feudal form of
landholding. This refers to the legal definition of feudal
landholding, the payment of feu duties, and not to any specific
social relations i.e. it referred to Feuferme and not to
Wardholding. In 1592, Earl Patrick Stewart had attempted to
introduce feudal holding of land as a way of increasing his
7
personal income, feu duties being paid to the Earl of Zetland.
However,- it was not until the mid-seventeenth century that feu-
charters become common, when they were introduced by the then
Earl of Zetland, the Earl of Morton. Feu charters had one great
advantage for landowners: they were a legal document of ownership
which could be used in any dispute over land. Udal tenure had
no written documentation to support it and, as such, was more
difficult to defend in disputes, and disputes over land ownership
appear to be endemic to Shetland society. However, the high
cost of the charters and the annual feu duties seems to have been
a cause of some of the rise in the debts of many lairds in the
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seventeenth century. In Shetland feudal tenure was never as
advanced as it was in Orkney, and was always secondary to udal
land.
The other important feature of the Shetland landholding
system was the "Crown Estate". This had originally been land in
the Islands (including Orkney) which had belonged to the
Norwegian and Danish crown and to the Bishopric of Orkney. On
the passing of the Isles to the Scotland, these lands became the
property of the Scottish crown, which gave the estate as a
privilege (in reality it was in return for money given to the
crown which, like all monarchies suffered from shortage of
finance), and along with it the title of the Earl of Zetland.
The estate had rights over the receiving of certain taxes, scat
and feu duties, as well as the rents and produce of the estate's
own tenants. In the seventeenth century the estate was the
single largest in the islands and whoever possessed it had
immense influence over the social and economic character of the
Islands. The crown estate (after the demise of the Stewarts)
was normally run by a chamberlain, usually one of the local
lairds. He supervised the estate collecting rents, dues etc.,
from the various factors and tacksmen who carried out the day-to-
day running of the scattered estate. The estate was open to
exploitation by the tacksmen and factors who lined their own
pockets, and to neighbouring lairds who encroached on the earl's
land.
The most famous (or infamous) Earls were the Stewart's;
Patrick and Robert, who through their own avarice did much to
change the social structure of the islands. For most of the
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seventeenth century the estate was held by the Morton family, who
had received it in return for £30,000 pledged to the royal family
in 1633. In 1767 they sold it to Sir Laurance Dundas of Kerse
9
for £63,000. Under the Mortons the estate was run by a local
steward, normally one of the major landlords. To the Earls,
Shetland was little more than an extra source of income and as
long as they received their payments they did not concern
themselves with the day to day affairs of the estate.
Shetland also had a distinctive form of measurement and
division of land. Land was measured in merks which referred to
both the quantity and quality of the land, and had its origins in
the Norse land tax values. Basically the greater the quality of
the land, then the smaller the area. Each merk was divided into
8 ures. A rough guide would be that a merk was, on average,
slightly less than an acre. Each merk was commonly referred to
as so many pennies the merk, normally 6 or 9, which was related
to the quality of the land and again had its origin in the Norse
land taxes, originally the more the pennies the greater the tax
paid.
The standard larger division of land was into townships,
each with its own enclosing hill dykes. Within each township
there was at least one room, which consisted of a group of farms
sharing land within the room's dykes. The farm, a term which
applied to the tenant's land rather than a distinct unit, was
held in run-rig, fragmented strips, with the other tenants' land
in the room. However, the vast majority of land in Shetland was
hill land, of little or no agricultural use beyond that of the
grazing of animals. This is usually called scattald although,
more correctly, a scattald contained both hill land (hoga land)
and township land. The scattald is typically regarded as common
land, but this applies to common rights of grazing, cutting of
peats etc. rather than to common ownership of the land.
10
Shetland did not experience the enclosure and division of land
until well into the nineteenth century, and this had only been
partially carried out when the Napier Commission ossified land
tenure.
THE RISE OF THE LAIRDS AND THE CRISIS
OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
The shift from Shetland being a society of freeholders to
one of tenants under a laird is directly related to the rising
influence of Scotland. The rise to power in Shetland of
landowners of Scottish origin was a long-term process but one
which changed the social structure and organisation of the
Islands and it was a system which itself was in a position of
financial crisis by the late seventeenth century. These events
go some way towards explaining the changes that were brought
about at the turn of the eighteenth century: the establishment of
the "Zetland Method", and they also show a greater continuity in
Shetland history than that which is normally assumed.
Although the Earls of Orkney were Scottish by the
thirteenth century, the Scots were slower to move into Shetland.
The St Clair family (Sinclair) originally from Caithness, had
property in Shetland as early as early as 1279, but generally the
11
Scots were "few and far between" before the 1500's. From then
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on there was a greater influx and by the mid seventeenth century
it has been estimated that a third of the population was either
12
of Scottish origin or married into Scottish families. This
was most evident in the church where of all the clergy during the
13
sixteenth century, ' only one was a local, the rest being Scots.
The clergy brought with them their relatives, a practice that was
common in Shetland at least into the eighteenth century. The
Hays originally came as ministers to the northern isles. They
later provided a home for their nephews and access to positions
within Shetland's economy and society.
With them the Scots brought their own legal system and
methods of landholding (described above). They also actively
undermined the position of the udallers, through raising taxes or
14
imposing fines or even seizing land through fraud or force.
Over this period of time estates were built up throughout the
islands, but because of their origin as udal land and the piece¬
meal way in which they were collected, they were made up of
fragmented small holdings, not large consolidated estates. The
result was scattered and unsystematic estates. It was common
for rooms to have multiple owners, and even individual tenants
paying rent to more than one laird. This can be seen through
the transactions in land in the seventeenth century. Almost all
of these were for small holdings: between 1623 and 1629, 55% were
under 5 merks , and 41% were for 5 to 50 merks. Between 1660 and
1669, 33% were under 5 merks, and 55% were for 5 to 50 merks.
And between 1690 and 1699, 27% were for under 5 merks, and 66%
15
were for 5 to 50 merks.
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By the mid-seventeenth century some substantial estates had
been built up, besides that of the Crown Estate (see above).
The Bruce family had an estate of 1,569 merks worth £3,000
(Scots) a year, but this was divided in 1665 when Andrew Bruce
granted his son Hector 500 merks. Other major lairds included:
James Mowat of Ollaberry with over 800 merks, Thomas Cheyne of
Vaila with over 600 merks, and John Sinclair of Quendale with
16
some 500 merks. Besides these there were a substantial number
of small landowners.
The lairds had various sources of income, the most direct
being that of their rents (scat and feu duties were paid to the
Crown Estate). In the seventeenth century there was a trend
towards changing parts of the rent into money rather than being
paid in kind. Besides the rent the other payment was grassums.
Originally a sum paid on the renewing of a lease, it had become
an annual burden, and was paid in cash. Other burdens that had
been converted into money payments were: wattle and sheep & ox
money, both were one shilling scots. Shaw gives some examples of
rents and how they were calculated in accordance with the quality
as well as quantity of the land and this gives us an idea of the
complexity of the system, and as such open to abuse by those who
impose the payments. The rent of one merk rated at six pennies
the merk, would pay one third of a lispund of butter and two
cuttels of wadmel (or 4 shillings scots per cuttel), and 8 shill¬
ings grassums. Land at twelve pennies the merk would pay double
this and the 8 shillings grassums. Butter was the single




This growth of rental burdens transformed from payments in
kind to that of cash required the tenants to have a source of
money income for their produce. This was possible through the
trade the Shetlanders carried out with the Dutch herring fishers
and the itinerant German merchants. The Germans played a more
complex and significant role than the Dutch, and are dealt with
in greater detail below.
The herring fleet of the Dutch (commonly called "Hollanders"
by the Shetlanders) would gather in Bressay Sound in mid-June for
the beginning of the season on the 24th. There developed a
strong tradition of commerce between them and the locals. The
trade appears to have been directly between the fishers and the
locals with little, if any, participation by the lairds. The
Shetlanders would provide: fresh food, woollen stockings etc., as
well as more illicit "entertainments". In return the Hollanders
would barter with tobacco or gin, but they mainly paid in cash.
These markets were often riotous affairs, and in 1625 the Sheriff
principal in Scalloway ordered Lerwick to be burned since the
town had become a "den of vice, with prostitution and drunkeness
18
rife". The international conflicts in the late
seventeenth century led to the decline of the Dutch herring
fishery, the most spectacular being the burning of the herring
fleet in Bressay Sound by the French in 1703, with the loss of
over 100 busses. This decline was recognised by contemporaries
as leading to a sharp reduction in the standard of living among
the Shetland peasantry:
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These Dutchmen used formerly to buy a considerable quantity
of coarse stockings from the country people, for ready money,
at a tolerable good price, by which a good deal of foreign
money was annually imported, which enabled the poor
inhabitants to pay the land rent, and to purchase the
necessaries of life; but for several years past that trade
has failed, few or none of these bussus coming in, and those
that come, if they buy a few stockings, it is at a very low
price, whereby the country people are become exceeding poor,
and unable to pay the land rent.19
This shows the way in which the changing structure of
international commerce has knock on effects in other economies.
In Shetland the decline of a money economy put pressure on the
existing organisation of landholding and would have made direct
labour by tenants a more attractive prospect.
It would be difficult to under-estimate the importance of
the trade with the German merchants for the history of Shetland.
It was more than just commercial activity and it is worthwhile
going into some detail on the organisation, structure and general
importance of this relationship. In short this trade was
instrumental in forming Shetland's position in the international
division of labour, and for its specialisation in the production
of stockfish (dealt with in more detail in the next chpt.), and
for the creation of its social organisation of production. At
the height of their influence the Hanseatic merchants were the
great trading force in Europe and provide the link between the
medieval economy and the modern economy. Shetland than was
integrated into the modern world-economy virtually from its
very birth.
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To understand future developments ik is necessary to give
some details on the historical development of Shetland's trade.
The direct trade was mainly carried out by merchants from the
Hanseatic trading cities of Hamburg and Bremen. Merchants from
the league had first come into contact with the produce of Shet¬
land in their trade with Norway, which had become open to the
Hanseatic League in the thirteenth century, they were eventually
able to dominate all Norwegian trade through their merchant
"factory" or "Kontor" in Bergen. This was controlled by
merchants from Ltibeck. The direct trade began at a time of
crisis in the League, there was increased competition from the
Dutch over the herring and Baltic trade. The League was
splitting into an eastern and a western division with Liibeck and
Hamburg as the most important cities respectively. Liibeck was
attempting to control the profitable stockfish trade centred on
Bergen through its control of the Kontor there. The western
cities therefore became involved in direct trading. This
#
explains why it was the case that direct trading with the islands
20
was illegal in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
*
The first record of a German merchant trading in the isles
is in 1415, but it was not until the mid-sixteenth century that
they arrived annually and in significant numbers. By this time
the trade had taken on its "classical" form. The merchants
would sail from their home ports in the spring and stay in the
islands for the summer months. They traded in the general
produce of the country, but of greatest importance was the fish
that they bought from the locals and which they cured themselves
(this is dealt with in the following chpt.). They would then
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return home before the winter storms, although it was known for
some to remain over the winter, sending the ship back with the
produce. Even at this early time the northen part of the Isles
were better served by the merchants and the fish from there was
21
preferred.
For nearly two hundred years the fierman merchants carried on
external trade with the islands. Over this long period there
formed an increasingly strong relationship of mutual dependence,
although probably more to the advantage of the merchants than to
the Shetlanders. The shift in relative prices suggest that these
22
grew faster for grain than they did for fish. Through their
relationship with the Shetland tenantry the merchants integrated
the production of the xslands into the demands of the north
European markets for stockfish. Thus the livelihood of the
typical Shetlander became increasingly dependent on favourable
market conditions. However at this time the tenant remained in
control of the means of production, but the merchant certainly
organised the trade and did the curing of the fish etc., but had
no direct control over the producer.
As far as the lairds were concerned they benefitted in
several ways: their tenants were able to get money with which to
pay the money part of their rents; the lairds were able to trade
the produce of their rents with the Hansa merchants, over 400
barrels of butter and 250 of oil being exported annually towards
23
the end of the seventeenth century. They also received
significant amounts of money from the merchants in payment for
the right to use the stony beaches necessary for the curing and
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drying of the fish, and for building their trading booths. Some
lairds charged for the right to trade with their tenants. Others
would built the stone booths since it was possible to recover the
24
cost in three years from the high rents they charged. In the
mid-seventeenth century the merchants paid some £800 scots
annually to the Earl of Morton. By the end of the seventeenth
century the lairds were imposing greater financial burdens upon
the merchants, increasing their charges for booths, beaches and
for allowing them to trade with the tenants. This was partly
due to the greed of the lairds and partly to their need for
higher income to pay for their less than frugal lifestyles, and
partly to make up for declining rents from their tenants and for
increasing advances and credits to them in the dearths of the
1790's. It was also due to the problem of prices. During the
inflation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the price of
grain had risen faster than the price of fish thus worsening the
relative position of the tenants and lairds to that of the
25
merchants.
By the late seventeenth century some of the important
Scottish lairds who had built up substantial estates over the
previous 100/150 years were in serious financial trouble. The
reasons are not entirely clear, and no one has been able to
quantify them, but they would include the following. The
famines of the 1630's and 1690's put great strain on their
resources; in particular the dearths of 1693-1696 forced many
lairds to make advances to their tenants, which the tenants were
unable to pay back. The smallpox epidemic of 1700 led to many
farms left ley. The costs of feu charters and their annual
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duties certainly had their effect. The rise in the weights for
the taxes to be paid to the Lordship Estate meant that more of
the produce of their own estates was paid to the Earl. In some
individual cases there were land losses from wind-blown sand
encroaching on land. Some lairds had relied too heavily on the
sale of the produce of their rents to the Germans. The disruption
in the Dutch fishery made the situation worse. Whatever the
reason, by the end of the century some of the oldest and well
established families were in severe financial debt. James
Mowat, who had an extensive estate in the north of the mainland
was in serious debt, owing £23,000 (scots), along with the Bruces
of Muness, the Cheynes of Vaila, and the Sinclairs of Brough (one
26
of the oldest families of Scottish origin in the islands). As
these families went bankrupt in the 1690's/1700's, so a group of
"new" men, who were more active in controlling the economy,
bought up their estates. It is to these "new men" and the
changes of the early eighteenth century that we now turn.
THE RISE OF THE MERCHANT LAIRDS?
The early eighteenth century saw a shift in the control of
Shetland's trade, away from the the German merchants and into the
hands of a commercially orientated set of local merchant/lairds.
The term merchant-laird refers to the fact that the lairds
carried out the functions of a merchant as well as that of a
laird. The traditional explanation for this is that with the
Union of Parliaments in 1707 the English navigation acts were
enforced, and with the imposition of duties on imported salt in
1712 the German merchants were finally excluded from the Shetland
60
trade. Since the islands depended on the German trade this left
a "vacuum" in the local economy such that the lairds were forced
to take the place of the German merchants. This historical
orthodoxy has its origins in the writings of Gifford in the
1730's:
when the high duty was laid upon foreign salt, and custom¬
house officers sent over, and a custom house settled at
Lerwick, these foreigners could not enter, and so the
inhabitants, and many of the heritors or landlords, were
obliged to turn merchants and export the country products to
foreign markets.27
This has become the established "truth", and has been echoed
by many writers on Shetland since. Although it is interesting
that it was state intervention in the form of the customs that
finally stopped the Germans, we do not know what role local
traders played in getting the customs established in Lerwick. It
is possible that they wanted the customs so as to exclude the
Germans but this remains speculation. Still it is interesting
that Gifford's statement on the customs have been forgotten in
later versions of the events; for example Tudor in the 1880's:
On the imposition of the salt duties the Hanseatic traders
were driven away and the proprietors compelled to turn fish
curers themselves. 28
or more recently by J.R. Nicolson, the great populiser of myths
of Shetland history:
The activities of the Hanseatic merchants declined in the
later decades of the seventeenth century and ceased
altogether about 1712, the last straw being the Salt Tax
introduced by the British Government to encourage British
shipping. But the fishing industry did not decline since
the landowners stepped in as merchants to fill the vacuum
left by the traders of Hamburg and Bremen.29
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Onto this has been added a racial dimension, that these were
Scottish lairds, who had, over a number of centuries, imposed
themselves upon the native Shetlanders, who remained a racially-
separate and distinct people. This remains a popularly held
belief in the Islands, reinforced by the large number of books
published in the 1970's which confirmed local prejudice by the
insipid re-writing of what was regarded as self evident "truths"
rather than questioning those "truths" and doing any original
research. This goes some way towards explaining the general
anti-Scottish and anti-devolutionist feelings in the islands in
the 1970's. Recent original research calls both of these
positions into question. In this version some local lairds and
merchants were more commercially aggressive and desired to
replace the Germans by at least the end of the seventeenth
century. The economic conditions at the end of the seventeenth
and early eighteenth century gave them the chance to be more
active in the economy and supplant the Germans.
There is contemporary support for this. The Rev.Brand
writing in 1701, notes that a number of commercially minded men
wished to take an active part in the fish trade, believing that
they could organise the trade with less capital and greater
profit since they lived on the island:
The Consideration of this great Gain that doth redund to the
Trading Merchants, hath of late animated some Gentlemen and
others in Zetland, to enter into a Society or Company for
Trading in Fishes, that whereas Strangers make such a good
hand with their Fishes, they may as well consolt their own
Profite and Gain, by Promoting of that Trade, which tendeth
so much to the Enriching of others, especially seeing they
can do it with far less Trouble and Expence when here at
home, where the Fishers are to be had, which when taken and
prepared may be sent Abroad for Sale to Foreign Markets.30
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This mirrors the mercantile origin of the most active of the
"new" men. These included James Mitchell, a merchant in
Scalloway, Magnus Henderson who had had a mercantile education in
31
Hamburg, and Arthur Nicolson a Lerwick merchant. and Thomas
Gifford, who although a landowner of Scottish origin came from a
family which had organised their succession by the traditional
Shetland way not by the primogenitor of the Scots. They had
strong mercantile links in the family, and had not been large
32
landowners anyway. Brian Smith argues that:
The point about these gentlemen is that Shetlanders would not
have regarded them as "Scottish Lairds" at all.33
These men bought up the bankrupt estates of the "old" lairds (see
above). Gifford bought substantial parts of the Muness estate
and Mitchell bought parts of the Sinclair estate as well of that
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of the Cheynes.
It was these men who were able to take advantage of the
situation in the early eighteenth century, by their conscious and
deliberate action, and they took control of the organisation of
the trade of the islands. Within a relatively short period of
time they were dominating the islands socially, politically and
economically, through the rapid enforcement of the "Zetland
Method". There is however some disagreement over the actual
dates when the "Zetland Method" was introduced. Wills argues
that the lack of evidence of resistance to their introduction
suggests that they were either not introduced or enforced until
much later in the century:
Fishing tenures, if they existed at all, were not widely or
rigorously enforced in the first half of the eighteenth
century but developed in the late 1750's and early
1760's.(emphasis mine)35
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His argument rests on what he perceives as the general shortage
of tenants in the early part of the century, a shortage due to
the effects of two smallpox epidemics, in the 1720's and 1740's,
and the dearths of the 1730's. It was the debts built up by the
tenants in the 1730's and 1740's which allowed the lairds to make
explicit the conditions of tenure, so that fishing was required
36
to buy off their debt to the laird.
Wills appears to be historically incorrect in stating this,
for the system of fishing tenures was established within a short
period, probably within the decade after 1712. By 1718 Gifford
could write that the landlords cured the fish of their own
37
tenants. In 1721 two lairds, Henderson of Gardie and Pitcairn
of Muness had joined together and employed a factor to cure the
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fish caught by their tenants in Unst and Fetlar. At the time
of writing his "Historical Description" in the 1730"s Gifford
assumed that fishing tenures were general. In the 1740's
Nicolson's tenants in Papa Stour paid most of their rents in fish
(details below). John Campbell writing in the 1740's understood
that fishing tenures were enforced and that the relationship
between tenant and laird was oppressive, even tyrannical:
in the Summer, the men are obliged to go to Sea a fishing for
Cod and Ling for the lord of the Manor...Compelling their
tenants to go to sea for them...those Masters are so absolute
as some Princes, for if these poor People do but murmer in
the least of their Orders, they and their families are
banished for ever out of their Territories.39
The merchant-lairds had therefore established this system
both quickly and without any visible dissent. It this lack of
protest that has led to the opinion that it was not enforced
until later in the century. As we shall see this system was
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later to be described as a form of slavery. It becomes a
problem to understand how it was able to be imposed so rapidly,
and not take the view of Wills. The answer is that the "Zetland
Method" was a development of the system of organisation that the
Shetland fishers had been used to for generations in their
dealings with the German merchants.
The Hansa merchants operated a system called the
ausreedesystem, in which goods advanced to the fishers in one
year was to be paid off in the following year in fish and other
40
products. They certainly used this system in Shetland.
Details of its operation in Norway show similar consquences to
that in Shetland. There the fishermen in the north, the
Nordfaher, were tied to the Hanseatic merchants through extensive
debts which they were unable to pay off and as such became
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dependent on them. As far as the tenants were concerned,
there would have been little difference in their lives, at least
initially, merely a change of personel.
THE OPERATION OF THE ZETLAND METHOD
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
There is much written about the operation of the "Zetland
Method" and how it was reducing the tenants to debt etc., but
none have actually given evidence from rentals on how the system
actually did work "on the ground". Among the Hay papers is a
rental account book for Nicolson of Lochend's tenants in Papa
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Stour for 1743 which clearly shows how the method did operate.
This a very interesting historical document and is set out in
some detail below. In the 1760's James Hay held the tack of
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Nicolson's lands in Papa Stour, and this earlier record must have
come into his hands at that time. Papa is a small island off
the north-west coast of the mainland, and at this time it was an
active part of the haaf fishing with a station for the far haaf.
In this rental book we have details for 29 tenants (and for
the heirs of 011a Brown), with their names and details of their
land and rent, debts and credits. There are two columns for
each tenant; on the right are the tenant's debits which consist
of: that year's rent, debts from the previous year, amount for
cess, plus any incidentals. On the right is the tenant's
credits; mainly fish but also oil, butter etc. From this we can
get a general picture of the position of the tenants in relation
to the laird (or as in this case the tacksman). This is given in
table 1 below. What is of equal interest is the differences
between the tenants and that is discussed after the table.
TABLE 1
DEBTS AND CREDITS NICOLSON'S TENANTS IN PAPA STOUR 1743
(in pounds Scots)
debit credit debts due by debts due to
rent/cess fish etc. tenants tenants
£302-7/4 £393-19/6 £396-8/4 £60-15/8
source: SA Hay of Hayfield
rent account 1743
For 1743 there was a healthy surplus in the tenants' favour
of £91-12/2 (scots). However there were debts carried forward
from 1742 of £422-15/6 to be paid off, and by the end of 1743
there were outstanding debts of £386-8/4 with some tenants owed a
total of £60-15/8. By far the largest source of credit was
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fish. There are details of 22 tenants fishing, with a total value
of £276-17/6 (£272-12/8 for white fish and £4-4/10 for herrings).
Other sources were: for oil £53-10/7; and for butter £16-11/4.
The table shows a slight fall in the general indebtedness
with a fall of £26-7/1 over that of 1742. Of those for whom the
figures are clear: 12 tenants reduced their debt; 6 increased
their debts; 3 remained the same; 8 were owed money. Most of
these debts were relatively small, but some were quite large
(given the resources that the tenant had to pay off debt).
Magnus Robertson owed £75-4/8, James Laurenson's debt was £69-3/-
(both slightly up on 1742), Andrew Coutt's owed £33-9/7 (a fall),
and Thomas Henry owed £31-17/1 (a rise). It would be difficult
to see how these men could pay off such debts.
There were some tenants that did not have any real source to
pay their debts. There were three women, only one of whom was
stated as a widow, the Widow Halcrow, with 2 merks of land - she
was credited with sums of money from various of the other
tenants, probably a recipient of poor relief; Janet Dalzeil,
with 1 merk of land, was only credited with 7 pairs of woollen
stockings, total value £2-2/- scots. Barbara [?], with 1 merk,
was credited with £1-16/- for a lispund of bere meal and £1 for
some peats. Three tenants are credited with nothing, and for 2
others (including Olla Brown's heirs) only monetary value is
given. This document makes the relationship between the
"haaf" fishing and the holding of land quite explicit. The
chance to trade in the produce of the tenants, in particular
their fish, would have been the only one in which the tacksman
could pay Nicolson the money for the tack, and likewise the only
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way in which the tenants could pay off their rents and debts.
CRITICISM OF THE ZETLAND METHOD
So far we have set out in detail Shetland's society and
economy in the eighteenth century. There remains one further
aspect to cover in this chapter, that of the criticisms raised
against the "Zetland Method". By the late eighteenth century
the "Zetland Method" was recognised by many as a hindrance to
both economic development and personel liberty. As such it came
under increasing criticism. Much of this criticism was part of
a wider debate on social/economic conditions in Scotland, and
will be dealt with in this context. Since there is already some
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work in this field, this chapter will concentrate on the
original material from the research for the thesis, in particular
the views of the merchants against that of the lairds. The most
commonly discussed criticisms have been those raised by the
church. Firstly, it is necessary to set the criticisms into the
context of the social/political and economic debates of the
close of the eighteenth century.
The late eighteenth century was a period of intense debate
in Britain, and of particular concern in Scotland was the
"Highland Question". Some saw the Highlands, which had only
recently been "tamed and conquered", as a replacement for the
recently lost American colonies. The Highlands were regarded as
an undeveloped part of Britain; indeed they were viewed as a
"colony" (dare one say an "internal colony") barely part of
Scottish/British civilised society. Various tracts and books
were written on how they could be developed to the advantage of
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the nation as a whole. The most famous and influential of
these was John Knox's "The View of the British Empire and
Scotland", published in 1784; as Dunlop writes:
In this book he [Knox] set out to contrast the large sums of
money expended on the colonies in America with the poor
returns realised, and he suggested that the Highlands would
respond more readily to development.45
This was a view which had already been expressed by one of
the major Shetland lairds, John Bruce of Sumburgh sis early as
1781, in which Shetland was made the centre of a similsir
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argument. The common way in which these writers saw that the
Highlands (and Shetland) could be developed was by expanding the
fishing industry. The fishing industry in general, and the
herring industry in particular, were seen sis one of the most
likely (and cost-effective) ways of increasing the wealth of the
nation sind improving the lot of the common people. This found
political support and in 1785, a Psirliamentary Committee was
established to "inquire into the state of the British Fisheries".
Shetland wsis an area of specific interest and various
individuals sent in information and reports on the islands to the
committee. Some gave evidence at the committee's hearings in
London,including James Hay in his position as a major merchant.
Hay was also involved in a lengthy correspondence with one of the
instigators of the committee, George Dempster of Dunnichen.
This correspondence and the reports of the committee contain
extensive details and criticisms of the Shetland lairds and their
social organisation of production.
When dealing with Shetland the committee was in a
politically delicate position. On the one hand to develop the
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fishing industry, but on the other not to upset the lairds.
Added to this is the complication that the social organisation of
Shetland was now out of step with the rest of Britain. In 1784
Dempster wrote to Robert Hunter of Lunna stressing:
that he [Dempster] meant nothing inimical to the landed
interest but he did feel that perhaps local custom was
unfavourable to the wishes of the nation for improving and
extending our fisheries.47
Dempster recognised the political and economic strength of the
lairds, and he diplomatically emphasised this position in a
letter to James Hay in 1785:
Nothing can be juster than your Idea how this matter should
be taken up and shall be taken up by me in treating publicly
of the State of the Highlands & Isles. Not as an Oppression
committed by the actual lairds and lords there, but as a
system so ruinous to Industry and population, that it must be
owing to their Humanity of the these Great Men, that there is
a alive or a fish caught in that country. Were we to bring
the Gentry on our Tops, we might make a noise, create such
odium against them, draw down some upon ourselves, and
certainly do no good to the poor people whom I most earnestly
desire of reserving from their present thraldom. But this
must be done by gentle and conciliatory and not by violent
means.48
The irony flows from his pen when writing on the Shetland lairds.
There is no doubt that Dempster meant to improve the lot of the
Shetland people, if it was in his power. His thoughts were
echoed in a letter from Hay:
Your Grand Object was no less than a liberal and laudable
Reform in the mode of Subrenting lands or in other words
liberating the lower class of people from their present State
of Bondage and Slavery.49
The third report of the committee (July 1785) contains the
greatest amount of all the reports on Shetland. Included among
this is evidence from John Hall, a London dealer in ships, who
had been involved in the Shetland fish trade. Hall's criticisms
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were not particularly strong; first he outlined the operation of
the "Zetland Method":
That the Fishery of Shetland (except in the instance of Mr
Bruce of Sumborough) is carried on by the poor Fishers, who
have small allotments of Ground granted to them, on condition
that the Fish they get be delivered to the proprietors of the
respected lands, at their Salting Houses, at certain Low
Prices...the greatest Price not exceeding Three Pence per
Head, which is not given them in Cash, but credited, in
Return, for Goods and Necessaries of Life, which the
Proprietors oblige them to take at the Price they set on
them.50
He than gave evidence on Bruce of Sumburgh's tenants, who had
been freed from these obligations, and although their rents had
been doubled they were "happier" than other tenants and were able
to sell their fish to the highest bidder. Then when asked:
Whether the Fishers would get more Money for their Fish, if
they were allowed to sell them to any buyer?
He replied:
They would...and that they coould be supplied with Stores,
Provisions, and Clothing, much cheaper than they axe now by
their landlords. 51
This was supported by the next witness, Gilbert Henderson, a free
fisher from Unst, who stated that the fishers only received 3/6
per cwt. but, if allowed free markets thay would be paid 4/- or
4/6 per cwt.
Since this was being presented before a Parliamentary
committee the lairds felt that these allegations could not go
unanswered. They presented an anonymous paper to the committee
setting out their understanding of the relationship between
themselves and their tenants. To give its full title,
Observations on, and Causes of the particular Connections that
subsist betwixt, the Landholders of Shetland and their Tenants or
Fishers; with Some Account of the Fisheries of that Country,
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written by A Native of Shetland, now known to be Thomas Mouat, a
major landowner in Bressay and Unst and self appointed defender of
53
the lairds.
It is in this document that the lairds argue that the
"particular connection", was a natural one that had arisen out of
the economic conditions of the islands, in particular the
conditions at the beginning of the eighteenth century when the
German merchants stopped trading. This argument echoes that of
Gifford fifty years previously. The ending of this trade
"forced" the lairds to act as merchants, and to guarantee their
advances they presumed rights over the tenants' produce.
The Dutch [meaning deutsch for German] having now deserted
the Covintry, the Fishers were at a great Loss how to dispose
of their Fish, Oil other product, as there was no Mercat
within the Islands...
In this untoward State of Affairs, which affected the
Landlord equally with the Tenant or Fisher, it became
absolutely necessary, that the Produce of his Estate should
not perish. And as very few of the Tenants had Stock where¬
with to purchase the necessary Articles of Subsistence, and
Fishing Apparatus, the Merchant-Landlord was obliged to
advance to them...For his Reimburse, and for his Land Rent,
he was obliged to take his chance of what Fish happened to be
caught through the Season,...and a certain fixed was, by
mutual Consent of the Buyer and Seller, put on each Article,
adequate to its Value at the Time.
In this Situation of Affairs it is evident and reasonable
the Advancer of those necessary Articles should have a
preference to the Purchase of all the Tenant's Goods, at
least in so far as to indemnify his Creditor; and it rarely
happened, that it was in the Debtor's Power completely to
indemnify him, especially when Grain was high-priced, or the
Fishing unsuccessful; yet as neither Party had any Alternative
the same System was pursued[emphasis mine]54
This lengthy extract clearly gives the lairds' version of the
relationship. Mouat then goes on to answer Hall's assertions on
Sumburgh's freed tenants, and he is doubtful of their advantages.
Sumburgh's estate, in the south of the island, has the advantage
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of being among the most fertile land in the islands, and the
tenants are able to grow a greater proportion of their own food
than others less fortunate. The estate is also close to
Lerwick, which is a large market for their fish and other
produce. Even though Bruce's tenants have all these advantages
he (Mouat claims) had great difficulty in getting his tenants to
accept their "liberty", since it meant a large rise in their
rents. Mouat also argues that it has done the tenants no good,
for with the bad harvests of the early 1780's, Bruce's tenants
are now in debt to the merchants who now buy their produce and
advance them credit:
though they are not now indebted to him, they are (from the
Misfortunes of these Three last bad Crops) considerably
involved with the Merchants who purchase their Goods, and in
this View have only changed their Creditors.55
This example was used to strengthen his argument that the
relationship "naturally" arose from the conditions of the island.
He also argued that the merchants were less likely to have the
interests of the tenants at heart than the landlords.
In the end the lairds had little to fear from the committee.
In the conclusion of the report the committee defended the
lairds against their critics, and stated that the relationship
between tenant and laird was a natural one:
Your Committee think themselves bound to observe, that no
particular Reflection can, in their opinion, justly be cast
upon the Land Owners of Shetland; as from everything that has
appeared to your Committee, their conduct towards their
Fishers and Tenants is such as naturally arises from the
actual State of the Islands, and is probably such as their
present Situation who ever had the property, would
unavoidably require. 56
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This was only to be expected in an age when the "Landed Interest"
was still the most powerful political force in the nation. It
is clear that at least George Dempster was sympathetic to Hall
and Hay, and possibly other members of the committee. These men
were expressing the desires of a new age and their time had
not,as yet, come. Hay never changed his views on the "Zetland
Method", although in later life he was in a more ambiguous
position as he became a Shetland laird. Still in 1805 he could
write in report to the Treasury that he built houses in Lerwick
for Shetlanders who were:
as inclined to Relinquish farming and Vassalage and be their
own Masters at Liberty.57
From then on it was common to see criticisms of the Shetland
lairds appearing in print generally from the clergy who
emphasised the moral effects on the people over that of the
economic. These have been comprehensively covered in the
writings of Wills and only need to outlined here, for to go into
further detail would merely be repetitious.
In the (Old) Statistical Account almost all of the ministers
were critical of the organisation of the islands; the reduction
in the size of holdings, the poverty of the people, the ready
advancement of luxuries (tea, drink and fancy clothing). All
these had undermined their moral wellbeing and they had taken on
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the attitudes and actions of slaves.
It was in this background of religous criticism that the
Rev. Dr. J. Kemp came to the Islands in 1799, in his position as
the secretary to the sspck to enquire into the establishment of
parochial schools. The following year he published a pamphlet
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condeming the laird's social organisation: "Observations on the
Islands of Shetland and their inhabitants...with hints for their
improvement" (1800). Thomas Mouat, anonymously, replied with "A
Letter by the Landholders of Shetland", which repeated the
arguments of his earlier defence (in 1785). A friend of Kemp's
took up the gauntlet, the Rev. Savile ,a minister in the Cowgate,
writing as Vindicator published a pamphlet directly attacking
Mouat, he was well aware of the author. Mouat's nephew Robert
Hunter of Lunna replied to this with "A Second Letter from the
Landholders", which set out to attack personally their critics
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rather than their arguments.
Criticisms of the system continued to be raised but less
often Neil's, "A Tour through... Orkney and Shetland" (1806), was
Vi
generally critical. However Edmondston's authoratative, "A View
of the Ancient and Present State of the Zetland Islands" (2 vols.
1809), and Shirreff's "Agriculture of the Shetland Islands"
(1814) were basically an apologia for the lairds. The
occasional criticism was embarrassing to the lairds but they did
not feel it necessary to defend themselves. Perhaps public
opinion had become tired of Shetland and had moved onto other
topics. We can leave the last word to Thomas Mouat (writing in
1807) writing on the social effects of these seditious writings:
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A mistaken idea that the lower ranks labour oppression from
their landlords has been lately adopted by some superficial
tourists, and seems to be the rage of the times; these ideas
have been propagated with great industry, and though utterly
unfounded have had the worst imaginable effects in stirring
up discontent and sedition views in the minds of the people,
by which their imagination are now so much inflamed, that
they are ready to break out in acts of violence and to become
in a state of insubordination to the laws and customs of the
country which practice if continued will in all probability
lead to the utmost anarchy and confusion.60
The "Zetland Method" had been created over a period of
centuries, and reached its most repressive in the mid to late
eighteenth century, at a time of increasing structural problems
in production in Shetland (chpt.4) The criticisms made of this
form of the social organisation of production almost totally came
from outside, or from churchmen within the Islands, and
emphasised the moral effects of the system. Within Shetland and
from the "merchants" only James Hay presented a criticism of the
system based on capitalist social relations, only he was willing
to attack the lairds in public, and as we shall see only he was
prepared to establish free labour in the Islands.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SHETLAND ECONOMY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
If the climate be unfriendly to vegetation,
and the earth yield with reluctance her
productions to the Zetlander, the sea
liberally supplies his wants, and, under
judicious management, is the natural source of
wealth to his country. 1
The , social organisation of Shetland in the eighteenth
century intimately connected with one form of production, the
haaf fishing (described below). The history of the trade and
commerce of the Islands reflect the history of this industry.
This form of production was Shetland's specialisation in the
international division of labour and is directly related to the
history of the Islands' relationship with the developing European
capitalist world economy from at least the early sixteenth
century.
The important point about Shetland's economy was that it was
not based on subsistence; it produced a commodity that entered
international markets. This commodity was not surplus from
local subsistence production, but from the islands'
specialisation within the international division of labour.
Shetland's economy and society reflected much more advanced
economic/ exchange relations than one would have at first
thought, given its peripheral position. The history of Shetland
shows that we need to be more aware of the dynamics by which the
world economy is created, and also the complex inter-relationship
between social and economic factors in the historical process of
development.
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This chapter deals with the structure and organisation of
this form of fishing, its historical pre-cursors, and its
relation with Shetland's general trade and commerce. Although
commercial statistics are somewhat vague, an attempt will be
made to quantify the extent, value and profitability of the
fishing. Finally the changes taking place in Shetland's economy
towards the end of the eighteenth century will be related to
certain problems in the fishing industry.
Haaf literally means ocean, and the Haaf fishing refers to
the open boat long line (or great line) fishing carried on around
the coast of Shetland for stockfish; in particular- ling but also
cod and tusk. These fish were exported to the great
international markets for stockfish in North Germany, and later
in the century to the Western Mediterranean. Cured fish,
herring, cod, ling etc. was a major food source throughout Europe
at this time; theW production was a huge international industry
which was labour and (in the pre-industrial world) capital
intensive
THE HAAF FISHING: HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION
The haaf fishing was Shetland's Summer fishing, the
traditional dates being from 20th May to 12th August. The
weather effectively prevented any extension of these dates. The
vessels used were four and six oared open boats, imported from
Norway in "kit" form, with a crew of four to six men. In the
earlier period four oared boats were more common but during the
century the larger six oared vessels became the norm. The
method of fishing was by long or great lines (baukts). Each
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line was 50 fathoms long, with a hook every 5 fathoms attached by
a short line of 3 to 4 feet. Each boat would have 40 to 50
lines which were tied together as they were layed out, resulting
in one long line with many hundreds of hooks (in this example
2
over 4 mile's long with over 500 hooks).
At the beginning of the fishing the men would congegrate
with their boats at fishing stations which were built as close to
the fishing grounds as possible. This was to reduce the sailing
time to the grounds. These were often some distance from the
men's homes and rudimentary stone lodges were used to house the
men while they were at the station. For most of the fishers
they were only able to return to their homes to see their
families occasionally during the fishing season. At each
station the laird or his factor would have a booth suppling the
men with all their needs advanced to them against their catches
of fish.
The station required a stone beach upon which the the fish
could be dried, after they had been split, washed clean and
salted. There also being different cures for different markets.
The stones allowed the air to circulate around the fish and any
water to drain away. The other main activity at the station was
the production of fish oil from the livers of the fish. These
jobs were mainly carried out by boys or men too old to go to the
fishing.
The typical daily activity at the station was for the boats
to leave for the distant grounds in the morning after they had
caught their bait for that day. They would lay their lines in
the afternoon/ early evening depending on the distance they had
to row. The lines were then hauled in after a few hours. If
the grounds were close to the station they would return that
night; if not they would stay out at sea over-night laying and
hauling their lines until they had a good catch. Those that
could do a trip in a day would do 4 to 6 in a week; those staying
out overnight would only do 2.
The best description of life in the fishing stations giving
the full feeling of the unremitting activity of the fishermen
and the claustraphobic conditions they lived under is that of
Ployen. Although written in 1839, the scenes of the Fethaland
station that he describes had not changed for over a hundred
years:
Fishermen from many parts of the country assemble there in
May to build stone huts, lightened with moss and roofed with
feals, or at best a thatch of straw, and there they remain
till the twelth of August, when the fishing season is at an
end. The proprietors for whom these people fish...have
erected dwelling-houses for their curers, and also stores
where the fishermen can procure everything they require.
When it is borne in mind that the crews of 60 boats, each
consisting of 6 men, sometimes assemble here, with the
different factors and their people; that sloops are coming
and going, bringing salt and other necessities and taking
away oil; that the fishermen whilst having nothing to divert
their attention from their special work exert themselves to
the utmost, it may be conceived that the scene is one of life
and bustle in this strange little hamlet, which, as if by
magic, becomes peopled in May and again stands desolate on
the twelth of August...Some boats had come home from the sea,
and their fish was being received and weighed by the
respective factors; others were preparing to go to sea, some
of the men were stretching and drying their lines, others
were melting livers into oil, while some stood with folded
arms resting after their toil and...yet others were busy
cooking victuals. The whole was like a great ship, for no
woman was to be seen in the hamlet. The inside of these
huts corresponds with the outside. You will find nothing
but some beds made of rude boards nailed together, containing
straw and coarse blankets...There is moreover a hearth round
which are hung wet stockings and other clothes to dry, and
over it is suspended a kettle or pot—and this is all.3
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During the eighteenth century this was the lot of the great
majority of Shetland men. The women, children and old men were
left to carry on the work on the croft during the summer months.
When a boy was old enough he would help his father at the
station; later he would have a share in a boat of his own. As
we shall see towards the end of the century alternative
employment became available and this was to attract many young
Shetlanders.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF THE HAAF FISHING
Fishing had always been part of the subsistence economy of
the Islands, supplementing the produce of the land and adding
variety to the limited diet. Yet fishing had historically been
of secondary importance to farming, from their Norse origins (if
not earlier) the Shetlanders had been an agricultural people.
However fishing had always been a part of their economy and
surplus had been traded for centuries but it is clear that it
would not have develop into the commercial haaf fishing without
external intervention. And that intervention was by the
Hanseatic merchants (see Chapter 2). It is known that Shetland
fish had been exported to Bergen from at least the fourteenth
century and as such it would have been known to the Hansa
merchants there. But the conditions that this early trade was
carried on under is not known to any great degree.
The evidence suggests that the German merchants built up the
Shetland fishing into something close to that of the haaf. The
merchants controlled all the processes in the curing of the fish
and dealt with the fishermen directly, not with their lairds.
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The locals did not appear to know how to cure the fish themselves
and most of the lairds were not interested in the trade beyond
the payments they received from the merchants. The merchant
arrived in the early summer, set himself up at his booth and then
spent the rest of the summer months curing the fish and trading
with the fishermen, as Gifford wrote:
They salted and dried the fish themselves, and stayed for
receiving these goods from the first of May till the last of
August.4
Balfour writing in the 1770's confirms that the Germans
introduced the fishing and suggests that they even taught the
locals to cure the fish:
It is probable these strangers first taught the Inhabitants
to fish for ling & other fish and to cure and dry them.5
It is not at all clear that the Germans did teach the locals to
cure the fish; it certainly would not have been a wise commercial
move. And the fact that in the early eighteenth century the
Shetland cure was often of low quality indicates that the locals
were not experienced at the art. Furthermore some merchants
were known to stay over the winter so that they could begin the
fishing earlier. There would be little point in doing this if
the locals could cure the fish themselves; indeed there would
have been no need to come at the beginning of the season at all.
They only needed to arrive in late August to collect that
season's catch. The method of curing in Shetland was based on the
German method of the fish being split and sun dried on stones
rather than the Norwegian method of drying on sticks. The haaf
was therefore the product of a long history but reached its
fullest development in the eighteenth century.
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EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS
During the eighteenth century there were some important
developments in the fishing; there was a shift to larger boats
with more lines, going a greater distance out to sea, and some
internal geographical specialisation. There was an early impetus
to the industry with the establishment in 1718 of a bounty of 3/-
(sterling) per cwt. Earlier in the century, and previously,
the Haaf fishing had covered most of Shetland. During the
century there was a tendency for the fishing to be concentrated
in the Northerly parishes, where over the century larger cargo
boats were used going further and further out to sea and
generally had larger catches. This was in search of Ling which
was found in greatest numbers in the deeper water at the edge of
the continental shelf. There is some evidence that fish were
becoming scarcer nearer to the shore although it is not clear if
this was due to overfishing or to hydrological changes forcing
the fish to migrate to deeper water.
These changes can be best seen in Northmavine the single
most important parish for the "Far Haaf", as this longer distance
fishing became known. By the 1790's the stations of Northmavine
accounted for almost a third of all boats at the Haaf. Details
in the statistical account give 6 stations with a total of
between 135 and 149 boats. These were concentrated at two main
stations; Stennes with 40 to 50 boats and Fethaland with 60 (the
fish from Uya station (14 boats) were taken to Fethaland as there
6
was no stone beach there).
The standard size of a six oared boat had been 18 feet keel,
25 to 27 feet overall; by 1785 this had risen to 19/20 feet of
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keel, 30 feet overall, and in the 1830's a keel of 24 feet was
standard. This mirrors the shift from four-oared boats to six-
oared. In 1733 Gifford when importing boats from Norway
explicitly stated that he did not want six-oared boats. Eleven
years later in 1744 the cargoe of Gifford's ship the Sibella
included 24 four-oared boats and 8 six-oared boats. In 1767 a
list of Shetland fishing vessels gave the fleet as: 290 with a
crew of 6, 100 with a crew 5, 60 with 4, and 150 with crews of 4
but of old men and boys (for nearshore fishing). By 1814 there
were 500 six-oared boats. The number of lines in each boat also
increased to 80/100 by the mid 1770's to 120 by 1785, the
latter giving a fully layed line of almost 7 miles with 1,000+
hooks. The average catch of these northern boats was estimated
at 800 Ling for the season compared with 300 to 500 for the
smaller boats. As the boats got bigger with more equipment, so
they became more expensive to buy and fit out: in 1735 it cost
£2-10/- to buy and equip a boat; by 1791 it was £8-19/10, and by
7
1836 it was £11-3/6.
By the late eighteenth century the fishing was reaching its
technological peak in numbers and size of boats and number of men
involved, and its ecological peak as far as catches were
concerned. In 1767 most of the boats were six-oared, 290 of the
450 at the haaf, giving a total of 2,500 men at the haaf fishing.
By the 1780's there were some 500 six oared boats with 3,000
8
fishermen, plus the shore staff. This was the maximum that the
fishing reached which suggests that there was a limit to the
fishing. After the crisis in production of the late 1760's to
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mid-1780's, the catch started to rise once more to a maximum of
1,000 tons annually, showing that the investment in larger boats
and more lines did eventually lead to larger catches. This
provides the context within which future economic development
took place, in particular the growth of Shetland as a supplier of
labour to the Greenland Whaling and the Royal Navy.
PROFITABILITY OF THE HAAF
All the writers on the haaf have stated that it was a
profitable concern for the landlord, yet there is little concrete
evidence to show how profitable the fishing actually was. There
are within the Hay records a set of calculations made by William
Hay in 1777/8 of the profitability of the fishing of Sir John
9
Mitchell's lands in Aithsting and Sandsting. These notes not
only give us an idea of the profitability of the fishing but also
an insight into the accounting techniques of an eighteenth
century merchant. Hay was interested in getting the tack of the
lands and so needed some idea of the return that he could expect.
He begins by estimating the value of the catches of the 3
previous years (1775, 1776, 1777), adding the value of oil and
butter, then subtracting the various costs from this and reaching
a figure for the profit. Mitchell had only 10 six-oared boats,
although Hay does say that there are other smaller boats that
fish at home (nearshore fishing), but it is not clear if his
figures include these or not. Hay's calculations are set out in
the figure below. If we subtract the figure for butter we get
an annual profit for the fish alone of £83-4/- stg., i.e. more
than £8 per boat. This can be regarded as a maximum figure
since even Hay recognised this as being an over-estimate, partly
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because the price of oil was currently only 35/- per barrel not
the 40/- he gives, and partly because:
Its customary to give the Fishers presents on Saturday & at
Johnsmas etc which will amount to something considerable.10
He does not give any details of how much this would be.
FIGURE 1
WILLIAM HAY'S CALCULATIONS OF THE PROFITABILITY OF
MITCHELL'S LANES IN AITHSTING AND SANDSTING: 1775-1777
Catch (for 3 previous years):
963 Quintalls Ling Fish @ 16/6 (1) £794—9/6
21 " " Tusk Fish @ 14/- £14-14/-
12 " " Cod Fish @ 9/6 £5-14/-
41\ Barrels Oil @ 40/- £83
The Lands also said to produce 441 lispunds
of Butter on which there is a profit of
2/- per lispund £44
£941-17/6
Prime Cost & Charges £648—5/6
Supposed Profit on 3 years £293-12/-
Profit for one year £97-18/4
Costs & Charges fishers oblig'd to keep up their
Shares in the Boats & not entitled to more than 5d
each or £5 Scotts the Q.
963 Quintal Ling @ 8/4 £401—5/-
33 " " Tusk & Cod @ 6/8 £11
Salt & Curing 966 Q. @ 2/6 £120-15/-
Discount of 5% on the Debenture in lieu
of Shipping Charges etc. £7—4/-
41\ barrels of Oil @ 29 cans is 1204 cans
tenant receives 1/- per can £60—4/-
41\ barrels @ 5/- per empty barrel £10—7/6
Loss on lines-10 boats require 50 lines
yearly-lines cost 19 or 20d
sell for 13d-estate loses 6d £37-10/-
£648—5/6
Notes: (1) this is the dry weight of the fish caught.
The ratio of wet fish to dry is 5 to 2.
Source:SA Hay of Hayfield. Details of
the fishing of Mitchell's tenants in Aithsting and
Sandsting. 1775-1777
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Less than a decade later James Hay (William's son) gave a
similar estimate to the Fisheries Commission of 1785. He
reckoned that the average catch in a season for a "West Side"
six-oared boat was 800 ling, for which the tenant received either
4d each or 3/4 for the cwt. for the wet fish, thus giving the
value of the catch at £13-6/8 for the fish and £2-13/4 for the
oil, a total of £16. The cost of the fish to the laird was
calculated at 8/- or 8/4 per cwt. of dried fish, which was sold
at 16/- per cwt, the cost of curing being covered by the bounty
of 3/- per cwt. According to Hay the return was:
...a Profit of an Hundred per Cent on the fishing, in the
Pocket of the Landlord, who is also understood to have a
Profit or Benefit on every article with which he supplies the
Fisher.11
On these figures then the fishing was a profitable enterprise.
The problem is calculating the other costs to the laird, the
problem of advances to the tenants, the low rents from over-
divided lands etc.
SHETLAND'S TRADE
The product of the haaf fishing was an internationally
traded commodity. The fish was shipped to the north German
ports and in return the necessities for carrying on the fishing
and foodstuffs were imported. Shetland therefore operated
within an international division of labour, within which it
specialised in a particular form of production. Like so much
else in the history of the islands we need to look at the
importance of the German merchants who controlled Shetland's
trade up until the early eighteenth century. They did much to
give the trade its form and structure.
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EXTENT AND VALUE OF THE TRADE:
EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.
Although the trade was in the hands of the German merchants
in the early eighteenth century, there were some Scottish
merchants, recognising the profitability of the commerce, who
wanted to become active in the trade. One such man, Robert
Jolly, drew up a plan to take over the trade and from this
invaluable document we can estimate the value and extent of
12
Shetland's trade at the beginning of the eighteenth century.
Jolly was the factor in Hamburg for Alexander Pyper, an
Edinburgh merchant, so Jolly would have had extensive first-hand
knowledge of the Hamburg-Shetland trade. Jolly's scheme was to
establish a Scottish merchant company to replace the Germans,
which interestingly enough was to be mainly financed by Hamburg
merchants who were willing to lend the majority of the capital
for the company. He then sets out details of the scheme, first
by calculating the requirements for one ship (100 tons burden).
For the journey to Shetland the cargo would be (note:
figures in brackets are the value in pounds Scots. In the
original document they are given in Liibeck Marks.): for the
fishing 800 ground lines (£500), and 20,000 great and small hooks
(£80), these would both be "sold" to the fishermen, and 240
barrels of "Lysbon Salt" (£1050) which would be used to cure the
fish and was a cost to production. Drink was important with
both beer (£500) and corn brandy (£500). Foodstuffs were 20
barrels of "meel" (£750). And there was also: "Lining Cloth of
Several Sort and Value (£400), several necessaries as Iron, hemp,
nails, twine, Tarre tobaco pyres Soap barrel hoopes drinking
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Cannes knives (£600). The single largest item, by value, was
money: "The Cash wanting to buy the cargoe on the other syd",
some £5,295, reflecting the extent that Shetland benefitted from
this trade. Out of this total of £9,675, only £2,930 was in
goods to be traded, £5,295 in cash to buy fish etc., and £1050
for salt for curing. The other cost were: freight of the ship
(1080), interest on £8,000 at 6% borrowed to carry on the trade
(£480), insurance (£320), and charges at Hamburg (£295).
The return cargo was to be: 20,000 ling, 6,000 cod, and
4,000 skate (weighing 85 tons) costing to buy from the fishers
£5,400. Also 80 barrels of butter (2,400), and 50 barrels of oil
(£825). Including the cost of the salt this gives the total cost
of the return cargo at £9,675. Jolly expected to be able to
sell the fish for £11,900 and the butter and oil for £4,170. The
total cost of outfitting the ship and buying the cargo was
£12,570, giving a profit of some £4,000 on the trip, a return of
approximately 30%.
Jolly estimates that the whole trade could be carried on by
5 ships, a smaller number than that usually used by the German
merchants which was eight or nine at that time (Gifford gives a
figure of ten to twelve which is an over-estimate since the trade
had decline somewhat towards the end of the seventeenth century),
and thus more likely to be profitable and have a more secure
return. If this figure is correct we can estimate the annual
Shetland trade as"being approximately: 440 tons of fish, 400
barrels of butter, and 250 barrels of oil. Costing over £48,000
to buy (with cash of approximately £26,500) but worth about
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£83,000 at the German markets. Hamburg merchants were to put up
some two thirds of the capital. Jolly makes no mention of
woollens which would have added, to the total value of the trade.
This is a useful document, and it is worth noting that
although this was to be a Scottish company taking over the trade.
it was to be financed and centred on Hamburg. It would he,
valuable to know if the German merchants involved were men well
established in the Shetland trade, and as such coming under
increasing political pressure from the Scottish government to end
their trade and ever rising payments to the lairds and crown
estate in the islands. In such conditions it was probably more
politically expedient and commercially profitable to allow
Scottish merchants to take over the trade. However, nothing
appears to have come of Jolly's plan and it was to be the
Shetlanders themselves who were to control the trade of the
Islands.
SHETLAND'S TRADE: EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS
With the shift to local control in the trade of the islands
the traditional contacts with the German ports, in particular
with Hamburg, were maintained. The lairds carried out the trade
themselves using their own ships and at their own risk; and
dealing with merchant houses in Hamburg that were well
established in the trade. One of the "new" men, Magnus
Henderson of Gardie had received a commercial education in a
Hamburg merchant house. Henderson also sent his two sons,
Magnus and William to be apprenticed to Hamburg merchants in the
13
1720's. The Hamburg market remained the single largest for
Shetland produce until the 1760's, after which the western
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Mediterranean markets, in particular Barcelona, became the most
14
important.
The reasons for this shift are not entirely clear. They
probably had as much to do with changing demand factors in the
the German and Spanish markets, of which we know little, as they
had with the changing supply position in the Islands. We do not
know if the prices in the German markets deteriorated or not, or
if it was the attraction of higher prices in Mediterranean
markets. For there is some evidence that prices were higher in
the southern markets. In the 1730's Gifford sent several
cargoes to Lisbon but with little success. At least one of
these in 1735 was on his own account, but the problems of curing
15
and transportation were not overcome. The southern markets
required a different type of cure which the Shetlanders were
slow at perfecting. By at least the 1760's southern merchant
houses were buying substantial amounts of Shetland fish for these
Mediterranean markets. These were bought and sold at the risk
of the dealers. This secure return may have been an important
factor as far as the lairds were concerned reducing their own
risk and guaranteeing payment. At this time it is not clear if
these southern merchant houses dealt directly with the lairds or
with local merchants. Some lairds did continue in the trade, but
we don't to what extent and for how long. The advantage of
using Shetland merchants was that a single order could be placed
and then left up to the local merchant to reach agreement with
the lairds on the amount they would sell and at what price. It s
not clear that a Shetland laird would be prepared to carry out
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all the functions of a merchant. From the early 1760's William
Hay along with another merchant were buying fish on behalf of a
16
London merchant house for the Spanish market. This change in
the organisation of Shetland's external trade allowed the
merchants to play a greater role in the economy but a specialised
one that was still primarily concerned with the servicing of the
existing economy; to this extent at this time they still played a
basically passive role.
TRADE WITH NORWAY
Shetland's trade with Norway was the island's oldest
economic contact. Starting in the ninth century with the Norse-
colonisation of the islands it lasted until well into the
nineteenth century. Up until the time when the islands were
ceded to Scotland the products of the islands, in particular the
products of the land taxes and crown estate, were sent to Bergen.
During the period of German domination of trade the imports from
Norway became specialised in timber and wood products, the most
famous being boats for the haaf fishing (see above for more
details on boats). There was a depression in the trade
from approximately 1350 to 1500, but from the mid-sixteenth
century it began to expand reflecting the increased demand for
boats etc., brought about by an expansion in the fishing industry
in Shetland. In the early seventeenth century ships from Orkney
and Shetland made up 10 to 20% of the ships loading in
17
Sunnhordland. This trade also led to specialisation in the




From the end of the 17 century the boatbuilders from Tynes
seem to have specialized in building boats for export to
Shetland.18
The accounts of this trade do show that other products were
bought in Bergen besides that of wood products. Early in the
eighteenth century Gifford regularly bought stores for the
fishing and even for his own household, but for these Bergen was
always regarded as being of less importance then Hamburg.
This regular trade was interrupted by the blockade of Norway
in 1807 to 1814, during the Napoleonic wars. This effectively
led to the foundation of the boatbuilding industry in Shetland,
which produced virtual copies of the Norwegian boats. However
after the war ended the trade did revive, even if not to the
extent of before the war. The Hays were importing Norwegian
boats in the 1820's, and sis late as the 1850's there were still
regular imports; for 1856-60 there were about 30s Jsieltebaade
19
(Shetland boats) exported annually to the xslands. During the
Napoleonic wars Bergen and Christiansand became important centres
for smuggling to the xslands, as well as for the re-export of
Shetland fish to the blockaded southern markets.
TRADE WITH SCOTLAND
Although the greatest amount of trside was carried on with
Germany and Norway, Scotland was becoming of increasing
importance in the eighteenth century. There is some evidence
that there were some Scottish merchants active in the southern
part of Shetland in the seventeenth century but they were of
minor importance compared with the Germans. When the Scottish
privy council attempted to exclude the Germans from the trade in
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1661 the locals lairds petitioned them to relent on the decision
20
since the ending of the trade would lead to ruin and famine.
In this they were successful; anyway it was unlikely that the
Scots could have effectively imposed such a ban. We have seen
that some Scots were interested in taking over the Shetland trade
at the turn of the century, although it was still to be centred
on Hamburg.
During the eighteenth century the Shetland lairds had more
and more dealings with merchants in Leith and Edinburgh. This
was part of a wider shift towards more social and political
contacts with Scotland as Shetland was integrated into the
Scottish/British political system. Leith in particular became
the centre for an entrepot trade with the Islands. Evidence
from the voyages of Gifford's ship suggests the development of a
21
"square" of trade: Shetland- Leith- Hamburg- Bergen- Shetland.
Similarly Edinburgh in its position as Scotland's legal and
banking centre became of greater importance for Shetland.
As the structure and organisation of Shetlands' trade
changed in the mid-eighteenth century, from being centred on
Hamburg to Barcelona, so Scottish trade became more important.
Scottish (and English) merchant houses acted as agents in buying
Shetland fish for export to the southern markets, linking
Shetland within a Scottish/British system of commercial exchange.
And Leith acted as a market for Shetlands' produce besides that
of fish. This was more of an east coast trade than being purely
Scottish and commercial/social links were established with many
English ports in particular: London, Hull, and Newcastle.
Towards the end of the century the Hays were active in widening
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these contacts into the industrial heartland of the north of
England.
THE LOCAL ORGANISATION OF FISHING & TRADE:
ROBERT SMITH OF MARRISTER
Among the Hay family papers there is the factor book of
Robert Smith for 1759 to 1769 which shows the organisation and
operation of fishing and trade in some detail and their close
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relationship. Smith was a merchant in Marrister in Whalsay
and was factor for the fishing interests of John Bruce Stewart of
Symbister (hereafter referred to as Symbister, the original
spelling has been retained), one of Shetland's major landlords.
The book deals with the economic relationship between Smith and
Symbister, so advances to the fishers are written as debits to
Symbister and the amounts of fish as credits etc., thus giving
valuable insights into the relationship between laird and
merchant in the eighteenth century. The station that Smith was
in charge of is not given. Some years are missing from the
book; 1762, 1763, 1764 and 1766, but we can still get a clear
idea of the value of the transactions over a period of time and
the range of activities. 1759 is covered in some detail in the
following paragraphs and then some summary tables for the rest of
the period are included.
The factor book begins with the amount of fish received from
Symbister's tenants, these are given for each boat not for
individual tenants, in the form of "John Robertson and partners".
There are a total of 11 boats, which caught a total of 7,272 Ling
(it was standard to give the numbers of fish caught not the
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weight since the fish were "paid" for individually), which was
made up of 7,214 plus 58 "score" Ling for which they credited 7d
per fish. Besides these fish Smith also received 300 fish from
Mr Gifford, a merchant in Hilswick, and 412 which he bought at 5d
each, in all giving a total of 7,984 fish. There were also 1
barrel 122 cans of fish oil and 16 lispunds of butter.
Against these were advances made by Smith to the fishers and
for "Sundrys Disbursed on the Trade at Hamnavoe". Smith made
advances to the fishers totalling £464-7/8 (scots. unless
otherwise stated all money is in pounds scots), only monetary
values are given in the book. At Hamnavoe various goods came to
£183-8/-, with alcohol and tobacco amounting to £79-17/- of this.
Symbister was also debited for returned goods at £137-8/-, which
included 2 ankers of wine @ £20 and 2 ankers brandy @ £20. And
for £56-3/- advanced to Mr John Campbell, who appears to be the
captain of a merchant ship, possibly owned or chartered by
Symbister to take the cargo to market.
In return for these, Symbister imported goods for Smith's
needs as a merchant, totalling £1,350. The way in which this
figure is made up gives a valuable insight into the range of
goods imported into the islands. These can be divided into 5
categories; linen and clothing, drink and tobacco, goods for the
fish trade, foodstuffs, and an "others" category. The linen and
clothing came to £406-3/6, made up of check linen, white linen,
12 pairs of shoes, mitts etc., a related item was 151b of indigo
worth £90. Drink and tobacco came to £384; only £48 was for
tobacco, the rest for alcohol. There were 3 barrels, 6 ankers
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and 6 half ankers of waters (cheap German brandy) @ £10 an anker,
and 10 ankers of Hollands gin ® £15, 4 ankers of brandy @ £20,
and 3 ankers of Corsican wine (for the table of the lairds).
Compared to these all the other categories are small. There was
only £138-16/- worth of goods for the fishing trade, mainly for
lines (£96) and hooks (£20). Foodstuff was insignificant, £33-
12/- for meal, £9 for sugar, and only £2-8/- for tea. The
"others" consisted mainly of cash, £126 for 10 Guineas. The
extent of the domination of clothing and drink is perhaps
surprising, but these were goods that were in constant demand by
the locals, and drink was regarded as a necessity for the fishing.
The final balance was in favour of Symbister to a total of
£354-5/3, which was to be carried forward to the next year's
current account. There are no values given for the fish and
butter (beside that which was bought). These would be part of
the tenant's rent account with their laird or his tacksman (as
seen in chpt. 2).
The following tables show the commercial relationship
between a merchant/factor and a laird. Table 1 shows the extent
of financial commitment made by Smith to carry on the fishing.
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TABLE 1
ADVANCES ETC. MADE BY SMITH 1759-1769
(in pounds Scots to nearest pound)
ADVANCES PAID FOR OTHER ADVANCES TOTAL(1)
YEAR TO FISHERS FISH/OIL AND COSTS
1759 521 149 327 996
1760 627 465 466 1,557
1761 926 498 475 1,899
1765 1,107 279 81 1,467
1767 667 162 200 1,029
1768 666 230 133 1,051
1769 501 92 199 791
Notes: (1) any differences in the total figure is due to rounding
of figures.
Source: SA Hay of Hayfield. Factor
acct. bk. R.Smith 1759-1769
To put these figures into some kind of perspective we need
to know the extent of the fishing carried out by Symbister's
tenants. This is given in Table 2 below, as we would expect
there was a great variation in the amount of fish caught. This
is also very revealing on the amount of fish that was purchased.
The assumption in the literature was that if not all then the
great majority of fishers were tenants. The following figures
suggest that there were many more "free" fishers then previously
thought. These would be either tenants who were not compelled
to fish or those who owned their own plot of land but were still,
due to economic necessity, forced to fish.
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TABLE 2
FISH RECEIVED BY R.SMITH 1759-1769
YEAR FROM TENANTS PAID FOR TOTAL
1759 7,514 470 7,984
1760 9,311 1,557 10,868
1761 6,869 1,671 8,540
1765 6,728 928 7,656
1767 3,793 632 4,425
1768 3,550 699 4,249
1769 2,106 294 2,400
Source: as table 1
The most striking fact to emerge from this table is the
dramatic decline in the amount of fish received both from tenants
and others, this corresponds with the contemporary evidence of a
general depression in the fishing from the late 1760's. If
these figures are correct, and they are the only concrete figures
we have for this period, then the decline was probably greater
than previously imagined. The consequences of this are plain: a
fall in income for both tenant and laird and a drop in the foreign
trade of the islands. The laird could sustain this decline
although if it continued it would pressurise his financial
resources. For the tenant it meant an increasing burden of debt
and a decline in living standards; for the merchant a drop in
his shop sales.
The decline in trade is clearly shown in table 3, where
there is a sharp drop from the mid-1760's. This table deals
with the amount of goods and cash imported by Symbister for
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(In pounds Scots, to the nearest pound.)
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Notes: (1) this is to the credit of Smith
Source: as table 1
We can see the relationship between the decline in catches
and the decline in commerce/ trade more clearly in table 4 which
summarises the above three tables in the form of indexes.
TABLE 4
INDEX SUMMARY TABLES 1-3, 1759-1769
(1759=100)
FISH FROM FISH ADVANCES TO ADVANCES
YEAR TENANTS TOTAL FISHERS TOTAL IMPORTS(1)
1759 100 100 100 100 100
1760 124 136 120 156 89
1761 91 107 178 191 153
1765 90 96 213 147 99
1767 50 55 128 103 77
1768 47 53 128 106 69
1769 28 30 96 79 52
Notes: (1) the imports will reflect the trading
position of the previous year.
Source: as table 1
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This table shows three important factors on Shetland
society/economy at this time. One is the extent of the
depression in catches in the mid to late 1760's. The second
is the strong relationship between the fishing catches and the
trade of the islands; and the third is the necessity of the laird
maintaining advances to his tenants in years of falling catches.
Assuming that the price paid for fish remained relatively stable,
and the evidence suggests this (there was only a slight rise in
the 1760's from an average of 12/- or 13/- per cwt. to 14/-) then
we can see that there was a period of worsening in Shetland's
trade balance. Other evidence shows that these figures are
generally worse than those for the Islands as a whole. This may
reflect specific local factors not representative of the Islands,
and that continued investment in the fishing on the West Side led
to less of a decline than would otherwise have occurred, although
there could have been a decline in average catches.
This chapter has the shown the intimate relationship between
the the haaf fishing and the trade of the Islands. How this
trade developed over several centuries and changes in its
structure in the eighteenth century. It also provides a
detailed example of how this system actually worked at this time.
If we combine this with the previous chapter we can see the close
relationship between production and trade and how control over
the labour of the tenant was a central aspect of the social
organisation of Shetland. Towards the end of the chapter it was
suggested that there was a decline in fishing catches. This
showed that there was a crisis in production in the Islands.
It is to that crisis that we turn to next.
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CHAPTER 4
SHETLAND AND THE SUBSISTENCE AND PRODUCTION CRISIS
OF THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
The lateft Advices from Shetland confirming
the former Accounts of the Diftreffes of the
People of the Country, from the Failure of
their Crops and Fifheries, and the Death of
their Catties, the following Particulars are
laid before the Public...1
Shetland was faced by a serious crisis in production from at
least the late 1760's onwards. The crisis took two forms: the
first was a slump in the fishing industry, the second was a
"Malthusian" subsistence crisis in agriculture. These were due
to both natural and social causes. In the literature the natural
causes have tended to be over-emphasised. What is important was
the way in which the existing form of the social organisation of
production was bringing Shetland to the brink of economic
collapse. The lairds seeing their incomes fall and the debts of
their tenants rise reacted. Attempting to maintain their
control of Shetland they proposed ways in which the economy could
be expanded with themselves remaining at the helm. It is in the
context of this crisis and the failure of the lairds that the
later expansion of trade and production of the "merchants" needs
to be understood.
Since production in Shetland depended on the annual vagaries
of fish, it was natural that there would be good and poor years.
And when there were several bad years in a row than this would
have serious social and economic effects in the islands. This
remains a crisis in production, and requires to be analysed as
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such. We have seen how over a period of several centuries
Shetland had specialised in the production of one commodity and
that this was intensified in the eighteenth century. The social
organisation of the society geared as it was to this form of
production also entered a crisis. Certain events are likely to
occur at this time; the lairds will wish to strengthen their
control over their tenantry, the tenants to maintain their exist¬
ing position. Other, more marginal groups may be able to
exploit this or the lairds and tenants can take advantage of
opportunities opened to them by changing structual circumstances.
As we shall see there were developments in the economy at this
period. Some had the effect of strengthening the hold of the
laird over the tenantry, while others undermined this control.
For example the increase of indebtedness of the tenants increased
the hold of the laird's over them, while opportunities of employ¬
ment in the Greenland whaling and even the Royal Navy undermined
the lairds control of the tenants labour.
CRISIS IN PRODUCTION
It has long been recognised that there was a serious
depression in the haaf fishing from the late 1760's onwards, and
2
Smith writes of "prolonged slump of 1769-1784" . The evidence
from the fishing of Bruce of Simbister (chpt.3) suggests that
this started before 1769. Not only was there a marked drop in
the catches but in the years before 1779 they consisted of great
3
numbers of small fish. In certain years such as 1774 the
weather was so bad that the fishing had to be ended prematurely.
Fea writing in the 1770's could state that:
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All kind of Fishing is greatly decayed here, notwithstanding
the greater pains is taken by the ye Fishers now then ever
before who with small Norway Yoells will adventure to the far
Sea, and oft times endure hard weathers. 4
There are no customs records for this period so we cannot compare
the extent of the decline in the fishing.
During the eighteenth century there had been a general
expansion of the fishing, an increasing investment in larger
boats, more lines, and the boats going further out to sea in
search for fish. This had been most marked in the northerly
parishes. This had led to a serious problem of over-crowding of
the fishing grounds with a decline in average catches per boat,
hence the need to go further out to sea, which was made worse by
the fall in catches. The lairds recognised that a reduction in
the number of boats fishing would not lead to an equal decline in
catches, indeed that such a reduction would result in an increase «
in average catches and a greater return on capital:
The Gentlemen would divide their tenants equally betwixt the
Greenland and ling fishing, which would produce a
considerable number of men for the Greenland trade... and
would divide the Gentlemens risk and loss and chance of gain
to better purpose, and it is a well known fact that the fewer
Boats which ply the ling fishing on any part of the Coast
their success is always greater. 5
The expression in catches undermined the economic stability of
the social organisation in Shetland but, this was only one aspect
of the crisis the other was a decline in subsistence agriculture,
and the increasing economic marginalisation of the tenantry.
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THE ZETLAND METHOD AND THE HWDUCTION/SUBSISTENCE CRISIS
OF THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Any "honeymoon" period that the tenants may have enjoyed on
the introduction of the "Zetland Method" was probably quite
short, and by the 1740's the method of enforcement of the system
was beginning to be oppressive (see chpt. 2). By the late
eighteenth century the logic of the system was having a dramatic
effect on Shetland society. There was a subsistence crisis
brought about by the decline in the size of holdings, a large
rise in population, and a decline in subsistence agriculture.
These were of course all inter-related, each reinforcing the
other. This marginalised the position of the agricultural econ¬
omy in general and of the tenantry in particular. This may not
have mattered in years of good fishing when there was money
enough for imported meal but when environmental factors led to a
combination of poor fishing and poor crops the precarious nature
of the Shetland system came home to roost with vengeance. Each
factor will be taken in turn.
DECLINE IN SIZE OF HOLDINGS
The logic of the "Zetland Method" was for the lairds to have
as many tenants as possible, and given only a limited amount of
land this naturally led to a general reduction in the size of the
holdings. We have only anecdotal evidence that there was a
decline in the average size of holdings, but it is extensive.
The explanation is that to increase the number of tenants the
lairds encouraged early marriage, and made land available by the
sub-division of existing holdings and by the creation of new
holdings outside the farmtoun dykes in the hill land (called
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outsets, generally of poorer quality land). James Fea wrote
that:
The situation of Shetland being so well adapted for the
fishing of Ling, Cod and Tusk, and the returns from hence, in
favourable Seasons so very advantageous, the Gentlemen of that
country have for several years past, directed their attention
entirely to this fishery; and therefore have converted some
of the larger farms on their estates into such small ones, as
commonly afford the possessors only Potatoe ground, a Cabbage
Garden etc. very little, if any, being allowed for Corn. 6
Fea clearly connects the fishing and the sub-division of land and
the decline in subsistence. In 1785 James Hay echoed these
ideas in his evidence to the Fisheries Commission:
The Landlord, in order to increase his Number of Fishers,
divides his Property into such small Farms, that the produce
of each cannot give Bread to the Family, even with the
Surplus fish. 7
This was also one of the main complaints of the ministers'
reports in the Statistical Account, in particular from the
parishes of; Aithsting, Bressay, Delting, Mid and South Yell, and
8
Walls. The minister from Walls spells it out quite firmly:
Many of their (holdings) within these 40 years being split
into triple the number. This has proceeded from the
impolitic rage for prosecuting the fishing. 9
It is noteworthy that these ministers were all important parishes
for the "prosecuting"of the haaf fishing. Accepting that there
was a reduction in the size of the average holding then there
must have been an increased marginalisation of the existing
subsistance farming.
The decline in Shetland's ability to feed itself is related
to this reduction in the size of holdings, although as early as
the seventeenth century Shetland relied on imports of food,
mainly from Orkney but also Germany, reflecting the early origins
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of the specialisation of production. One interesting indicator
of this is the decline in the use of the plough in cultivation,
to be replaced by the spade which could be used on relatively
smaller pieces of ground. As Fenton writes:
Shetland was one of the main areas of spade cultivation in
Scotland. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
intensification of its use accompanied a decline in the
number of ploughs, the fragmentation of former joint holdings
into large numbers of small units and the development of
outsets. 10
The spade was certainly a substitute for the plough, and by 1814
some nine-tenths of Shetland was cultivated by the spade. The
spade cultivation was most marked in the parishes where the haaf
was most important, giving further credance to the relation
between fishing and the reduction in the size of holdings. There
is the case of Unst where "the old "Zetland" plough had been
11
completely replaced by the spade". Meanwhile in the more
agricultural parishes (Tingwall, Whiteness and Weisdale), the old




Shetland experienced a large population increase in the
eighteenth century, particularly in the second half. In crude
figures the population rose from 15,210 in Webster's 1755 census,
to 20,451 in the O.S.A. of the 1790's, and 22,379 in 1801, a
rise of 34% between 1755 and 1790, and of 47% between 1755 and
1801. This is all the more noteworthy when compared with
13
Orkney's static population over the same period. This rise
was not even throughout the islands for it was greater in the
north which as we have seen was the main area of expansion for
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the haaf fishing. The population of Unst, Yell, Fetlar and
Northmavine grew by nearly 47% between 1755 and the 1790's, and
by almost 63% between 1755 and 1801. The population of
Northmavine, the single most important parish for the fishing,
rose by 77% between 1755 and 1790's, and by 103% up to 1801. By
comparison Lerwick's (& Gulberwick) population had risen by only
14
5.5% between 1755 and the 1790's.
The standard explanation for this great rise is that it was
almost entirely due to the fall in the death rate. This was
through a combination of factors. The success of inoculation
against smallpox is regarded as the most important, and the folk
hero of "Johnny Notions" who did much to make inoculation
acceptable to the people is often presented sis an expression of
the innate intelligence and inquisitiveness of the Shetlander.
The introduction of the ubiquitous potato from the 1730's
improved the general diet. This decline of the death rate
combined with the encouragement of early marriage led to the
large population rise of the second half of the eighteenth
15
century. At the present there is insufficient evidence to
either support or replace this theory. As it stands it is too
simplistic. Either there was a very high birth rate in Shetlsind
which after a rapid decline in the death rate led to a rapid
population increase, or the effects of smallpox epidemics have
been exaggerated. All that is clear is that there was a rise in




By at least the 1770's the islands were entering into a
classic "Malthusian" subsistence crisis where the population had
outstripped the agricultural resources, and the fishing industry
had reached its peak within the existing technology . Even in
good years the country was only able to feed itself for two-
thirds of the year, and in poor years, at best between a third
and a half. In the dearth of 1784, the harvest only produced
5,000 bolls of meal out of an estimated requirement of 22,500.
Even in a good year 5,000 to 10,000 bolls needed to be
16
imported. The only other resource that the people had were
their animals, which they grazed on the hills. As a
contemporary wrote in the 1770's:
The wealth or poverty of the Inhabitants consist chiefly or
arised from the produce of their cattle & sheep. 17
These were not only a source of food but could be used to
pay off debts and acted as a safeguard against future hardship.
But the rise in the number of holdings had led to increasing
pressure on the hill grazing and a drop in the average number of
cattle and sheep held by each family. This position was
aggravated by the bad winter of 1783-1784 which killed off many
livestock and made the dearth of 1782-1784 that much worse. The
lairds sent a petition to the House of Commons in 1784 to get
relief for the Island:
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That their two laft Years Crops had failed in a greater
Degree than ever known, and, by the Length and Severity of
the laft Winter, moft of their Sheep and Cattle have Died,
and many of the poor People have been loft for Want of the
real Neceffaries of Life.-That their Fifheries had almoft
totally failed, and the Land-Owners of the Country had
fupported the Inhabitants until all their Refources were (
exhaufted.-That at this Time there is Bread to be bought, but
the Funds of the Land-Owners being expended, and the Sheep
and Cattle belonging to the poor People dead, their Diftrefs
is only aggravated by feeing a Relief which they are now
incapable of purchafing. 18
There was interest throughout Britain in sending money and food;
bankers in Hull, Lincoln, York, and Leeds all collected
subscriptions as well as in Edinburgh where Alexander Alison of
the Excise-Office co-ordinated the relief. In the Islands
Robert Hunter, John Bruce and Thomas Bolt were in charge of the
distribution of any foodstuffs sent.
In the mid-1780's sheep scab broke out in Dunrossness and
relentlessly worked its way northwards, all attempts at stopping
it failing. The sheep population declined from an estimated
20
100,000 in 1790 to between 70,000 and 80,000 in 1814, a drop
from an average of 5 per head to just over 3. In the severe
winter of 1784 large numbers of animals died, in Delting it was
recorded that 4,506 sheep and 427 black cattle were killed.
This further marginalised the position of the tenants, forcing
them into debt and requiring aid from outside the Islands.
This was generally a bad time for harvests and the fishing.
There was only 5 years between 1756 and 1824 in which both the
fishing and the harvest were good. And there were dearths in;
22
1759, 1766", 1772-74, 1778, 1781-6, and 1811-13. The
concentration in the 1770's and 1780's meant that there was no
time to build up stocks. Matters were, on the whole , worse in
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the north of the country, where the land was poorer and the
fishing of greater importance. In the 1770's William Balfour
writing on Unst stated:
The common stocks of wealth is reduced at least two
thirds, and there is not now, in these Isles, nor in all the
country one yoke of oxen for six 50 years ago
[the people were in great debt]...thus it became common for
men who never had £100 Scots of Stock to be 2 or £300 often
more in debt to there landlords & to continue so all their
lives. 23
Another contemporary writer, George Low travelling through
the islands in 1774 recognised the effects that the existing
social organisation was having on the people, and that their
indebtedness was in danger of destroying the fishing, the very
basis of the system itself:
always keep the fisherman in debt; and; if not remedied, must
end in the fishing altogether
[and that the people would emigrate if they had the chance]
and could they get themselves properly headed, I believe the
people would emigrate from most parts of the country in
shoals. 24
Captain James Kyd in his evidence to the Fisheries Commission
warned the commission on the great poverty of the people:
If an Emancipation of the Shetland Fishers is intended, care
must be taken to provide immediate employment and Subsistence
for them, otherwise they would starve, the most of them being
in absolute poverty. 25
In chapter 2 we saw how this form of social organisation of
production was coming in for increasing criticism at this period,
both internally from merchants like Hay and the local clergy, and
externally from the church and men who wished to see Shetland's
economy develop. All viewed the "Zetland Method" as being
damaging to the moral well-being of the people and to the ability
of the economy to develop (these two issues were seen as
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different sides of the same coin to such men). In this light it
is interesting to reflect that the "Zetland Method" was itself
the creation of a small number of commercially minded men, men
who wished to gain a footing for the produce of their land in the
great commercial markets of their day. They built on the
traditions left them by the Scot lairds and the German merchants
and created the system of "fishing tenures". In less than a
century the logic of this system was bringing the xslands into a
serious crisis.
RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS
Faced by this crisis in the social/economic fabric of the
Islands those who were operating the system were forced to
respond. Their actions took three forms: (1) the
intensification of the existing form of production, (2) expansion
into new areas of production, (3) the emancipation of the
tenantry. We have already seen (above and in chpt.3) how
throughout the slump in fishing of the late 1760's to mid-1780's
the lairds increased their investment into the haaf. On the one
hand this reflected the basic economic conservatism of the lairds
but on the other it appeared to contemporaries to be reasonable
and sensible as the fishing was bound to improve eventually. It
is the second and third forms of response that is of greater
interest; the second took (at least) three distinct attempts: (a)
to rationalise Shetland's role as supplier of labour to the
Greenland whaling, (b) to establish a herring fishery based on
Shetland, (c) the establishment of a linen industry in Shetland,
(these are not in chronological order). The third response was
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significant if limited, but did not provide a model for others to
follow.
The attempt by the lairds to put under their control the
supply of labour to the Greenland whalers is dealt with in detail
in chapter 6. What is important is that they failed and opened
the way for others to take control of this lucrative trade. If
they had succeeded they would have guarranteed themselves a
regular supply of income as they proposed to control all aspects
of the mens' employment. The lairds would decide who could go
to the whaling and they, not the whale owners, would set the wage
rates and make all the payments to the men. In effect the
tenants would be involved in wage labour but without relations
based on cash payments, the "cash nexus" without the cash.
STATE INTERVENTION: THE HERRING FISHERY
The second response as stated above is somewhat more
ambitious; it was to establish Shetland as the centre for the
British herring industry through government subsidies. The
history of the herring industry is dealt with in chapter 7.
What is interesting about Shetland was that although a huge
international fishery took place around its shores, and had done
for many centuries, to the island, herring had only been of
marginal importance compared to stockfish. In a fascinating
document entitled:
Some Cursory Observations upon the Herring Fishing carried on
upon the Coasts of Shetland, by the Dutch, and of late by
most of the Northern Powers in Europe, showing the advantages
that would probably arrive to Britain by her excluding all
European Nations from that Fishery, & taking the management
thereof interely to herself.(dated Febuary 1781) 26
John Bruce goes into extensive detail on the establishment of a
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herring industry in Shetland and how it would benefit Britain as
a whole. This document is so revealing that it is worthwhile
going into it in some detail.
The paper is divided into four sections. The fj.rst is a
history of the failure to establish a British herring industry.
The second is on the extent of the Dutch and other "foreign
powers" herring fisheries off Shetland. The third sets out the
possibility of encouraging the Shetlanders (and Orcadians) to
develop the industry themselves. The fourth states the
advantages that such an industry would be to the nation as a
whole. It is these last two sections that are the most
interesting.
The main reason that there had never been a successful
British herring industry was that the efforts had always
attempted to copy the Dutch. It was much more expensive for the
British to man and equip the 60 ton busses as used by the Dutch,
and because of the bounty laws (crews had to from the home port
of the ship, and bounty was only paid on ships of 20 tons and
over) the British ships had never been able to take advantage of
the cheaper but experienced labour in Shetland. And because of
the cost of buying and equipping even a small trial of boats on
the Dutch system, estimated at seven to eight thousand pounds
sterling, the Shetlanders had never been able to establish their
own fishery. The scheme as proposed was for the bounty
regulations to be changed so that small boats could be used, the
small open boats currently used at the haaf. Once the fishing
had been established on a firm footing there would be great
benefits for the country as a whole.
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Bruce develops this in a classic mercantile form. Britain,
or the "Parent State" as he writes, would benefit from the
exclusion of the
. Dutch and other "foreign powers" from a
"British" resource. The fishery would lead to rapid rise in
population. In this pre-Malthusian/ pre-industrial world
population was seen as the main source of national power and
wealth. The current population of Orkney and Shetland was
estimated at 50,000 and Bruce believes that this could rise to
500,000 (Bruce was nothing if not optimistic).
He then goes on to compare Orkney and Shetland with the
Dutch republic and the American colonies. Although Orkney and
Shetland are small islands they are no smaller than the wealthier
and most populous of the Dutch provinces, and they had made their
wealth from their fishing around Shetland:
They consist both together of about 15 hundred sqare miles,
which space is not a vast deal inferior to some of the most
populous Provinces of the seven united States; and yet the
most solid support of these states...has been their fisheries
all of which have been carried on upon, and along the coasts
of Shetland.27
The comparisons with the American colonies is perhaps of the
greatest historical interests since it locates the document
within a contemporary debate on development in Scotland and it
pre-dates the argument of John Knox by three years. The
colonies had cost the country much to defend and develop and now
they are in a state of revolt against Britain. The money spent
on the colonies would have been better spent on developing the
northern parts of Britain instead, for there not only would there
have been a greater expansion of trade and commerce at a much
smaller cost but also they would be much easier and cheaper to
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defend than more distant colonies. It is worthwhile giving an
extensive quote from the document which will show the
mercantilist nature of the argument and its relation with the
contemporary debate on development:
Our American Collonies on the Continent have revolted and
distant Colonies must always be fixed by a more precarious
tenure and defended and governed at a much greater Expence
than Territories nearer the Parent State. Orkney and
Shetland may justly be looked on in the light of a
Colony... these islands are at present but little improved and
have hitherto been neglected by Government; yet if Government
would give proper attention to the great consequences, and to
the improvement of the Islands of Orkney and Shetland, in
agriculture Fisheries and manufactures, their population
would increase with amazing rapidity and they would probably
become in time the source of great wealth and Power to the
Parent State. The effects of their improvement would br
felt by Britain alone and by increase of Population, Britain
would derive more Benefit,...supposing them to only increase
to 200 thousand,...than she has ever recieved from a million
of Inhabitants in the new world, in her sole right of being
the Parent State; These Collonies have all of them cost
Britain very large sums of money to support and defend them,
and they have to be sure enlarged her Commerce and Marine.
These Islands would cost Britain little to defend and as
little to support them, they would proportionaly increase her
Commerce and would give an effectual assistance in the
defence of the Parent State, being in Fact a part of it, when
attacked by a foreign Enemy. This is a subject of great
importance to Britain at present. The increase of
population in a State increases its Power, and in time its
wealth. To Britain the increase of population caused by the
increase of Fisheries is of much greater importance than any
other; it Breeds Seamen for the defence of the State, and of
all manufactures or any other business, a Fishery is by far
the best calculated for a poor Country. In Manufactures if
a workman cannot sell his goods he must starve but if Fish
will not sell it may be eaten and it is said that above all
other food it promotes fecundity so that, if promoting
population increases the Power and wealth of a State, the
encourageing of a Fishery in that State, is in fact promoting
(if the expression may be used) the manufacturing of the
human Species, and of food for its subsistence!28
Alas the "Parent State" felt no particular need to develop this
internal colony, perhaps it was too busy fighting half of
Europe, but more likely it continued in its general indifference
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to the fate of its most northerly isles. The future of Shetland
was not to be decided by direct state intervention.
THE LINEN INDUSTRY
The attempt to establish a linen industry was the first
.attempt to introduce manufacturing industry into the islands.
Like the two examples above it begins with a great deal of
optimism on the potential for the islands and the people, then
step by step the promises are not fufilled and it finally fails.
There are two distinctive points about the linen industry in
Shetland: one, that the lairds actually invested their own
capital into the business (along with some state encouragement),
and two, that it was a united effort between "laird" and
"merchant". The linen industry provided an opportunity for the
laird to increase his wealth from the labour of his tenants in
particular from women and girls who did little to add directly to
their wealth. By its nature, owing to the need for a
centralised factory and bleachfield which required a large
capital outlay, the industry called for an unprecedented degree
of united effort from the "Gentlemen" of Shetland. Besides a
mention in the Statistical Account very little is known about the
linen industry in Shetland; Wills only mentions it in passing and
Smith is unable to give it the discussion it requires. The
following should go someway in rectifying this situation.
The origins of the scheme are not clear but the evidence
suggests a combination of the ambitions of William Hay and the
Mitchell family (in particular Lady Mitchell the wife of Sir John
Mitchell of Westshore). Lady Mitchell had close contacts with
the Commisioners and Trustees for Improving Fisheries and
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Manufactures in Scotland (generally known and refered to as the
Board of Trustees), and represented them in Shetland throughout
this period. In 1765 she was offering incentives to grow flax.
William Hay was at this time a tacksman in Papa Stour and he had
shown an early interest in getting his tenants to grow flax and
to learn spinning, to the extent of employing a Lerwick woman to
set up a spinning school in the island. In 1766 he engaged
Robert Moodie, a weaver from Falkirk to teach the trade to the
locals, he also made enquiries to "engage a Servant woman that
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understands the bringing up of Flax".
Both Hay and the lairds wanted the industry to be operated
on a much more extensive footing. They envisaged the
establishment of a significant industry based on the labour of
many hundreds. A plan was outlined for the whole population to
be involved in the production of linen mainly by spinning. At
first the tenants would need to be forced to carry out this extra
burden, and it was suggested that this could easily be organised
as part of the existing method of social organisation by making
spinning a part of the lease:
...the method of force (its humbly thought) should be, that
every proprietor in the country shall set his lands to his
tenants with that new clause, that each tenant should cause
to be spun in his family 1 pound of lint in the year for each
merk of land he labours, & each outsetter 1 lib for each 5/-
of debt he pays. 31
Once the people were used to the industry and shown how mutually
profitable it was they would soon increase their effort by
themselves:
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When the profit arising therefrom is hereby forced on there
sences, they will voluntary extend the quantity spun for
their private emolument, so that what at first may appear a
tyranicall compulsion, they will in a little time gladly
embrace as a necessary & profitable duty. 32
If this plan was to be carried out then the total product of the
islands was estimated at 40,000 yards of cloth, calculated in the
following way.
10,500 merks of land paying cess
5,500 " superior property and umboth
16,000 merks, & the same number of libs of lint spun
allowing each outsetter to pay an average 15/- stg. per,
is 3 lib lint each; sis 380 families will be
1,140 pounds of lint from outsetters
17,140 pound, besides what may be spun in gentlemens families,
amongst the independent & better sort, & in the towns of
Lerwick & Scalloway, which cannot be reckoned less than
2,860
20,000 lib, which will amount to about 40 thousand yards of
cloath 33
The teneint was to receive for spinning 2d per hank (compared to
3d in Edinburgh and 2d in Orkney), totalling some £500 which:
would be neat gain to, and soley by, the labour of the
poorest class,vizt women and girls 34
The estimated profits from this plan was to be over 600 per
annum, greater if the quality of the cloth were to be high and
the amount was to rise.
The immediate need was to establish a bleachfield and a
factory. To this end Hay apprenticed his eldest son James in
1767 (he left Shetland in January 1768), to Sandeman of Luncarty
(near Perth) to learn the trade. He was "to be taught the whole
art of Bleaching in two years". It was arranged by Lady
35
Mitchell that all the costs were to be paid by the trustees.
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On his return in 1770 the "Company of Linen Manufacturing in
Shetland", was established (also known sis the firm of "Sir John
Mitchell & Co."), the subscribers to which included a virtual
who's who of Shetlsind Society. Hance Smith states that the
compsiny, "was backed mainly by landowners and merchants with
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indirect interests in the haaf fishing". Yet the most
important names included among the subscribers were: Sir John
Mitchell of Westshore, John Bruce of Sumburgh, John Stewart of
Simbister, Gideon Gifford of Busta, William Mouat of Garth, and
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Robert Hunter of Lunna. These were the most powerful men in
the land and at least the last four were all active in the haaf
fishing. The initial capital was to be 750 stg. (later
increased to 1050 stg.), Hay's share being one-sixth. Of this
500 was to spent on the building of a weaving "shop" of 12 looms
and a bleachfield, both at Catfirth. The rest was to be spent
on stock. In his position as manager Hay was to be paid a
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salary of £35 a year.
The organisation of the company was not conducive to its
future development. The plan as outlined above was never
introduced to any great degree. The factory was to receive yarn
from the lairds; this was then to be woven into cloth and
bleached; it was then to be returned to the laird with a charge
made according to the length/type of cloth. In effect this
meant that the company was producing linen as required by the
local lairds, subsidised by the investments made by the trustees,
and not as a commercial company making its own cloth for sale
either for internal use or export. The result was general
under-use of the facilities; there was often not enough work for
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the weavers, unit costs were too high, and the resulting cloth
could not compete with imported Scottish/ German linen either in
cost or quality.
One of Hay's main jobs was to train apprentices, and as late
as 1775 he was being urged to take on as many as 8 to 10 although
there are only records for 4: John Ogilvie, John Goodie, Charles
Cumming, and James Nicolson. One of the reasons that the
company was so keen to have apprentices was that they were
subsidised by the trustees. Besides the apprentices there were
at least 6 weavers: David Keller, John Moodie, George Greig,
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David Aitkin, Hugh Robertson, and John Paul.
Things did not seem to go well for the business even from
its earliest days«. In 1773 there were complaints that Hay was
charging the company too much for meal, flour, spirits and
tallow. By 1774 Hay and Bruce of Simbister were on bad terms
over the quality and quantity of the cloth produced. Hay was
even contemplating emigrating. He also had problems in his
relations with the weavers; he complained of their laziness and
they of his authoritarian attitudes. The company struggled on
until 1776 when Hay refused any further work and the weavers were
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idle. The company was wound up in that year with a loss to
all concerned. As late as 1780 John Bruce of Sumburgh was still
trying to get money out of Hay for "a quantity of Yarn Stole and
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Embazzeled".
The collapse of the company seriously affected Hay's
relationship with the lairds. They blamed him for the loss and
were less inclined to deal with him in other commercial matters.
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In 1777 John Richardson & Co. of Perth, with whom Hay bought
fish, wrote to him stating that:
We have had it hinted to us that it is against our interest
you not being in the Best terms with the Gentlemen of the
Country- It may be so we should be sorry that you were on
such terms as to oblige them by receiving fish of an inferior
quality. 42
If anything it had the opposite effect, pushing Hay on to being
even more determined in establishing himself in Shetland society.
He was to move to Lerwick and set up his mercantile business
there.
EMANCIPATION
There were two landowners who freed their tenants from the
existing tenure system in the 1770's, John Bruce of Sumburgh and
The Earl of Zetland (only some of his tenants were freed). Two
points are interesting from this "emancipation"; it was limited
to the southern/ central part of the island, and was not copied,
at that time, by any of the other lairds for reasons that will
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become apparent. In 1774, John Bruce set out an agreement for
the release of his tenants from compulsory fishing in return for
raised money rents (tacksman refers to the fact that the rents
are to be paid in cash and are on fixed term leases), the most
important points of which were:
Art. 1st That John Bruce of Sumburgh designs to set his
estate in the parishes of Cunningsburgh, Sandwick and
Dunrossness in a different manner from any hitherto attempted
in Zetland...
4d...each tacksman has full liberty to fish for himself, cure
and sell his own fish to whom he will, and he may buy sell
every article of produce such as fish oil, meal, cattle &c to
whom he pleases, and he may deal in any kind of merchandise
he pleases;...
8th Every tacksman will have liberty to fish from any part of
Sumburghs ground as he pleases, let his farm and his house be
never so remote; and Sumburgh will use his interest for
liberty of landing and fishing from any other place in
Zetland that his tacksman shall choose to go and fish from.44
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Bruce was releasing his tenants but emphasised the importance of
the fishing. The parishes mentioned were not important for the
far haaf, but were good for nearshore and winter fishing. The
fishing in these areas was not as productive as that of the north
and had not seen the investment in boats and equipment of the
north. These parishes were also generally of better quality,
agriculturally, then the north. Therefore there was not the
same financial dependence on the fishing as there was on the
north nor the need for returns on the capital investment.
Similarly the "emancipation" on the lordships' estate was
also geographically limited, this time to the central belt
covering the parishes of Whiteness, Weisdale, and Tingwall, also
the island of Trondra (on the west side near Scalloway). In the
1770's the chamberlain of the estate was William Balfour who
wrote a invaluable survey of the estate, with comments on the
general social and economic conditions of the island at this
crucial period. In this he calls those lands where the tenants
had been "free'd from all oppresive prestations and Restrictions"
as being, "generally the least commodious for the great
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fishing". In Whiteness, Weisdale, and Tingwall, there had
been previous attempts to improve the land but to no avail, so
raising money rents and freeing the tenants was tried with some
success. Trondra was good for the winter fishing but not for the
haaf; here too the combination of raising rents and freeing the
tenants had led to improved conditions. Balfour is clear that
this has benefited the tenants and on the reasons why:
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...they are better fed, better clothed and more comfortably
lodged than they were ten years ago & they seem to feel the
change. Their industry being now for themselves & families
they appear evidently animated to greater exertion. 47
The emancipation of tenants therefore were limited to areas
with certain characteristics; those that would benefit from
agricultural improvement, and where the haaf fishing was not the
main fishing but where there were important spring and winter
fishing. These conditions did not hold for the north of the
Islands. Furthermore those lairds who had invested heavily in
new boats and equipment were the least likely to free there
tenants and allow them to fish for others. It is in this period
that we see the creation of internal regions within the Shetland
economy with a degree of geographical specialisation.
The failure of these schemes had two significant effects in
the historical development of the islands. Firstly it
reinforced the position of the haaf fishing in the political
economy of production as far as the lairds were concerned.
Secondly it led to James Hay (and some others but most
importantly Hay) establishing himself as an innovator within the
economy. It is important to see this in relation to the
failures of the lairds and not as some necessary historical
division of effort in the control of Shetland's economy. Also
it is in this period of retrenchment of the lairds that we see
the conflict between laird and merchant. The emancipation of the
tenants was important for the economic activity of the merchants
and for the response it received from the other lairds, but its
very limited nature actually reinforced the social organisation
of production in the northern half of the islands.
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MERCHANT AND LAIRDS
It is within the context of this crisis in production that
we need to see and assess the laird/merchant distinction that so
much is made of in the literature. The contention is that there
was a shift in the social and economic control of Shetland from
the lairds to the merchants, and that these are socially and
economically distinct "classes" with opposed interests, since the
merchants are landless and the lairds depend on the land for
their income etc. The assumption, and since it is never clearly
stated it remains an implicit assumption, is that the merchants
are the agents of modernisation, the ubiquitous "capitalists",
and the lairds, if not feudal lords, then at least the defenders
of a pre-capitalist world. The problem as it stands can be
summed up in a quotation from Wills:
The end of the Napoleonic Wars saw the beginning of the
merchants' rise to real prosperity, and their increased
confidence in challenging the hegemony of the lairds....[and
that]...The history of the nineteenth century struggle
between merchants and lairds has yet to be written. 48
This identifies two opposed social groups locked in a struggle
for the supremacy of the islands. Wills does not go onto
elaborate this struggle and the form it took. One of the
original aims of this study was to search out that very struggle
and this was an important reason for the concentartion on the Hay
papers. However, as is so often the case, the theory predicting
the struggle depends on an abstraction that bears little resemb¬
lance to social reality; and is of limited value when actually
considering the particular events and conditions in Shetland.
The distinction between merchant and laird needs to be qualified
and examined, and the "struggle" put into context.
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The main example used by both Smith and Wills as a concrete
expression of this struggle is that of Peter Innes' dispute with
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the Mouats. Innes was a Lerwick merchant and The Mouats among
the most important lairds in the Isles. Innes begins his
memorial with a description of the social structure of Shetland:
The Islands of Shetland, contain about Twenty Thousand
Inhabitants, who may be Ranked & distinguished into Three
Clafses.
First the Lairds or Gentry /Except Sir Laurence Dundas/
hold the whole or greatest part of the Lands in these
Islands.
Secondly, the Merchants, or in other words People who
have no Land Estate in the Country, and they mostly reside in
the Village of Lerwick.
Thirdly, the Tenants & fishers who immediatly Hold their
little pofsefsions off the Lairds,...50
This establishes the class structure of the Islands and makes the
distinction between laird and merchant that of the possession of
property. Innes further goes on to describe the Mouats and
as:
In short a Line of Lairds, I should have said of Forts, is
formed from Unst...to Sumburgh,...just in a direct line,
North & South, being the whole length of the Country.
Whereby they and their doers have good opportunity to
distress the people of Lerwick. 51
Innes had crossed the Mouats by buying some land that William
Mouat had wanted for his son. The Mouats were in a powerful
position in Shetland society, being related to other and even
more influential lairds. Through the patronage of Dundas John
Mouat was able to get the position of Surveyor of Customs. Thus
allowing them to exploit this position to smuggle. Using this
position they seized in April of 1776 Innes' sloop the John &
Robert for smuggling, which he claimed he had only used to carry
wood from Norway and on which he had paid duty. Innes accusses
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the lairds of being involved in smuggling and claims that he had
taken part because of the customs being in Lerwick.
In some aspects this supports the the thesis of lairds
versus merchants, but only to a limited extent. He does claim
that the population of Lerwick, "...enjoyed a state of freedom,
unknown to all the other people of Shetland", and that the
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lairds, "...live like so many small Princes on their Estates."
However he makes no comments on the improving of the conditions
of the tenantry; that they should be employed in any way differ¬
ent from that as they are at the present indeed, when he
describes the situation of the tenants he assumes that their
conditions are inevitable given the siruation in Shetland:
...these Tenants, stands bound, Not Only to give and deliver
to the Lairds, their annual Produce,...at a small and
undervalue, But also, not to Buy from any person whatever,
any sort of Merchandize or goods but from the Laird only who
sets his own price on these goods.
This and nothing else could enduce any Man to Purchase
lands in Shetland, ... [emphasis mine] 52
Innes bought land near Lerwick; it would be interesting to know
how he organised his estate, it is known that James Hay bought
53
fish from Innes in 1780. In the end the Innes example is
trivial, simply because it is conflict not over opposed interests
in relation to the organisation but to personal greed. It raises
no questions or issues on the organisation of Shetland. The
structure of economy and society would be the same if organised
by men like Innes. It is only through seeing the area of
conflict as being in the sphere of production, and only then over
the restructuring of the social organisation of production that
we can really talk about class conflict in Shetland. This can
be made clearer by looking at a further example by Wills.
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In a section entitled "The Upstart Merchants of Lerwick",
Wills recounts the story of a dispute between William Hay and
John Mouat in 1824. Mouat had built docks at "Garth's Pool"
outside Lerwick, rivaling Hay's Freefield docks in size. Hay
used his influence with the Collector of Customs to make sure
that Garth's Pool would not be within the legal boundaries of
Lerwick, since all goods would have to be examined by the Customs
in the town thus increasing the cost and difficulty of using the
docks. This restriction was only lifted after an appeal to the
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House of Lords (Wills doesn't give the date of this). This
can hardly be called class conflict, indeed it highlights the
"innovative" and active role of the Mouats in the economy as late
as the 1820's. This is the form of dispute that any business
men would be involved in, using influence to gain advantage over
rivals.
We have to look at the evidence presented by James Hay to
the Fishery Commission in 1785 (chpt.2) to see a Shetlander
arguing for a new way of organising production, that of free
labour. His attempt at introducing a herring fishery in 1786
based on free labour failed, although both he and his son William
were at the forefront of establishing the later herring and cod
fisheries (chpts. 7 & 8). This was conflict over opposed
interests, and it was recognised as such. However it was not
conflict between merchant and laird but between capitalist and
laird. This is an important difference. The term "merchant"
just does not convey the differences over which conflict arises;
in the case of Shetland that is over control of the labour of the
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tenants. this provides the arena for conflict, but even here it
can only be termed class conflict if it is over the organisation
of that labour, since there would be no real difference in social
terms if the fishing tenure system was continued no matter who
controlled it. As such' the conlict between merchant and laird
becomes meaningful when the merchant no longer is a merchant,
that is it is when the "merchant" attempts to restructure social
relations on a different bases. In Shetland the James Hay wished
to establish "capitalist" social relations, few merchants did.
Furthermore it emphasises the internal nature of conflict that it
was over the labour of Shetlanders not over the control of
external trade.
This chapter has dealt with the production and subsistence
crisis in Shetland in the late eighteenth century. It has
argued that the existing form of social organisation was coming
under increasirg,pressure due to this crisis. Several changes
were either contemplated or attempted by the lairds with little
or no effect. Although in some areas tenants were freed from the
obligation to fish for the laird in return for increased rents.
The result of this was to reinforce the existing system in
certain parts of the Islands but, at the same time shows that
this system was effectively bankrupt. The Shetland economy
relied on a combination of good harvests and good catches at the
fishing, this was a combination rarely experienced. The crisis
did open the economy to changes, and these were stregthened by
the structural change in Shetland's relationship with the world
economy. It is to these changes and to the central role played by
the Hay family that we must now turn.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN SHETLAND'S ECONOMY: 1770-1820
As granting the Defendant a Speculative
Adventurer he may thereby very Essentialy
influence his own interest. Yet the
Experience of almost all Country's of every
Age has proved beyond doubt the benefit &
Utility of Speculation, to which Britain owes
its present Excellence in Agriculture,
Manufactures, Fisheries & every Branch of
Trade.2
The previous chapters have detailed the organisation of
Shetland's society and economy and the crisis in the islands in
the late eighteenth century. It is within this context that we
need to assess the subsequent developments in Shetland. There
are too many changes in the structure of the economy and society
to be covered in one chapter, and these are detailed in the
following four chapters. At the centre of all of these develop¬
ments are the Hay family, first James then his son William. The
story is one of continual growth, expansion, and diversification;
all the more remarkable for the troubled and uncertain times that
were this period.
This chapter looks at some of the changes in the trade and
commerce from the 1770's up to the 1820's and the forming of the
Shetland Bank when the economy entered a new period. It will
focus upon the character of James Hay, since he played, such an
important role in the islands economy at this time. A marxist
would see in his actions a form of primitive accumulation, and to
a degree this was true. Hay was a capitalist, he accumulated
capital, by whatever means, and invested that capital into
productive activities. Weber would have been proud of him, even
though his accounting was less then "rational" on occasions. He
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had that concern for detail in business and commercial matters
that was so important in maintaining profit margins and securing
returns. Indeed he can be compared to MacDougal Hay's character
"Gillespie", and between himself and his son William they came
close to dominating the economy of Shetland, although they did
3
not capture the soul of the people as "Gillespie" did.
The start of any outline of changes must be the fish trade
because of its central importance in the Shetland economy. This
was a difficult time for the trade due to the general dislocation
caused by the French wars. However high prices for fish in home
markets more than compensated for the difficulties and general
rise in foodstuffs. The high duties of this period meant that
there was substantial smuggling going on throughout Shetland at
this time. James Hay was one of the most active and successful
t
smugglers and the profits from this "trade" was an important
element in his growing prosperity. James (and later William)
invested their wealth in property as well as in new areas of
production (chpts. 7 and 8). The following describes their
important role in the development of the economy in this period.
THE FISH TRADE
After the failure of the linen industry James Hay became
active as a trader in the produce of the country. Within a few
years he was to be the single largest buyer of fish in the
islands, doing so not only as an agent for southern merchant
houses but also for himself. As such the structure and
organisation of Shetland's trade at the end of the eighteenth
century and into the nineteenth were greatly influenced by him.
At the very least he speeded up the trend whereby merchants
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replaced the lairds in controlling external trade.
It is known that from the 1760's there wadjp. shift in the
organisation of trade related to the change in markets. Merchant
houses in London, Liverpool, Leith, and Glasgow, were buying
Shetland fish for southern European markets. This established
the form of organisation of trade that was to dominate well into
the nineteenth century. The merchant house ordered fish for the
foreign market from a local representative, either a laird or a
4
well placed merchant like Thomas Bolt. The fish was picked up
in the islands then shipped to the destined market. This form
of organising the trade was closely related to the shift in
markets for Shetland fish from northern Europe, to the westen
Mediterranean. The incentive for the lairds was greater
financial security, and also higher prices for their fish. By
the 1770*s the structure of this trade was for local merchants to
act as intermediates between the producer and the buyer.
James Hay first entered this to any extent in 1777, when he
began buying fish on behalf of the Perth merchant houses of John
Richardson & Co., and Robert Scott Moncreiff & Co.. For them he
bought 150 tons which was sent out in two cargoes. The first
met with low prices in Barcelona and incurred a large loss. The
second was sent to Gibraltar then forwarded to other markets in
Italy, France, and Spain, and made a substantial profit more than
covering the earlier loss. Also in that year he bought fish for
Robertson & Ronald of Leith, but they only wanted a small cargo
5
of tusk (£60 to £100 worth) and one ton of ling.
The actual organisation of the trade was for Hay to take a
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part share; in the above case he had a quarter share, Richardson
a half and Moncreiff a quarter. Hay also received commission of
two and a half percent and his costs. This was an extension of
the existing system of creating partnerships for individual
"adventures", a partner being more likely to work actively to
improve the fortunes of himself, and therefore all concerned,
than if he merely received a commission. In this case Hay
bought the best quality fish possible and therefore got the best
prices at market.
Hay was quickly established as a major buyer of fish. In
1779 he sent a large cargo to Italy which made a loss; and a
shipment of 128 tons for the Amsterdam house of Blau & Co., in
which he had a quarter share. 1780 was a good year for Hay, for
he bought nearly 335 tons of fish at the prime cost of £4,722.
The single largest amount was from John Bruce Stuart of Simbister
from whom Hay bought slightly over 77.4 tons for £1,122. Hay
also bought substantial amounts from Simbister in 1782, 77.4 tons
6
again, and in 1783, 52.8 tons. At this time the total annual
produce of the islands was in the region of 800 to 1,000 tons of
7
dried fish, for 1783 Goodlad gives a figure of 740 tons. Hay
therefore was accounting for something in the region of a third
of the total produce of the islands, and he certainly regarded
himself as the single largest buyer and trader in Shetland. He
also seems to have overcome any earlier problems he had with the
lairds and was on close and friendly terms with some of the most
important such as Bruce of Simbister, although his success was
not received with unanimous acclaim from the more established
buyers; for example James Linklater writing to Hunter of Lunna in
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1782 commented on lairds selling their fish to Hay saying, "An
8
Old dealer has little chance I see".
The annual structure of the trade was for the southern
merchant houses to place their orders with Hay (or the other
r
dealers) in January or Febuary. Hay would then spend February,
March, and possibly April reaching agreements with the lairds/
curers on the amount of fish they were willing to let him have
and at what price and where and when it could be collected. In
September and October cured fish were collected from haaf
stations throughout the islands and then shipped to the foreign
markets. After October it was unlikely that the fish would
be shipped that year and they were put in storage for the winter
to be shipped in the spring of the following year. It was usual
for the fish to be held at a few places and the vessel would
collect the fish from these two or three points, occasionally the
fish would be taken to Scalloway, but rarely to Lerwick. The
hope was to get the fish to market as soon as possible, to beat
the winter storms and get the perishable cargo to market in good
condition. It was common for large amounts of the fish to be
rotten by the time it reached Spain. Once the fish were sold,
normally through a local merchant house that had contacts with a
British house, then the payments could be made. The laird did
not receive the money for his fish until three to four months
after the shipment, although sometimes an advance of a quarter or
a third would be made. So there was a long delay between
production and payment. By this time another yearly cycle had
begun. Under such a structure credit was of central importance,
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and payment was made through a sophisticated system of
international exchange and credit, organised through chains of
local, national, and international merchant houses.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The international situation was critical to the succesful
operation of such a system of exchange. Conflict, state policy
(still mercantilist), and competition could all change and upset
this delicate balance of trade. In conditions of intensive
international competition for markets, information on prices, and
general market conditions could make all the difference between
loss and profit. At a time of slow communications this called
for future speculation and local initiative. The shift to the
Mediterranean markets made the operation that bit more risky; the
Hamburg market was well known from years of personal experience
and long term contacts, and not having such experience of the new
markets placed greater emphasis on good intelligence.
The produce of Shetland had to compete in the European
markets with that of Norway and Newfoundland. They mainly
produced dried cod, often of poorer quality th%n that of
Shetland, which had through the specialisation in ling found a
niche in the market for a better quality product selling at a
higher price. It has been estimated that Shetland had
9
approximately 7% of the Spanish market. However there were
problems of market saturation. Since the industry was seasonal
there was a tendency for many cargoes to arrive at market at the
same time, in the autumn before the winter storms. In late 1786
a merchant house in Barcelona wrote to Hay informing him that 20
cargoes of Norway cod (of bad quality and at a low price), 4 of
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Newfoundland cod, and 3 of Shetland ling had all recently arrived
in the port, flooding the market and that prices were very low
and fish could not be sold at amy price. They were astute
10
enough to forward Hay's ship to Leghorn (in Italy). Under
such conditions the quality of cure was important; the better the
quality the higher the price and the more likely it would last
winter storage.
Occasionally conditions were improved when other fisheries
failed and where dried fish could be used as a substitute in the
diet. In 1786 Hay was informed that the Cornwall pilchard
fishing had failed and as that fishery was a substantial supplier
to Italy they would require cod and that prices should be
11
good.
The shift to the Catholic western Mediterranean was based on
their need for fish in their diet as prescribed by their faith.
By the 1770's Spain had became the largest importer of Shetland
fish, and Barcelona was the single largest market. Barcelona
was Spain's most important trading city and the centre of Spain's
industrial growth and experiencing rapid population growth.
There was a large demand for foodstuffs to feed this growing
population. But the total demand could vary depending on the
clerical rulings on what and when in the year, the people could
eat. In particular the prohibition on meat during lent was a
major factor on the level of demand, and when there were changes
in this then new markets had to be found. In 1779 a papal
ruling allowing the eating of meat during lent reduced the demand
in Spain for dried fish:
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There is another which is much against it, which is that the
Pope has given permission to all the Spanish subjects in
Europe to eat meat four days a week during lent for three
years. 12
In this case the cargo was sent on to Italy.
These problems highlight the need to have good contacts with
the foreign markets, contacts which will give good and up to date
information, and which could be trusted to be left in charge of a
valuable cargo. Contacts were initially made through existing
trusted business associates; this personal side to commerce was
of vital importance at a time when legal protection was minimal.
There were British merchant "colonies" in most major European
cities, and these provided close links with British merchant
houses. There were also local branches of British merchant
houses, or even one where a British merchant, often the son or
relative of of an established merchant, had joined with a local
to form a partnership. Messrs. M. & J. Gregory & CO. of London,
well established in the Shetland trade, had a branch in Barcelona
(Gregory & Guille); George Gibson & Co., better known for their
smuggling connections with James Hay, had one in Rotterdam. The
family connection was important, In 1787 Alex Turner of Leeds
wrote to Hay informing him that a relation was forming a trading
business in Ancona. in Italy with a local and they wished to be
involved in the Shetland fish trade. Occasionally the link was
even more tenuous, the firm of Mague & Brown of Lisbon had a Mr.
Elliot Crauford on the staff, who was the nephew of Lady
Mitchell, and they used this as a contact into the Shetland
13
trade.
From the late 1770's onwards the single greatest problem to
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the carrying out of the trade was international conflict.
Britain had been at peace with its European neighbours since the
ending of the seven years war (1763). Then in 1775 the American
war began. At first this looked as if it would be good for the
Shetland trade since the Newfoundland fishery would be disrupted.
However in 1778 France joined the colonies against Britain, but
matters were made worse in 1779 when Spain joined against Britain
closing the Spanish market to British goods. Hay was able to
get around this by sending the fish in Dutch ships, but in 1780
the United Provinces entered the war against Britain. The effect
was to depress severely the trade of the islands; in 1781 Hay
wrote:
The Mercantile & Export Trade from Shetland in which I have
been engaged for several years past being much hurt by the
Spanish War & entirely put to an end by the Dutch war. 14
This was a difficult period and there was a brief return to the
old Hamburg market and a greater reliance on Italy. In 1781 the
Hamburg market was flooded with Shetland fish; and there were
15
poor returns from the Italian markets.
The international conflict of 1778-1783 made Hay look for
possible alternative ways of organising the trade so that markets
would not be closed to Shetland produce again. One scheme he
put forward was for greater contacts with the Faroes (then
Danish). In a letter to a Faroes merchant, Urbanus Flon, he
outlined his plan. It proposed that they should work closely
together, buy and operate ships jointly, thus benefiting from
being both British and Danish (Denmark had not been involved in
the last war). Together they could ship the produce of the two
islands, and import salt direct from Portugal/Spain and spirits
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direct from the West Indies and France. This was certainly to
be a cover for smuggling and overcoming the problem of British
goods being excluded from continental markets since they would be
16
exported under the Danish flag. The scheme was rather one
sided and there seemed little benefit for the Faroes, and it
never got off the ground, although there was to be a revival of
interests in trade with the Faroes during the Napoleonic wars.
It is very difficult to give a longterm picture of the
profitability of the trade. That it was profitable is certain,
but there were wide fluctuations and great losses had to be
accepted as well as good returns. If market conditions were
favourable then the profits were high for all concerned. In
1784/85 from two cargoes sent to Alicante, 75 tons by the Duke of
Buccleuch and almost 74 tons by the Diligence, Hay made a profit
17
of £543 on his quarter share. At other times it could go
drastically wrong; in 1786 the Friendship captained by James'
brother Charles, was lost with its cargo of 104 tons of fish and
1500 cubic feet of timber, all at the Hay's own risk. Charles
had been told by Hay:
...as you have now under your charge much more then my all in
the World My credit and character depends on your Prudent
Conduct. 18
Instead of making an expected £1,000 profit Hay made a loss of
19
£200 to £300, even though the ship was insured.
Although there are not the figures to give an overall
picture of the profitability, there are two indicators that it
was profitable in the long term. One is that both Hay and
southern merchant houses continued to be involved in the trade,
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even giv^n Hay's regular protests on his losses that he was
going to give up the trade and leave Shetland. And second that
throughout this period the wealth of the family steadily grew
(see below).
The problems of organising Shetland's trade during the
American Revolution was minor compared to that of the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This was for two reasons,
not only were they much longer-lasting and more intense, but also
because the French blockades were more successful in excluding
Shetland produce from its markets. During this period new
markets had to found for Shetland produce, and/or ways of getting
around the blockades. There was also the added problem of high
insurance, a particular burden on Shetland where everything had
to be transported to and from the islands by sea; and the regular
need to go by convoy disrupting the established trade routes and
times and destinations.
The feeling of British merchants at this time was summed up
by Alex Turner of Leeds when he wrote:
I think I never knew so gloomy an aspect for people whose
dependence is on continued Business, almost all Europe is
shut against us. 20
As far as Shetland was concerned matters reached a low point in
1804 when Italy was blockaded and Spain went to war with Britain.
The Spanish market was to be closed until 1808. Shetland used
Norwegian ships {at that time part of Denmark and neutral), the
fish being exported to Norway and reshipped to Spain. Some
Norwegian fish merchants became interested in buying Shetland
21
produce for Spanish markets. But even neutral ships soon had
great difficulty in getting through since in retaliation against
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the French, Nelson had blockaded Barcelona in 1804/05. Also in
1804/05 yellow fever was raging in the Mediterranean, requiring a
long quarantine. Finally ships for Spain would no longer be
insured in Holland or Copenhagen. Under such conditions the
home market became the most important, particularly Ireland.
The loss of export bounty was more than offset by the high prices
22
that war brought about.
The first decade of the nineteenth century therefore saw a
shift towards home markets and the Hays shipped directly to the
Irish market, in particular Dublin. Liverpool was an important
entrepot port and trade was helped by Andrew Hay being a partner
in a Liverpool merchant house of Geddes & Hay. Cargoes of fish
and oil were shipped to Liverpool and the boats returned with
Irish meal and salt. A further development of this family
concern was speculation in the timber trade organised between
James Hay Jnr company in St. Johns New Brunswick (Hay &
Donaldson) with James and William in Lerwick and Andrew in
Liverpool.
There are no reliable figures on levels of production for
this period since there are gaps in the customs records for 1797
to 1810 (with the exception of 1806). And it is difficult to
compare what little we know with earlier periods since there is a
gap for 1769 to 1782. Still it does appear that after the
crisis in catches in the 1770's they rose in the 1780's and
1790's. Goodlad gives an annual average of just over 700 tons
23
for 1783 to 1789, and nearly 800 tons for 1790 to 1796. The
figures that Hay mentions in his correspondence are for 1788
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annual production of 800 to 1,000 tons and for 1797 600 to 800
24
tons. It would be expected that production would fall since
substantial numbers of Shetlanders were in the Royal Navy either
forcibly impressed or as volunteers, and many were going to the
Greenland Whaling. This reduced the amount of labour available
for the haaf fishing. However a reduction in production was
more than offset by the rise in prices brought about by war
conditions. The figures below are the prices paid by the Hays
for fish from the 1760's to the 1820's.
TABLE 1
FISH PRICES:
Prices paid by Jas.& Will Hay
1760's to 1820's. (in shillings per cwt)
ling tusk cod
decade range in prices
1760's 12 to 14
1770's 13 to 16 14 to 15 12 to 13
1780's 13/6 to 17 12
1790's(1) 17
1800's 16 to 25 14 to 19 14 to 17(2
1810's 20 to 30 20 to 25 12 to 27
1820's 15 to 21 15 to 16
notes:(1) only for 1797.
(2)it is not clear from some of the correspondence what amounts
received the higher figures; it would be safe to assume quite
small quantities relating to very favourable market conditions.
sources: business correspondence, accounts,
notebooks etc.throughout Hay papers.
Although it seems that prices rose generally the greatest
rise was in the early 1800's. In 1806 the price was 18/- for a
cwt, in 1809 it had risen to 25/-, and remained in the 20/- to
25/- range peaking in 1813 with 26/- (there was at least one sale
at 32/- a cwt in 1810) and in 1814 with a range of 27/- to 30/- a
cwt. In 1815 prices had returned to 22/- to 23/- and by 1819
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down to 20/-. The 1820's were also poor with prices as low as
15/- in 1821, improving to 21/- in 1825. Prices for Tusk and
Cod followed a similar pattern, with peaks in the early 1810's
and soon falling back. Cod was as low as 8/- a cwt in 1821, but
like ling recovered in the mid 1820's. These were the prices
paid for the fish in Shetland and do not reflect the prices in
the markets. The peak; years were the 1810's; in 1811 prices
reached as high as 36/- in London, in 1813 in Dublin at their
best they were between 37 and 39/-; in 1814 prices in Cork were
25
only 28 to 30/- (all prices for Ling). So there were great
fluctuations in fish prices but on the whole prices were good in
the first two decades and held up well for the decade after the
ending of the war.
SMUGGLING
Smuggling, that most British of activities, was an integral
part of eighteenth and nineteenth century Shetland society and
economy. In Shetland smuggling was regarded sis part of the
general trade of the islands and historically grew out of the
needs of the fishing industry. In relation to the size of the
local economy it was a major business and included, at some stage
of the operation, virtually everyone in the islands of all social
ranks. The profits made from it were significant in the capital
accumulation of some of those individuals, including the Hays,
who were to later invest in new industries.
The main item smuggled was alcohol, with lesser amounts of
tea and tobacco. Spirits were regarded as necessary for the
carrying on of the haaf fishing, and the high duties were
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regarded as a cost on production. At its height up to 10,000
gallons were annually smuggled into the islands, either "waters"
from Hamburg, or geneva (gin) from Holland. Smuggling was
endemic in Shetland and the rugged coastline of voes and isolated
islands made it easy to escape the attention of the excise
officers. Up until the 1770's smuggling was mainly carried out
26
by the lairds as an extension of their trade with Hamburg.
From then on the main smugglers were merchants and the trade was
centred on Rotterdam. This was related to the shift in the
control of external trade from the lairds to the merchants.
THE LAIRDS & SMUGGLING
The lairds' smuggling activities were operated as part of
their trade with Hamburg. The local customs and excise were
ineffective in limiting this "trade" and were occasionally
implicated. The level appears to have increased around the
1760's and there was an attempt in 1764/65 by the customs to
force all ships coming to Shetland to load and unload in
27
Lerwick. The lairds successfully had this stopped, since it
would have greatly increased the costs in transporting their
goods throughout the islands. As the fishing expanded, and as
population increased, and as the duties rose, so the smuggling
intensified.
By this time the 1770's and 1780's, a number of Lerwick
merchants particularly James Hay were becoming more active in
smuggling. And there was a change in the main source of goods
from Hamburg to Holland. The merchants were involved to such an
extent that they became known as the "Rotterdam Gentry". The
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reason for this shift is related to the general shift in the
trade of the Islands. With local merchants acting for southern
merchant houses the lairds no longer maintained their contacts
with Hamburg. It would also have meant that they would have
operated their smuggling activities separate from trading and
this would have been difficult to cover up. With Barcelona
replacing Hamburg as the main export market, smuggling became a
more complex and ultimately dangerous occupation; complex because
it included more individuals and international exchanges and
payments; dangerous since the smuggling was carried on during a
major conflict. This phase of the history of smuggling lasted
until the end of the Napoleonic wars, and in the case of the Hays
until 1814 when they were heavily fined. Most of the following
is based on new material of the smuggling activities of the Hay
family, who were well known as being as among the most important
smugglers in the islands. The real significance of smuggling
for this thesis is its importance as a profitable trade which
aided capital accumulation which was then invested in new
industries.
JAMES HAY AND SMUGGLING
The first mention that there is of the Hay family being
directly involved in smuggling is in the mid-1760's; in 1767
William Hay was sent 10 ankers of geneva, 2 of brandy, and 400
28
lb. of tobacco, by J. Crauford & Co. of Rotterdam. It is
likely that this was only a small part of a larger shipment for
many others throughout the Islands. James Hay was involved from
at least 1774, again dealing with Crauford & Co. In early 1777
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a full cargo of gin was sent to the islands, with Hay onboard the
vessel, but the customs and excise had been informed and most of
it was seized. To escape possible arrest Hay fled to Hamburg,
on the ship, and wrote to Crauford explaining what had happened:
Their was an Watchfull Eyed keeped our me by two of there
yachts & altho' I got all landed, yet before I left the
Country they had Seized a Great part of the Subjects & ere
this time perhaps the Whole. They also came in pursuit of
the Sloop which induced me to take this Voyage with her. 29
Surviving accounts suggest that either not all the gin was seized
or there had been a previous shipment. The cargo arrived in
April and was quickly distributed, much of it landed at Papa
Stour, under the care of James' father William. Accounts for
30
Gideon Gifford show that he bought 61 ankers at 25/- an anker.
James Hay's smuggling activities were well known even by
this time, and were common knowledge to his business associates
in the south. One of his most important southern contacts, J.
Richardson of Perth, wrote to him disapproving of his smuggling
trade:
We shall be glad to hear the ship you were uneasy about is
arrived and hope that you will find it in your interest to
employ her in a fair trade for we cannot help hinting to you
that it gives us great uneasiness when any of our friends are
engaged in the contraband business. 31
The ship that this letter refers to is the Janet, a sloop of 40
tons that Hay had bought in 1777. In December of 1778 on a
voyage to Rotterdam it was caught in a storm and was stranded in
Calais, the hull being seriously damaged.
Some years later Hay was to write about the history of
smuggling in this period and conveniently forgot about his own
involvement. It had been the Lerwick merchants especially:
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Geirson, Innes, and Bolt who had been active. Then in the mid-
1770 's after extensive seizures by the excise the trade had once
more been in the hands of the lairds, in particular, Robert
Hunter of Lunna, John Bruce Stuart of Sumburgh, and John Scott of
Melbie. Then at the end of the 1780's the Lerwick merchants
once more became involved, and Linklater, Ogilvy and some others
purchased a boat from John Bruce of Simbister for the trade with
Holland. This halted in the 1790's because of the war involving
Holland, during which time they bought spirits from a "Foreign
Enemy", which drained the country of Gold & Specie to pay for
32
it. Although valuable for those he names, this document is
only partially correct, as it was to be Hay that was to be the
single largest smuggler in the islands.
In the 1780's Hay established his trading relationship with
George Gibson & Co., which was to continue into the nineteenth
century. Gibson had two merchant houses, one in London (at
Kings Arms Yard), the other in Rotterdam. This now meant that
cargoes of contraband could be ordered and paid for through a
British merchant house. From at least 1783 Gibson & Co., were
arranging for shipments of gin for Shetland to be sent direct
from Rotterdam. In that year the Jacubus sailed from Rotterdam
for Shetland in late April with a cargo of gin, and then
33
proceeded to Hamburg with a cargo of fish and oil.
In 1785, James Hay, in partnership with Charles Ogilvy (it
was common to work in partnership to spread the risks), and with
George Gibson & Co., were involved in no less than 5 smuggling
trips between Rotterdam and Shetland. There was the Ann in
April, then the Rodney in June, the Hawk in July and again in
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August, and the Ling Fisher in November. This goes some way in
show the extent and regularity of the trade. It was inevitable
that there would be losses, and the Rodney was seized in 1787.
Yet in that year there were two new ships mentioned as being
involved, the Adventure and the Hope. Also between 1791 and
34
1793, the Ranger was active.
Disaster befell Hay's activities in 1795 when Holland was
captured by the French, cutting of his supplies. By 1798 that
contact had been re-established but through Norway. The new
structure was for the gin to be shipped from Rotterdam to Bergen
and then to Shetland, normally in small amounts onboard the
numerous craft that traded between the Islands and Norway. In
Bergen the agent was the merchant house of Alex Greig & Son,
which was well established in the Shetland trade. In 1798 a
minimum of 649 ankers and 518 half ankers were shipped to Greig,
a total of 7,567 imperial gallons. Of this 429 ankers and 222
half ankers were on joint account for James Hay and James Cheyne.
Some of this at least was shipped from Bergen in Cheyne's own
vessel. In November some were landed in Papa Stour, well out of
35
the way of the customs.
Accounts from that year reveal the profitability of
smuggling. Hay bought his gin at 21/9 an anker, and 11/3 per
half anker. It was sold at 60/- a full anker. Normally there
was little storage time and the barrels were distributed as soon
as they arrived going to those who had already placed orders.
Even assuming that shipping and storage costs took this price up
to 30/- an anker, then there was a large profit to be made. In
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this one year Hay and Cheyne could have made as much as £800 out
36
of their share.
In 1799, Holland was again closed and the trade with Bergen
stopped. However by 1802 Hay was once again active, still with
George Gibson, but the new contact in Norway was Dan Isaackson in
Christiansand. In July 1802, Isaacksand received for Hay 905
ankers and 335 half ankers of gin (10,825 imperial gallons).
This had been carried from Rotterdam on Hay's own ship the
Brothers (57 tons), which Hay was to claim that he had bought for
the Norway timber trade. In August the 2nd the Brothers left
Christiansand with 405 ankers and 135 half ankers. The ship was
seized in Lerwick, although it seems that the cargo had been
unloaded. Hay then bought the boat back from the customs for
£250, only to have it seized again, this time in London, but with
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some difficulty he was able to get it cleared, although he still
. had some trouble with the Admiralty in getting a licence since
they felt that the ship was to used for smuggling:
The smallness of the Vessels appearing to them as if intended
for an illicit trade. 38
In 1805 the ship was seized once again (see below). The rest of
the gin at Christiansand was shipped to Shetland in 1803, in June
the Hope carried 135 ankers and 90 half, and in August the
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Brothers carried 160 ankers and 30 half. As the above
suggests events were rapidly catching up with Hay, he was having
difficulty in getting his ships insured in London because of his
smuggling:
That you are so much suspected of carrying on an illict trade
is very unfavourable, how others know I know not. 40
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During the Napoleonic wars the dangers appeared to be
increasing, not only from the excise but also from privateers,
and given these increased dangers the prices for the spirits
rose. In 1805, this time in partnership with William Ogilvy (a
merchant in Quendale), Hay, still using the Brothers, had a large
cargo of gin sent from Christiansand. In July 1804 Gibson had
shipped a large cargo of contraband from Rotterdam to Isaackson
in Christiansand. In January of 1805 the Brothers left Norway
with 500 ankers gin, 10 ankers French brandy (total of 4,250 imp.
gallons), 37 ankers tea (1082 lbs.), and 3 matts of tobacco (400
lbs.). The total cost of this cargo to Hay was £904-18/8
(including insurance of £119). The gin had been bought at 30/-
an anker and was sold at between 75/- and 84/-. Even though the
goods were landed in Noss, Marrister,' and Skerries, the customs
were still able to seize some 82 ankers. Hay and Ogilvy sold
the remaining for a total of £1,793-14/-. So even given the
risks they were still able to make a good return, but perhaps not
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so good for Hay since the Brothers was seized once again.
After this there is a break in the records as far as
smuggling is concerned, and the events that we are next sure
about are in 1814. That was a fateful year for James Hay, for
two of his ships were seized by the customs and another's cargo
was taken. The customs certainly appeared as if they were out to
end his smuggling activities. In March the customs in Lerwick
confiscated some goods onboard the George Rose, and in June the
Margaret was seized in Leith on suspicion of smuggling.
Although he managed to overcome these without much difficulty it
was the events surrounding the seizure of the Catherine later in
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the year that brought an end (as far as known) to James Hay's
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career as a smuggler.
The Catherine was a sloop of 54 tons and had been bought in
1813 for the herring fishing. In 1814 with James Hay on board
and under the cover that it was to go to the cod fishing, it
began a series of smuggling voyages criss-crossing the North Sea.
The following shows the complex set of networks and exchanges
involved in smuggling. Leaving Lerwick on the 16th of April,
the Catherine sailed to Sandsay in Orkney to pick up a cargo of
meal and potatoes for shipping to Norway (at that time the export
of grain was illegal). In Bergen a new cargo of animal skins
and hides was taken on for shipment to London. In London a
small cargo of ships ropes (cordage) was to be shipped to Hull,
but instead on clearing London in mid-July she sailed for
Rotterdam. There 600 ankers of gin were taken on and the ship
sailed directly for Shetland. The contraband was dropped at
North Roe, Tangwick, Papa Stour, and Foula. After this the
Catherine returned to Orkney to collect a further cargo of meal,
only to be seized by the customs who had been warned by the
Shetland customs, who it seems had received information from a
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local source.
James was fearful of the consequences of the arrest
believing that the customs would discover all of the gin and that
he and his family would be ruined. He became very depressed (as
his illness reappeared) but he remained astute enough to transfer
his property to his son, and he wrote to William:
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What to do, God knows...I have applied to []...forward me a
Scroll of Deed...that fl] can convay all my property in your
favour.44
He estimated the fine for the 600 ankers of gin would come to
£12,825 (calculated as treble the duty twice). He even
considered pleading "derangement", but on the advice of his
Edinburgh lawyer did not. However the customs could only charge
him with the cargo of grain and the fine was to be £1,662,
calculated as £831 for breaking the blockade, and £831 for
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exporting grain, based on 20/- per bushel. His case was not
to come to court until May of 1815, by which time his lawyers had
reached a composition with the customs and excise of £1,000 and
forfeiture of the vessel (which may have been included in the
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price). The Lerwick customs were not pleased that Hay got off
so lightly. They had written earlier to the Collector in
Edinburgh that:
A prosecution for penalties in this case...would have the
greatest possible effect towards suppressing smuggling in
this country and we do not know a man who better deserves
prosecution than Jas. Hay. 47
The Hays seemed to have ended their smuggling activities at
this point, although it is quite possible that they carried on
but at a lower level using their herring and cod boats as cover.
William Hay was never as involved as his father had been and was
probably quite happy to see the family concentrate on more legal
ways of making money. The Hays became respectable citizens and
in 1819 Charles Ogilvy could write to William that:
...the smuggler has made another visit to this coast...and
has now left the country with money, stockings, Tallow & not
a little it is said - this has been a destructive Trade to
the country and not likely to be stopped readily. 48
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Smuggling was too much a part of Shetland life to end so
easily, and with James Hay no longer involved others took over,
in particular John Ross of Sound and Balfour Spence in
conjunction with the London "smuggling house" of Ewarth & Sons.
Their activities lasted until about 1819 when after a number of
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seizures by the customs Ewarth was forced out of business.
After this smuggling went out of the hands of locals and became
centred around foreign vessels usually dealing with the cod boats
or the tenants direct. As the duty declined "legal" whisky and
tea replaced "illegal" gin as the staple drink of the Shetland
people.
It is difficult to give a concrete figure on the economic
importance of smuggling in the Shetland economy, it was certainly
instrumental in the economic fortunes of James Hay. There can
never be shown a direct link that money gained from smuggling was
used as investment capital in other areas or that more risky
b**t-
investments were made with such capital, there is enough evidence
to show that it played an important role in capital accumulation.
The Hays were soon to put that capital to good use in developing
the islands' economy. There is even the suggestion that
investment in the cod and herring fisheries were probably more
likely since they could be used as covers for smuggling, and
profits from smuggling would have offset losses from the
fisheries (along with the bounty). However smuggling would also
have made the fisheries less efficient due to the need for large
vessels so it is not clear-cut. Smuggling remains an important
part of Shetland's late eighteenth and early century history, and
the Hays played a central role in the making of that history.
SHIPPING
Investment in ships was a logical and sensible extension of
the Hays economic interests. Owning ships brought in income
from frieghting and leasing, and offset costs in shipping cargo
and could be used for smuggling. From an early date James Hay
was a shipowner, but it was not until the early nineteenth
century that the Hays became owners of a significant number of
ships, suggesting an expansion of coastal trade and smuggling as
well as a growth in capital available for investment. At first
these vessels were used for trade from but 1809 the Hays entered
into another phase as they bought boats for the herring and cod
fisheries, although most of these were used for other activities
as well (as in the fateful voyage of the Catherine in 1814).
After 1815 there was also the development of coastal and
international freighting which was operated separately from the
traditional trade of the islands.
The table below sets out the investment in vessels by the
Hays from 1777 to 1820 with as much details as are known on cost,
tonnage, and the Hays' share in the vessel.
160
TABLE 2
SHIPPING AND FISHING VESSELS OWNED BY THE HAYS:
1777-1820 inclusive
year bought name tonnage cost share if
1777 Janet £150
1787 Olive Branch £262 1/8 (1)
1800 Mary 31
1800 Morning Star £307(2)
1803 Brothers 57 £250
1803 Hope £200+
1808 Don 80 £750
1810 Ceres (4)
1810 Dorothy 1/4
1810 Margaret 73 £210
1813 George Rose 85
1813 Catherine 54
1819 Marbank 15 £40
1819 Lerwick Packet 1/4
1819 Alert £30 1/6
1820 Mary 40 £175
1820 Jane 112 £280 (5)
1820 Discovery
1820 Fidelity
notes:(1) bought for his brother Charles who was the captain.
(2) sold in the same year for £160
(3) sold have share to William Ogilvy
(4) sold in 1812 for £300
(5) the Jane had been stranded in Lerwick in 1818, in 1822 she
was seriously damaged off Galloway carrying a cargo of fish to
Dublin.
source: business correspondence, accounts,
bills of sail etc. all Hay papers
Most of these vessels were used for carrying Shetland
produce and smuggling (detailed above), and the developments in
the herring and cod fisheries which are dealt with separately
(chpts. 7 and 8 respectively) The other development in shipping
was in general freighting separate from Shetland's trade.
The first indication of this trade was in 1813 when the Don
was insured for a trip from London to the Baltic, although this
could have been a cover for smuggling. In 1815 William Hay
received from Thomas Strong of Leith a letter of introduction to
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Messrs S. Sibbald & Co. of St. Petersburg. From then on the
Don was regularly involved in the general cargo trade from
Britain to Norway and the Baltic. For much of 1816 she carried
coal from Newcastle as well as general manufactured goods to
Norway. In 1817 she spent most of the year leased to Fowler &
Co. of London on voyages from London to Memel. She carried
mixed cargoes for local German merchant houses and returned to
London with flax, oats, linseed, and bass matts. In 1818 the
Don was even shipping herring and tallow from Bergen and St.
Petersburg. Such journeys were profitable; between June 1815
and December 1816 the Don earned £1,106 carrying freight against
total disbursments of £206; in 1817/18 she earned a minimum of
£1,150 (neither figures include insurance costs). An example
for 1817 for a return voyage between London and Memel shows that
the freight for general merchandise for the outward trip came to
£131-6/-, and for the return journey with flax, oats, and
50
linseed, it was £142-4/4.
The rise in the number of ships meant that there was
employment for Shetlanders as seamen, and the creation of a group
of professional seamen. Although there was at this time not a
large number of boats, as the number rose so it became more
viable to become a full-time seaman. In 1803 the pay rates for
the Brothers were: for the captain it was £3 a month as well as
regular employment; for the crewmen it was not so good, the rates
were £1 to £1-10/- a month and only for the duration of the
voyage. These wages are comparable to those at the whaling
(chpt. 6) although given that seamens' wages generally rise
51
during wartime they are lower than the average pay rates.
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OTHER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS: KELP
Kelp became an important product of Shetland during the
period of high prices.brought about by the exclusion of Spanish
barilla from British markets due to the disruption caused by the
wars. Kelp was never as important in the Shetland economy as it
was in Orkney or the Western Highlands, but it did provide an
extra source of income for the landed estates. There are
several reasons for this; the kelp in Shetland didn't appear to
have as much alkali and it certainly produced a poorer quality
product and sold at lower prices; nor were there as many shores
that were right for the growing of kelp; and it always remained
secondary to fishing and farming. It is possible that the
malting of kelp was begun as early as the 1760's, its production
expanded in the 1770's and 1780's to as much as 200 to 300 tons,
mainly as a substitute for the poor fishings of that time.
In 1781 Hay shipped 35 tons of kelp, mainly from Robert
Hunter of Lunna, to Hull, which sold for £4-10/- a ton. In 1782
he tried a further cargo, this time 50 tons which he sold to
Richard Poly & Co. soap manufacturers in Leeds. During the
Napoleonic wars as prices rose so did production, reaching 500
tons. In 1808 Hay sold 103 tons at £14-14/- a ton, once more to
52
Poly of Leeds. At this point kelp provided a large part of
some estates incomes. However that was a good year and by 1814
prices fell to £5-5/- a ton, and the costs of production rose to
53
60% of the selling price. James Hay claimed that he made a
large loss speculating on kelp at this time. Kelp production
continued in Shetland although at a lower level and was still
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being produced into the 1870's. Kelp was most important during
the Napoleonoc wars, and was a significant factor in the growth
of estate incomes at this time.
LIVESTOCK
Cattle had always been important as far as the Shetland
tenant was concerned. Rarely eaten, a tenant's cattle provided
a way of paying off debts and rents, and in years of famine they
were sold to buy meal. The milk, butter, meat, skins, and bones
were all of value. Balfour believed that the security and well
54
being of the tenants lay in the number of cattle they reared.
Yet there is no evidence that they were reared commercially, that
is for southern markets, until the late 1810's. Before that
time they were slaughtered locally and the beef salted and the
hides sold separately. The export of live cattle was begun
sometime in the 1820's but did not become really feas able
until the introduction of a regular connection with Aberdeen in
1838.
The only point of interest concerning the development of
trade in sheep is the lack of any. All the interest in Shetland
wool in the 1790's had lead to nothing, and the wool was still
wasted on making poor quality stockings which were worth less
completed than the wool itself. It was estimated that Shetland
wool when made into a stocking fetched only 6d per pound but,
55
that the actual wool was worth 5 shillings per pound. Due to
the effects of scab sheep numbers declined throughout this period
(see chpt.4)
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SHETLAND TRADE: EARLY 19TH CENTURY
The structure of the Shetland economy at the beginning of
the nineteeth century can be seen in the table below, taken from
the calculations of Arthur Edmondston in his history of the
Islands published in 1809. This is the basic structure of the
trade on the eve of the developments of the 1810's and 1820's.
The continuing importance of the fishing industry in the economy
is clear but so is the increasing significance of external
employment in the whaling and the Royal Navy for the total value
of trade.
TABLE 3




1,075 tons ling, tusk, cod @ £18-10/-
45 tons saithe @ £10
300 barrels herring @ £1-7/-
900 barrels fish oil @ £2-10/-








200 barrels of beef @ £2-10/-
3 tons tallow @ £60
400 hides @ 10/-
20 tons butter @ £50
Livestock
150 horses @ £3
100 cattle @ £3
50 sheep @ 10/-
Knitwear and Skins
Stockings, gloves etc.


















Volunteers and sea fencibles
Sales to Royal Navy etc.




2 Regular trading sloops 7 trips each to
freight




500 tons salt 8
freight
Wood, boats etc from Norway
Gross total
Balance surplus in Shetland's favour
source: Edmondston 1809 vol.2 pp.20-23
(after Smith, H.D. 1984)
It is impossible to check many of these figures. The amount for
the straw manufacturing seems very large, indeed it remains one
of the mystery industries of the early nineteenth century
Shetland economy. It was first introduced in 1802 by a London
gentleman and lasted until about 1820, and at its height employed
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some 200 women in "factories" in Lerwick and Dunrossness. Its
profitability could solely be due to the low cost of the labour
of Shetland women, since the straw was imported and the finished




















somewhat large; at this time Shetland woollens were still of poor
quality. It would have been helpful if Edmondston had provided
more detail on the cargoes of the trading sloops, for this figure
seems too great to be only goods for the fishing or indeed
clothing and household goods and it must include further
foodstuffs. The remittances to: whalers, saliors, fencibles
etc., show how important wages were to the expansion of Lerwick's
retail trade and thus the general trade of the Island. Shetland
certainly was doing well out of the conflict. However the
surplus is very much an illusion since the calculations do not
include the costs of smuggled goods, which would have come to a
figure of many thousands.
GROWTH OF LERWICK
One of the most important changes in Shetland at this time
was the expansion of Lerwick. Through most of the eighteenth
century Lerwick's population had remained fairly stable with a
population of 600 to 700. From the 1790's the population grew
rapidly, as shown in table 3.
TABLE 4








sources: Irvine, J.W. Lerwick Lerwick: Lerwick
Community Council 1985 pp. 64-65
Census 1821
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There are many reasons for this growth. The wars had led to an
expansion of employment in whaling and the navy which in turn had
helped the expansion of retail trading in Lerwick, as had the
establishment of a military garrison at Fort Charlotte. The
general conditions of the wars aided the merchant and retailer
and there were many retail shops in Lerwick (possibly as many as
57
40}. With merchants being involved in a wider range of
commercial activities and at a higher level so the concentration
of activity in Lerwick increased. There were now occupations
open to Shetlanders which meant a separation from the land: for
men jobs at sea or in the Lerwick shops or even as tradesmen, for
women in the strawplaiting or as knitters or even in service for
the merchants and the gentry living in the town.
Between 1800 and 1819 there were seventy new houses built in
Lerwick. Of which: 37 were for merchants (which probably
includes retail shopkeepers), 18 for "country gentlemen",
tacksmen etc., 8 for tradesmen and seamen, and 7 for public
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officials and profesionals. The number for "country
gentlemen" is interesting suggesting that they no longer felt it
necessary to live on their estates and that they wished to enjoy
the pleasures of Lerwick society. The Hays were important in
this growth, between 1788 and 1805 they built 12 houses (plus
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shops and a wharf) at a total cost of £3,354. This investment
in new buildings was in itself a cause and effect of the growth
of Lerwick. New houses gave employment to tradesmen and
reflected the demand for housing in the town, and at the same
time the availability of houses attracted people to the town.
Lerwick was then at the turn of the century a thriving community,
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but crowded along the seashore, dirty and insanitary. Still this
was a remarkable period of expansion for the town, and it was not
to experience anything similar until the herring boom of the
1880's/1890's
THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF THE HAYS' COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
As we have seen from the above the Hay family were active in
every area of trade and commerce over a period of three
generations. They organised their economic interests in the
typical form of the times. This mainly meant that the whole
range was under the control of the individual, who looked after
all aspects of the business, from the lowest daily routine to the
long term decisions. Such activity was structured around family
and personal contacts, which were crucial for supplying capital
and credit as well as spreading risk. When necessary they
formed partnerships for individual commercial "adventures", or in
the buying and operating ships, which called for large financial
investment and were relatively risky.
As the range of activities increased and diversified and
the scale of the operation grew, a more sophisticated form of
organisation was required. This was mainly done by splitting
the retail trade from the rest of the business. The Hays had a
large and generally profitable commercial retail business based
in Lerwick. They employed clerical assistants to help run the
shop; Charles Ogilvy had been an assistant in the early 1780's,
but as it expanded they preferred to use partnerships. The
scheme was for each partner to invest some capital in the stock
with the member of the Hay family acting as a sleeping partner.
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This allowed, them to concentrate on the wider commercial
business, and by the late eighteenth century James Hay was
spending a large part of the year away from Shetland doing
business in the south. In such cases the other partner would run
the store and have a share in the profits in relation to thier
original investment. Part of the retail business normally
included buying and shipping country produce, and in the late
1810's cattle became an important export. ijhe reasoning behind
having partners rather than employees was not just to spread risk
and increase capital, for by this time the Hays could easily
afford to operate by themselves, but that a partner sharing in
the profits would be more inclined to work harder for the joint
venture then an employee would. To this end the Hays formed a
series of co-partnerships over a long period of time, and the
table below lists them with the partners and their dates. It
clearly shows the range of their commercial contacts in Shetland,
and the way in which they used their capital to establish
businesses, the labour bei g supplied by the other partner. The
shares reflect the initial investment in stock and the division
of the profits. The overlap in companies shows that they were




CO-PARTNERSHIP COMPANIES FORMED BY THE HAY FAMILY
dates title (where known) partners shares
1784-1786 James Hay & Co. James Hay 3/4
Charles Ogilvy 1/4
1797-1800 Hay & Hughson James Hay 1/2
John Hughson 1/2
1803-1806 Balfour Spence & Co. James Hay 1/2
Balfour Spence 1/2
1808-1811 Hay & Mouat ? James Hay 5/6
James Mouat 1/6
1811-1821 James Hay & Son James Hay
William Hay
1815-1821 William Clark & Co. William Hay 2/3
William Clark 1/3








notes:(1) the bank was run as an extention of the partners other
business activities and followed the same pattern
(2) the company went through several changes, in 1826 C.
Ogilvy Snr. transfered his interests to his sons and at the same
time William Hay brought his own commercial business into the
company, in 1830 John Ogilvy left the partnership.
source:NLS acc 3250 Hay of Hayfield b.84
(details of partnerships) plus accts,
correspondence from all collections
The above shows the extent of the Hays commercial activities.
An important new period began in the early 1820's with: in 1821
with the founding of the Shetland Bank, and in 1822 and the
forming of Hay and Ogilvy. This consolidated the advances made
by James and William and now through one company the Hays were to




If there is any one indicator of the growing complexity of
the Shetland economy and of the increased commercial confidence
of its controllers, then it is the establishment of The Shetland
Bank in 1821. Banking represented the height of commercial
sophistication at that time, and was seen as a way to develop the
local economy, overcoming the problem of acute shortage of
finance. This problem of finance was regarded by
contemporaries as a great hindrance t-o the economy, particularly
as the economy began to expand in the early nineteenth century.
There were ever increasing demands made on the financial
organisation of the local economy which could not be met by the
existing system.
Like so many of the developments in the Shetland economy the
establishment of a bank was swimming against the tide of the
general Scottish experience. The number of banks in the lesser
burghs had fallen; of the eight in 1810 there was only one
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independent left by 1826. There were only two new banks
founded in the 1820's, the Shetland Bank, and the Arbroath bank.
Such banks were responses to local factors outwith that of the
rest of Scotland, in particular to the needs of an expanding
economy. There was a slow build up to the establishment of a
bank in Shetland, the original impetus being the general lack of
finance in the economy throughout the eighteenth century which
became acute in the nineteenth.
Shetland had suffered through much of its history from a
shortage of money to carry on its external and internal trade.
The islands were major importers of foreign coinage through the
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trade with the Dutch herring fishers, and in its many contacts
with foreign ports. However the islands were also a major
exporter of money to pay for its imports of foodstuffs,
particularly with Orkney, one of the few places that would accept
foreign coins. In international trade there had not been too
great a problem when most of the trade had been centred on
Hamburg, where exchanges could be made in accounts and balances
carried forward to the next year. However with the shift in the
fish exports to the Mediterranean, via southern merchant houses,
and increased commercial contact with Scotland through Leith,
Shetland became part of the international system of bills of
exchange. As the organisation of exchange became more complex
there was greater need for financial sophistication. This
developed into a requirement for the lairds and merchants to have
accounts with Edinburgh bankers. The Hay family had had an
account with Sir William Forbes since at least 1781, as did some
of the lairds. From 1787 they also had an account with Forbes
main rival, Mansfield and Ramsay & Co.. Then with the expansion
of wage labour, with substantial numbers of Shetlanders in the
Navy or at the Greenland Whaling there was a further requirement
for the import of significant amounts of money. With the
developments in the herring and cod fisheries in the 1810's the
need for finance grew. Among those most active in the Shetland
was
economy the need for a secure source of local finance both for
A
the carrying on of trade and for investment capital in the new
industries. This seemed the obvious answer in an economy that
had been starved of capital.
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The first indication of the increased sophistication of
locals in using banks and of the rising financial needs of the
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islands was in the Hays links with the Commercial Bank. Almost
from its very conception the Commercial Bank established a close
relationship with Shetland, through the Hay family (operating as
James Hay & Co.). The bank was interested in having its notes
as the main circulating medium in the islands. William Hay
claimed that he was "solicited by several of the directors" to
act for them, and he was to be employed as their representative
in the islands, on a salary of £70 a year. Hay was to inject
the Commercial banks notes into the economy and to return the
notes of other banks to the Commercial Bank. To cement this
relationship Hay bought four £100 shares in the Bank. Soon the
notes of the Commercial Bank were the main medium of exchange
within the islands with between £11,000 to £12,000 in
circulation. To maintain this high level Hay received regular
shipments of notes: in 1811 £6,000 worth of pound and guinea
notes, in 1812 it was £7,000, in 1813 it was £5,500 worth, and in
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1814 (only up to July) it was £4,000.
The knowledge and experience gained with working with the
Commercial Bank, seems to have given the Hays the inspiration for
establishing a local bank. In 1815 William Hay first put
forward the idea of a Shetland bank which would be successful if
the lairds and the merchants would join together:
...if the principal proprietors and merchants in whose credit
the public would have the fullest confidence. 63
As Hay saw things the main problem facing the country was the
lack of a ready source of credit, necessary for the expansion of
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the trade and industry of the islands. But this was difficult
given the isolation of the islands from the main financial
centre. A local source with the full backing of all the main
local figures would provide a secure and stable local currency.
These ideas ruminated for a few years, then in 1819 the
Shetland Society took up the challenge. In 1819 a detailed
outline of proposals for the bank was written by Arthur
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Nicolson. Like Hay, Nicolson argued that a bank would not only
be beneficial but necessary for the economy. For support he
called upon the authority of Adam Smith:
To show that these results are not the visionary
anticipations of a sanguine mind, I need only refer to the
great authority of Dr. Adam Smith.
That writers Book 2d chap 2 of his Treatise on the
Wealth of Nations, after stating what might be expected from
Theory to be the Consequence of the establishment of Banks -
informs us that about fifteen years after the institution of
the Glasgow Bank, the trade of that town was doubled - and
that the trade of Scotland had quadrupled since the
establishment of the two chartered Banks in Edinburgh...
If so a great and sudden an effect was produced by two
Banks in a great kingdom; it appears to me very probable that
the effect on the trade and industry of a small Community,
would be more speedily apparent, as well as more permanent.65
The plan was immediately taken up by the Shetland Society and a
"committee appointed to prepare a scheme for the regulation of
the proposed Shetland Bank", was formed in July; consisting of
Arthur Nicolson, William Mouat, and William Hay, showing a great
deal of unity in vision for the development of the islands
between laird and merchant. The first two mentioned were
landowners, and Mouat had one of the largest estates in the
Island.
The Bank was to have capital of £20,000, in transferable
shares of £100 each. It was to commence business on reaching
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£10,000. However nothing came of the scheme or the committee.
The reasons why are not entirely clear, and perhaps the scheme
was just too ambitious and there was not £20,000 available within
the economy to invest in a bank. Possibly at this time interest
was in investing in the herring or cod fishery.
William Hay did not give up on the idea and in 1820 he in
co-partnership with the Ogilvy family established the Shetland
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Bank. This was much smaller than the ambitious scheme of
Nicolson. The original capital was only £2,000, later
increased by a further £2,000 in 1825. The original amount was
invested in equal shares by William Hay and Charles Ogilvy
senior. Ogilvy further divided his holding between his two
sons, John and Charles. The founding of the Bank was shortly
followed by the same partners establishing the firm of Hay &
Ogilvy. The Shetland Bank never truly operated seperately from
the other business interests of the partners. It did issue its
own paper money up until 1828, after which it used the notes of
the Royal Bank. In total there were some 8 to 9,000 pounds
worth of notes issued.
The financial organisation of the Bank was less than strict
from its beginning. It mainly made advances to Hay & Ogilvy to
finance their fishing and trading business, and it also lent
heavily to the partners individually. In 1842 William Hay
personally owed £6,974-12/7, and Charles Ogilvy Jnr. £5,444-9/7,
most of which had been used to buy land. The accounts of the
Bank were not kept separate from that of Hay & Ogilvy after 1830,
and were not even balanced after 1834. The partners, however,
continued to pay themselves from the assumed profits of the Bank.
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For the years 1825 to 1828 (inc.) they paid themselves £100
annually; in 1829 it was £75, this rose to £250 for the years
68
1830 to 1838 (inc.), and in 1839 it was £150.
HAY AND OGILVY
With the advantage of hindsight we can see that the forming
of Hay and Ogilvy in 1822 was an important date in the economic
history of Shetland. It was the culmination of the economic
efforts of two families who had worked closely together for
nearly forty years. The company was to go on to lead the
economic development of the islands for the next twenty years,
building on the advances already made by James and William Hay in
trade and fisheries and on William and the Ogilvies in banking.
Hay & Ogilvy was established in 1822 with as partners
William Hay, Charles Ogilvy Snr.,and his two sons John Ogilvy,
and Charles Ogilvy Jnr., and with an original capital of £2,400.
The capital invested and the shares were divided equally between
Hay and the Ogilvy family. To finance the expansion of the
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company the capital was increased to £6,000 in 1825. As
already noted there are few records remaining of the firm since
on sequestration the company records were sent to the interim
factor. There would be a complete thesis in those records alone.
What records we do have of the importance of the company are
given in the following chapters. Suffice to say that the
company was the largest in the islands having a virtual monopoly
on external trade and being the most important establishment in
the herring and cod fisheries, as well as all forms of general
mercantile trade and commerce. Something has been said of the
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close contacts between the company and the Shetland bank. (for
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details on the collapse of Hay and Ogilvy see chpt. 8)
THE HAY ESTATE
James Hay proved to a successful trader, merchant and
smuggler, and his family fortune grew. Over a period of some
forty five years actively involved in the commerce of the country
he built up a large estate. His son William increased this to
make it one of the largest in the islands rivalling most of the
lairds. The Hays were propertied men with extensive holdings in
property in Lerwick as well as owners of land. This section
looks at the structure of the Hay estate, how it grew and how it
changed in form and content.
James Hay had a tendency to emphasise his losses rather then
his profits and successes. Although he had several significant
losses in his trading and other activities his general wealth
tended to grow throughout this period. Through calculating his
wealth we can see the slow capital accumulation that was going on
in Shetland. Hay was to take advantage of his increased wealth
to invest in a series of projects, some successful, others failures;
he also made more conservative investments in land and property.
There are several estimates made by Hay of his total wealth, in
1787 he valued his estate at £4,000; by 1810 he reckoned that it
was between £15,000 and £20,000; by 1840 the estate was worth
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£45,000 to £50,000.
A good indicator of the wealth of James Hay is that of his
savings in banks and credits with merchant houses. These reveal
a good depth of financial stability and a high liquidity. The
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figures for the 1780's are poor but for 1791 to 1807 they are
almost complete, and therefore give a good picture of his
economic position during the Napoleonic wars.
TABLE 6
JAMES HAY'S FINANCIAL POSITION:
1781 to 1807 (to nearest £)(1)
BANK /COMPANY
YEAR FORBES M & R GIBSON OTHERS TOTAL
1781 264 264
1783 400 400
1785 610 790 1,401
1787 498 408 906
1791 1,239 500 1,739
1792 1,359 1,009 2,368
1793 1,276 1,094 2,369
1794 1,275 290 1,566
1795 1,326 830 2,156
1796 742 742
1797 1,020 1,019 2,039
1798 990 2,796 3,785
1799 1,029 1,530 657 3,216
1800 1,020 2,000 1,000 4,020
1801 1,051 1,742 2,254 750 5,697
1802 1,098 2,137 953 4,189
1803 953 2,129 1,035 4,126
1804 274 1,235 638 1,117(3) 3,265
1805 330 1,200 3,128 1,117 5,765
1806 414 1,279 2,735 2,900 7,328
1807 457 820 1,846 1,446 4,618
notes:(1) This is primarily current and circulating accounts and
are for the end of the year.
(2) any difference is due to rounding of figures.
(3) this was for £2,000 of consolidated @ 3% sold in 1809
for £1,345. Hay had bought at 57/58 and sold at 67.5
abbreviations:
Forbes = Sir William Forbes & Co. bankers in Edinburgh
M & R = Mansfield Ramsay & Co. bankers in Edinburgh
Gibson = George Gibson & Co. of London
Source: various accounts in
SA Hay of Hayfield and
NLS acc 6250 Hay of Hayfield
This of course only reflects his liquidity, and as such is only
part of the the family's wealth, for there were numerous other
factors to take into account; and fixed capital investment in
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land, houses and shops and ships, the capital tied up in the
extensive shop business.
Another good indicator of the growing wealth of the Hay
family was their ability to advance money to other people in
Shetland. This was usually to cover debts or to make other
investments and were covered by heritable bonds on the landed
estate of the creditor. It was standard for interest to be paid
on the bonds, usually of four percent. The table below gives
details for 1783 to 1837, with the date when the money was
advanced and when it was cleared if known and also the security
given.
TABLE 7
ADVANCES MADE BY THE HAY FAMILY 1783-1837
year cleared amount by security
1783 ? £105 W.Scott of Scottshall Propertry Lerwick
1793 1813 £150 T.Sandison of Buness 34.5 merks Yell
1801 1815 £501 R.Ross of Sound 104 merks
1807 1817 £2,120 G.Gifford of Busta 117 merks (1)
1810 1811 £500 J.Ross of Quarff Property Lerwick
1812 1814 £650 R.Ross of Sound 94 m.+ more land
1826 ? £100 J.Murray Property Lerwick
1837 (2) £3,000 A.Gifford of Busta much of G's estate
1837 (3) £500 J.Yorster Property in Lerwick
notes: (1) transferred to William Hay in 1814, then to Charles
Ogilvy Snr. in 1817, then to John Ogilvy in 1828.
(2) William Hay and Charles Ogilvy Jnr.
(3) William Hay and Charles Ogilvy Jnr.
Source: SRO Sasines
If we compare these two tables, we can see that the Hays were
generally successful in their business activities, their growth in
financial security and ability to advance money reflect this.




The Hay family invested greatly in land and property, as
would be expected since land provided security in an insecure
world. Land provided rents and as security for borrowing land
also gave status and power in a rural society. This section
looks at two aspects of the development of the Hay estate; the
investment in property in Lerwick, and the creation of a landed
estate. These culminated in the Hays being among the largest
property and landowners in Shetland by the early nineteenth
century. As such their propertied estate reflects their growing
wealth from their various mercantile activities.
On leaving Catfirth James Hay soon settled in Lerwick and as
his wealth grew so he invested in property in Lerwick, not only
buying property but also building houses and shops. The table
below gives details of Hay's purchases and building up to 1813
with the cost and estimated value, and where relevant the annual
rent. This clearly shows the extent of capital that James Hay
was accumulating over this period, and if we compare it to the
other tables given above we can get a rough idea of the success
of his various "adventures". Hay was always ready to moan about




JAMES HAY'S PROPERTY IN LERWICK 1787 - 1813
(prices/values to the nearest £ sterling)
year bought/built details cost value(1) rent
1787 bought house and shop 211 500 24
1788 built house 98 6-
1789 built house 88 6
1790 bought house and shop 105 350 20
1794 built own dwelling house 670
1797--1800 built 4 distinct houses 415 29
1801 bought house and shop 435 500 20
1801--1805 built 3 distinct houses 448 27
1803 built house 35 3
1805 bought little shop 24 50 5
1805 built house and wharf(2)1 ,600
180? bought house & wharf 750 1,000 40
1813 bought house 200 250 12
5 ,080 6,004 192
notes: (1) estimated by J.Hay given where different from cost
(2) this is Hay's loadberry now the Queens hotel.
source: NLS acc 3250 Hay of Hayfield. "other
items" 108 personal cash book
This was a great period of growth in the population of the parish
of Lerwick and Gulberwick, which rose from 1,254 in 1793 to 1700
in 1801 a percentage growth of 35.5. Lerwick itself probably
grew faster since it appears that the rural population of
Gulberwick appears to have remained stable (see above). Hay's
interest in property in Lerwick was both cause and effect of this
expansion, for increased population required more housing and the
availability of rented accommodation attracted people to the
town. It was Hay's plan (after the failure of the Yarmouth
herring adventure see chapter "£) that Lerwick should be developed
into a fishing town and to this end he built houses for those
willing to leave their crofts and come to Lerwick. He
complained in 1806 to the Government that taxes, in particular
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window tax, were too high and that the rents for the houses
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barely covered the taxes.
The Hays continued to invest in Lerwick, although there are
not as good details as there are for the early period. The
Freefield docks were first begun in the 1810's, although no
records remain. In 1816/1817 William Hay established Hayfield
near Lerwick consisting of a large house and several parks.
About the expense of which his father wrote:
I observe if you have thrown away money on Hayfield then I
ken other fools beside you, altho' not to the same extent.72
Hayfield rivalled the country houses of the lairds in size and
splendour. The rental value of the property of Lerwick was a
large part of the total estate rental. In 1825 for total
property in Lerwick (including property occupied by William Hay)
the rental was £441 (plus a further £68 for Hayfield). In
1827/1828 this had risen to £524, and for 1828/1829 it was
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£554.
Property in Lerwick was important but only one part of the
family estate. Under both James and William, the Hays built up
a large landed estate. The first William Hay had purchased 4.5
merks in Westsandwick (Yell) in 1755, and in 1761 had built a
house on the hill land (also to be used as a booth for the
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fishing). In 1791 this was assigned to James. This remained
the only landed property they owned until 1809 when James bought
88.5 merks in Tingwall, including house and garden, from the
creditors of the estate of Walter Scott of Scottshall. This was
the foundation for the estate at Laxfirth where James Hay retired
to after the misfortunes of 1814. In 1817 this was extended by
183
buying 176.5 merks from the heirs of Peter Innes, mainly in
Tingwall but also Weisdale and Gulberwick. This was under
burden of £3,000 which the Hays paid 4 percent until they paid of
the capital. £1,000 was cleared in 1825 and the further £2,000
paid off in 1829. Although they concentrated their purchases in
Tingwall the Hays also bought land in Yell and Northmaven, 3
merks and 22 merks respectively.
The general growth of the estate can be seen from the cess
returns, which show the following progress:
TABLE 9
GROWTH OF HAYS' LANDED ESTATE











notes: (1) this includes 20 merks of Mrs Smith's land in Whalsay,
she was James' aunt.
source: NLS acc 3250 Hay of Hayfield b39 f3
Cess payments.
In the valuation returns of 1825 the landed estate of William Hay
was the tenth largest in the islands. In less than twenty years
and excluding their property in Lerwick the Hays had become major
landowners in Shetland, whose estate and personal wealth could
match all but the very largest of the lairds. The rents for
Tingwall (including small amounts of land in Whiteness and
Weisdale) were for 1825 £410, and for 1826 £426, and in 1828
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£483-10/-.
Given that the Hays' estate was so large, the manner in
which the estate was run is important. James Hay having given
up his commercial activities into the hands of William spent the
rest of his life looking after the estate in Tingwall from the
house in Laxfirth (he became known as Hay of Laxfirth and William
became Hay of Hayfield). This gave James his opportunity to be
involved in fanning improvements. As early as 1813 the idea of
establishing a farm at Laxfirth was mooted and by 1816 James had
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made some advance towards this. A friend wrote from Banff
saying:
I rejoice to hear from several hands that you are doing
wonders on your farm, but I fear it will be long before it
makes you rich however it will amuse you in the meantime &
set a good example to others. 7 6
At this point in time the farm was not more then a couple of
parks rather than a full well organised farm.
One other advance that the Hays made was the giving of
leases to the tenants of large holdings. In 1827 John Meldrum
agreed on a 10 year lease for 58 acres of ground at Laxfirth for
£10 a year (plus 15 chickens), and William Grant had a 9 year
lease on 4 parks at £1 an acre. Both were required to follow
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rotation of crops as part of the lease. In the mid 1830's
William employed a John Swann at the farm at Laxfirth and one of
his duties included the teaching of 5 course rotation to the
tenants. However he had difficulty in getting the tenants of
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smaller holdings to accept the system. The next development
was the formation of sheep farms, and to this end there had been
divisions of several of the rooms in Tingwall and the laying out
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of sheep runs in the 1850's.
It was not only the Hays who were becoming richer in this
period, and for comparison it is worth looking at one of the most
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important of the landed families, the Mouats of Gardie. In
the 1825 valuation the Mouat landed estate was the largest in
Shetland. It was concentrated in Bressay, Yell and Unst. The
Mouats were among the most economically active of the Shetland
lairds and were their natural spokesmen and defenders of the
Zetland Method. The value of the estate was estimated at £4,030
in 1777, and by 1817 this had risen to £40,838, which made it
more valuable then the Hay's estate at that time. Annual income
had grown from £250 in 1777, to £2,250 in 1814, and fell to
£1,800 in 1817. This propably gives a slightly inflated figure
of the extent of the growth since 1777 was a poor year being in
the depression of the 1770's. Still the value and the income of
the estate had grown considerably over the period of time.
The estate benefitted greatly from the price rises during
the Napoleonic wars. In particular a valuable contribution came
from the great rise in kelp prices, which was of importance in
years of poor fishing catches. 1804 to 1807 were good years for
kelp as were 1809/10 when it was nearly half of the year's
income. Among other items Mouat invested his money in property
in Edinburgh. He had a half share along with two of his nephews
on 2 houses in St. James Square, for which he paid £925 in 1807.
The Mouat family continued to play a central role in the economic
development of the islands.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has surveyed the changes in the trade of
Shetland from the 1770's until the 1810's and examined the
important role played by the Hay family in these developments.
It has also looked at the growth of the wealth of the Hay family.
By the end of this period they were significant owners of
property as well as having capital available for further
investments in new areas of production (chpts. 7 and 8). When
others discuss the role of merchants in the Shetland economy they
virtually mean the Hays. James Hay was the single largest buyer
of fish and general trader he was also the most important
smuggler for nearly forty years. Merchant is used here in its
true sense. And as we will see in the following chapters the
Hays were in the forefront of every economic development.
Shetland went through some important restructuring of the
organisation of its trade over this period. It is suggested
that this restructuring was instrumental in a shift of control of
trade from lairds to merchants. However at this time this did
not develop any further. Individual merchants did not introduce
new forms of organising production in the Islands. At this time
the main form of production remained the haaf and dried fish was
still Shetland's largest export (see table 3). There had
therefore been a restructuring in trade but not a fundamental
change in the organisation of Shetland's economy and society.
It is to these changes of the 1810's to 1830's that we now turn.
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CHAPTER 6
SHETLAND AND THE GREENLAND WHALING INDUSTRY:1780-1872.
"The course of the whale fishery should reflect
the industrial rather than the demographic history
of Europe."1
The whaling industry was one of the major avenues through
which Shetland was integrated into the general course of British
industrial development. This chapter sets out to evaluate that
process and to analyse its effects upon the Islands' society and
economy from the 1780's to the 1870's.
It is somewhat surprising that there has been no serious
study of Shetland's position in the whaling industry considering
the importance it has had in the historical experience of the
;
islanders. Perhaps the romantic vision of hardy sailors is
preferred to detailed academic research, the former lives on in
the memory of the people, the latter in the ledgers and account
books of the local merchants. This study is primarily based on
research of one of the major mercantile families, the Hay family,
who were actively involved in the whaling industry. Unhappily
theirs is the only extensive contemporary local mercantile
source that has survived, and any conclusion must keep this
serious limitation in mind.
Whaling was basically an industrial pursuit, and its growth
and decline were directly related to wider industrial needs.
The main product of the whale was not its meat but its oil, and
to a lesser extent its bone. The oil was primarily used as a
substitute for rape seed oil in the textile industry, where it
191
was used to clean wool before spinning. It could only be used
for low quality cloths and was commonly used for military
uniforms, the demand for which expanded throughout the eighteenth
century. Local whaling industries often grew up around local
manufacturing needs, such as Peterhead and Dundee first for the
linen industry and later for the jute. Other uses for oil was
for lighting both in private and for public, and London,
Birmingham and Hull were all light by oil. Oil for soap had been
common in the earlier period of the industry. And the bone was
renowned for its use in the fashion industry.
The Greenland whaling industry was crucial in opening up
Shetland to the British economy, in aiding the development of a
cash economy,in expanding the economic base of the islands, and in
the weakening of the existing social organisation of production.
The islands' main role in the industry was as a supplier of
labour, which it did right up until the demise of the British
industry in the 1960's. During that period of time many
thousands of Shetlanders sailed in the whaling fleets, in both the
Arctic and Antarctic. This chapter concentrates on the period
that saw the establishment of the industry in Shetland and the
form it took in its first 80 or so years of operating. The fact
that Shetland was a supplier of labour had significant effects
within the Islands. It meant that there was a conflict of
interest between laird and the whaler agents, for the lairds
wished to retain their control over the labour of their tenants.
This was further related to the general availability of labour
within the economy. The result was that conflict over labour was
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the result of variable factors which were often localised. It
would be fair to say that up until the end of the Napoleonic wars
the lairds were generally against their tenants going to the
whaling, after which the opposition was more in relation to
specific local conditions. The whaling led to a great influx of
money into the economy which helped the growth of the retail trade
in Lerwick (and with it general trade). The growth of
relationships based on cash helped in undermining the relationship
between tenant and laird. In more general terms it also
increased the available capital within the economy for future
investment not only for merchants but also for some individual
tenants.
EARLY HISTORY
Although the English Arctic whaling industry had been
established from the sixteenth century, it was not until the
latter part of the eighteenth century that it intruded into the
life of the Northern Isles. In the earlier part of the century
there were various mentions of using Shetland as a possible base
for the whaling industry. In 1706 the Earl of Morton, at that
time the Earl of Zetland, floated a joint-stock company, of which
a part of the capital was to be used for the whaling. Given the
extent of his Shetland interests it can only be assumed that he
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would use the islands. Gifford writing in the early 1730's
mentions that there had recently been a plan by a whaling company
to establish; "Lerwick as a most comodious port for lodging their
3
stores...and for...melting their oil". Nothing seems to have
come of these plans, and it was not until later in the century
that the relationship between the industry and the islands becomes
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clearer.
THE LAIRDS AND THE WHALING INDUSTRY
Over time, the attitude of the lairds changed somewhat
towards the whaling industry, depending on their particular
economic circumstances. In the early days they were basically
against the industry,"that vile trade" as one referred to it,
since they regarded it as an intrusion into their realm of
control. The antagonism was based on the need of the lairds to
control the labour of their tenants. During the labour
shortages of the French wars there was extensive friction between
laird and agent. However the expansion of the whaling after the
end of the Napoleonic war only led to one known case of dispute,
that was however quite a remarkable one (see below). In general
then the attitude of the lairds depended on the specific
circumstances of the local labour supply for the haaf fishing.
In the early period the lairds feared that the Greenland
whaling would break their control over their tenants and therefore
the haaf fishing. Furthermore it also posed the threat of
merchants acting as agents for the whalers, and thus being able to
replace the lairds as sources of credit and gain a foothold in
controlling labour and production. However in the crisis
conditions of the 1770's and 1780's the whaling was an attractive
prospect providing a secure income at a time when the fishing was
poor and the tenants' were in debt, as long as the laird could
remain in control of the tenants labour. The landowners were
well aware of these threats and of the potential of the whaling,
their response to them is given in an insightful document titled:
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Proposals for furnishing the English Greenland fleet with men
4
from the Islands of Shetland ( dated 7th of January 1781).
This document provides us with a wealth of both direct and
indirect information on social relations and the organisation of
production in Shetland in the late eighteenth century.
Basically the proposal sets out to guarantee a regular supply of .
low cost labour (compared to the wages of English seamen) to the
Greenland whalers if the owners will contract to deal directly
with the landlords and not operate through the merchants. The
lairds were to be left in control of the selecting and paying of
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the men. A related letter sets out in detail the number of men
that would be provided by each landlord and area, in all totaling
some 825 men, with the proviso that they could easily supply
twice that number if the demand was great enough. This was
certainly an ambitious plan and was worked out in some
considerable detail. The main selling point that the lairds
emphasised to the shipowners was the regular supply of cheap
labour, which would reduce running costs not only by paying the
Shetlanders less money than English seamen, but also from the
savings from only requiring a skeleton crew to and from Shetland
to the home port.
A possible problem for the carrying out of this scheme was
the complex set of regulations for the receiving of the bounty,
which set out the size of crew in relation to the ships tonnage,
and this crew were required to muster in the ship's home port,
thus limiting the numbers they could pick up in Shetland. The
lairds hoped to overcome this by getting the regulations changed
allowing the ships to rendezvous in Shetland and receive the full
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customs' certificates necessary for the bounty.
The lairds were making it clear that they intended to remain
in control of their tenants, and that they were not prepared to
allow freedom of movement, indeed they would do all in their
power to stop their tenants from taking up positions in the
Greenland ships unless the owners agreed to the lairds' scheme:
"The landmaster having no means of procuring his rents
but by fish from his tenants...he will surely then never
permit his tenants to enter onboard a Greenland Ship, for he
can restrain them by contracts".6
Some lairds had forcibly impressed into the navy tenants who
had, in previous years, gone to the whaling and were prepared to
7
so again. Likewise the Sheriff Court records show that the
lairds were able and prepared to use the courts to restraint their
8
tenants from sailing.
The lairds wanted to control the supply of and the selection
of the men as well as paying them their wages, could be held by
the laird against any outstanding debt. The landlord was to
receive 45/- per man per month, and he was to decide the rate that
each man was to receive be it more or less than this amount.
They stipulated that the shipowners were not to deal with the
Lerwick merchants, whom they obviously saw as a direct threat to
their control over their tenants. The agreement was to be solely
between the landlord and shipowner since:
This will cement the connection betwixt the owners and the
landmasters, who will all have agents in Lerwick if they are
not there themselves, for in general they much dislike the
Lerwick merchants acting for their tenants, who deduct round
sums for their commission, and it is not to be supposed that
they have the interests of the landmasters tenants at heart.9
Not that the laird necessarily had the interests of his own
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tenants at heart either. This whole scheme has behind it the
desire for a stable and regular income, rather than the precarious
earnings from the fishing, which depended on many external factors
outwith the control of the lairds (or anyone else for that
matter). Besides the obvious problems of the elements and market
conditions there were also internal problems brought about by a
crisis in the organisation of production. There was a
"Malthusian" crisis in the islands as population outstripped
resources which was at least partly due to the policy of the
lairds themselves.(see chpt. 4)
The crisis had seen an intensification of the haaf fishing.
This had led to a serious problem of overcrowding of the fishing
grounds with a decline in the average catch. The lairds
recognised that a reduction in the number of boats fishing would
not lead to an equal decline in catches, indeed that such a
reduction would result in an increase in average catches and a
greater return on capital:
The Gentlemen would divide their tenants equally betwixt the
Greenland and ling fishing, which would produce a
considerable number of men for the Greenland trade... and
would divide the Gentlemens risk and loss and chance of gain
to better purpose, and it is a well known fact that the fewer
Boats which ply the ling fishing on any part of the Coast
their success is always greater.10
In the light of these factors the possibility of alternative
employment for their tenants in the whaling industry was
attractive to the lairds, as long as they controlled the whole
range of commercial activities of the trade. Since rents were
relatively low and the laird received the greater part of his
estates' income from the produce of his tenants labour, therefore
control of that labour was vital to the laird. Furthermore the
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existing form of fishing had reached, by this time, what could be
termed its "ecological" peak of some 500 boats and employing 3,000
fishermen. From then on as population continued to rise, both
alternative employment could be opened up as well as the fishing
continuing at its high level.
These documents are the product of commercially minded men
who were well aware of their economic position and the operation
of trade, and of the need within the context of the crisis
within the economy to secure income and reduce the indebtedness
of the tenantry. It was an ambitious plan and it would be
intriguing to know the response of the Whale ship owners. What
is known is that the lairds failed and that the future of the
Greenland trade in Shetland lay in the hands of the merchants and
not the lairds. Some were not prepared to give up without a
fight as they saw the increasing encroachment on their tenants.
In 1793 one laird Thomas Mouat, a major landowner in Unst,
felt strongly enough about the loss of tenants to the whaling
ships to send a petition to the Commons. In normal years only 5
to 10 men went from Unst, but in 1793, 27 men went, apparently
11
encouraged by an envious neighbour of Mouat's. In this
petition Mouat sets out the evils of "That Vile Trade",
separating sons from their families, servants from their rightful
masters, and when they returned they lived off the labour of
others giving nothing in return, but most importantly that they
did not go to the summer fishing:
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Those ships arrive in Bressay Sound and in Baltasound in
Unst, about the middle of March, and seduce and carry off
servants from their masters, children from their parents and
even tenants from their possessions without any regular
intimation being given, and tend a deaf ear to the
remonstrances of landlords, masters of families and parents,
who object to such unwarrantable proceedings...
This evil is the more clamant in that those young men
who are thus seduced having remained as burdens on their
masters or parents during the preceeding winter (in which
nothing they can be employed in can compensate the expense of
their maintenance) desert, at the very time when there is
most occasion for their services in the labouring the ground,
the season for which just commences about the time those
Greenland ships arrive; thus their masters and parents are
left destitute of assistance...and the fishing, in the summer
the principal object of this country, is consequently
sacrificed...they or some of them return in autumn when there
is little use for them at home, after having imbibed the
vices and dissipation of their late comrades, who are in
general the lowest class of tars, and often without a penny
in their pockets. Instead of being useful members of the
community, they sow discontent and set examples of idleness
and dissipation among the natives and tempt their
acquaintances to embark in the same line of life.(emphasis
mine)12
Mouat's greatest fear, his tenants no longer fishing for him,
had to be guarded in the moral language of the effects on the
family.
During this period the number of Shetlanders allowed to go
to the whaling was limited by legislation.
, Indeed as Jackson writes; "as late as 1793 the Board
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of Trade refused to allow Shetlanders onboard whalers". This
suggests that a substantial number of Shetlanders were already
going to the whaling on a regular basis. This was later
14
relented on and 3 Shetlanders per 50 tons of ship were allowed.
One reason why the Government wished to limit the number going
was to maintain the Islands as a supply of "recruits" for the
Royal Navy. Shetland had long been a source for the Navy, and
many hundreds had fought in the previous wars of the 18th
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century. It was claimed that some 900 had fought in the Seven
Years War, and some 2,000 had been in the navy and merchant
15
service during the American War. Throughout the Napoleonic
wars the naval impressment ship was a common sight off the
shores, and many stories have been passed down about their
actions. The whaling industry was one of the very few trades
that the men were protected from being impressed, harpooners and
other skilled men were exempted from all forced service,
16
ordinary seamen only from Febuary until the end of the voyage.
The fear of impressment was such that the ship owners even
distributed advertisements stating that; "full protection is
17
guaranteed for Shetlanders employed in the Greenland fishing".
This of course did not stop the Navy from impressing whalers.
In March 1804, Thomas Francis and Peter Pole, both of Papa Stour,
wrote to Hay saying that they were afraid to come to Lerwick to
join their whaling ship because they had been impressed but had
18
managed to escape. In 1810,10 out of the 19 Shetlanders
onboard the Prince of Brazil (of Hull), were impressed near the
19
end of their voyage. Therefore it can only be assumed that
the Government wished to keep Shetland as a ready supplier of
"recruits" for the Navy, and at the same time increase the number
of experienced sailors in the home ports.
The demand for seamen for the whaling declined towards the
end of the century, which probably reduced the pressure on labour
supply in Shetland. The number of active whaling vessels
declined; from 250 in 1787/88, to an annual average of 97 in the
years 1790-94, and to 61 in the years 1795-99 (the tonnage and
20
crew size remaining the same). After this the number of ships
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was to increase despite the higher costs of fitting out during
the weir as the prices of oil and bone rose. So did profits and
the risk became worthwhile. From an annual average of 84 during
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1800-04, to 97 in 1810 and to 147 in 1815. This combined with
the relaxation of the regulations on the number of Shetlanders
allowed to go to the whaling and matters became potentially worse
for the lairds, together with the large numbers of Shetlanders
in the Royal Navy. And it is at this point that the conflict
between laird and whaling agent intensified due to the labour
shortage. It is estimated that in the early 1800's there were
annually 600 Shetlanders at the whaling; Sir Walter Scott wrote
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that this had risen to 1,000 by 1814. As Edmonston wrote in
1809:
In their efforts to obtain men for the ships which they
supply, they frequently disappoint the Cardholders in their
fishing schemes, and as the prosecutions of the one is deemed
to be incompatible with the other, this opposition of interest
gives rise to endless jealousies between them ...the heritors
... (urge) that the Greenland trade is prejudiced to the
morals of the people, and they wish to put a termination to so
injurious a system. 23
Generally matters improved on the ending of the war as the
returning sailors increased the locally available labour.
However for one laird, Arthur Nicolson of Lochend, the problem
had become worse and matters had reached a head by the mid-
1820' s, when the industry was at its height in the islands. He
set out in writing a detailed list of his complaints against his
tenants in Fetlar with suggestions on how to improve their damaged
24
relationship. Nicolson's complaints were written in such a
way as to appeal to what he saw as a traditional Shetland way of
living , where the tenant was a combination of farmer and
201
fisherman and the laird looked after the best interests of all;
the interests of tenant and laird were the same. However, much
to Nicolson's dismay many of his Fetlar tenants were going to the
Greenland whaling, thus rejecting this way.of life. The document
is effectively an ultimatum, stop going to the whaling and
return to fishing for him or be evicted:
...all those persons, whether tenants, tenant's sons, or
others, residing on my property in Fetlar, who are in the
habit of going to Greenland, will have to decide forthwith
upon either becoming altogether Sailors or betaking
themselves to such occupation as the place admits of [farming
and fishing]. For, such as go shall not on any account be
received again in their present abodes. 25
Nicolson threatened his tenants with the establishment of a
sheep farm which would; "more than triple the income of the
26
proprietors". A sheep farm would require the clearing of the
land. However many of his tenants did not heed his warnings and
choose the hard life as a whaler then the idyllic pastures
described by Nicolson. This is still remembered, and one person
recently described the event in the following way:
the men had had a meeting among theirselves, and they said,
"Now men look here. There's plenty of money to be made at the
Greenland whaling fishing. And we're going with...we could
tell the landlord the land lord he could take his land, and
keep it and we're going - to where we can make more money."
[they then went to Nicholson] "Well you go in and tell Sir
Arthur we're gathered here today to tell him that we're not
going to fish for him, we're going to the Greenland
fishing...And that was the end of (the fishing tenures).
After that they paid their rent.
But the rents were not enough:
(Nicolson) found that he wasn't making a lot of money from
the rents. He would like more. So what he did...Well he
evicted about forty or fifty crofters off the rich land.
And brought in sheep, black-faced sheep and cattle from the
Highlands of Scotland, and he kept sheep and cattle. And he
did think he made more cash out of this. And so he would.27
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Nicolson then proceeded with the first major clearance in
28
Shetland. This turned out to a slow process and dragged on
until the 1840's. Fetlar is one of the most fertile of the
islands in Shetland and at the time had a population of over a
thousand. This was to rapidly and consistantly fall throughout
the rest of the century, with the largest decline
(proportionally) of any area.
This goes some way in showing the importance of the whaling
industry in changing the attitudes of some of the lairds. The
*
Shetland landowners had always, been commercially minded so they
were able to respond to the changing social and economic
conditions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
These changes made the older forms of production less viable and
alternatives more attractive. Those that argue that the coming
of the market economy was not until the late nineteenth century,
seem to consider the existing system of production as being pre-
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market. However it was certainly commercial and based on sound
economic sense considering the historical position of the
Islands. Shetland existed within certain, quite serious,
constraints; geographical, social, economic and historical.
Within these constraints the existing methods were entirely
"rational". The whaling industry brought new pressures to bear
and with them new possibilities, but also new limitations, which
had a profound effect on the development of Shetland.
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THE MERCHANTS AND THE GREENLAND WHALING:
THE HAY FAMILY
One social group certainly made substantial gains from the
whaling industry, the local merchants who were primarily based in
the town of Lerwick. Their success in securing the position as
agents for the ship owners, thus acting as intermediates between
the latter and the Shetland seamen meant that they could improve
their placing in the islands' social structure. Their success
can be explain in terms of the needs of the ship-owners, for they
were more flexible than the lairds and had wider commercial
experience and contacts particularly in the commision trade.
These social and economic networks that linked the merchants with
the wider commercial world are important for the establishment of
the trade. An example of this is the Hay family, who had by the
late eighteenth century an extensive set of international
commercial connections through which the family organised their
business dealings.(See previous chapter) Of greatest importance
for the whaling industry was their relationship with the merchants
of Hull, and we can see in the increasing role of Shetland as a
supplier of seamen a direct correlation with the rise of Hull as
the main whaling port of Britain.
As we have already seen by at least the 1770's (and earlier)
there were whalers regularly calling at Shetland for crewmen. By
1781 James Hay was using the returning Greenland ships to carry
produce back to their home ports. Also in 1781 he was in regular
correspondence with several of the Hull merchants, including Hugh
Kerrs and Robert Bell both involved in the whaling trade. In 1781
Hay sent a cargo of kelp to Hull and in 1783 he shipped a large
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cargo of fish oil, some 40 tons (Hull was a major market for
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oil). In 1784, Hay was even contemplating buying shares in a
whaler since the returns seemed to be so good, although he was to
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change his mind and invest this money in a "herring adventure".
After this there is a break in the records concerning the whaling
industry in Shetland, and it is not until the 1790's that we have
concrete evidence of the Hay family's involvement as agents.
This involvement was once more with Hull men, in 1796 Thomas
Barmby wrote requesting Shetland seamen for his ship the
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Samuel. From 1796 onwards we have a much clearer picture of
the number of ships and the number of Shetlanders on them,
although it is clear that Shetlanders had sailed on Hull whalers
for several years previously. As Robert Bell, a well known Hull
whale owner wrote in 1797:
Mr Fea informs us you have frequently supplied our ships with
men in this way.33
Mr Fea was a native of Shetland. These business connections were
reinforced by close personal contacts, suggested by the tone of
the business correspondence, and Hay made regular trips to Hull.
Both Thomas and Robert Bell helped him in finding apprenticeships
in Hull merchant houses for two of his sons; Andrew and William,
34
as well as his nephew, Laurence Smith. These close contacts
tended to strengthen Hull's place in the early nineteenth century
as the major employer of Shetland seamen. This led to the
establishment of a tradition, where it was said that the
Shetlanders preferred to sail on Hull and Whitby ships over
others, and that the conditions were better and that they worked
35
well with the Hull seamen.
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The other main port for whaling at the end of eighteenth
century was London, and the figures tend to show that for some
years at the turn of the century that city often supplied more
than Hull. It is not known if this is caused by the dearth of
36
data or if it reflects London's then dominant position.
Certainly from the 1760/70's Shetland had had increasing trade
and contact with London merchant houses. This was part of a
wider and more general shift of the main markets for Shetland
produce from Prostestant Germany, centred on Hamburg, to the
Catholic Mediterranean based on Barcelona.
Table 1 shows for the the first 10 years that we have
records for both the number of ships and the relative importance
of Hull and London.
TABLE 1
NO. OF WHALING SHIPS: WITH MAIN PORTS OF ORIGIN
(Hay acting as agents) 1796-1805 inc.
TOTAL NO. OF NO. FROM NO. FROM
YEAR SHIPS HULL LONDON
1796 1 1
1797 3 1 1
1798 5 1 3
1799 8 44
1800 5 1
1801 6 1 5
1802 6 42
1803 5 5 —
1804 11 10
1805 3 3 —
source: NLS ACC 3250 Hay of Hayfield.
SA Hay of Hayfield.
SA Hay & Co (NRA 0650).
This includes some of the most well known whalers, from
Hull: the Blenheim (1804) the Egginton (1798, 1799), the Emperor
(1804), the George & Mary (1804, 1805), the John (1799, 1803,
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1804), the Manchester (1805), the Minerva (1797, 1799, 1801,
1802, 1804, 1805), the Samuel (1796, 1803, 1804), the Sarah &
Elizabeth (1804), the Traveller (1802, 1803, 1804) the Truelove
(1799, 1800, 1802),and the Williamson (1804). From London the
Dundee (1801), the Inverness (1797, 1798, 1799, 1800, 1801), the
Ipswich (1798, 1799, 1800, 1801, 1802), the Nancy (1798, 1799,
1800, 1801), the Unicorn (1797, 1798), the Vigilant (1799, 1800,
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1801, 1802).
These are the earliest records that we have of ships with
details of crewlists etc. rather than the vague comments in
correspondence. It needs to be kept in mind that there were
other merchants acting as agents for the trade, however their
records have not survived. Neither can we be too sure of the
completeness of the Hay family papers. It would therefore be
best to be cautious about either the general trends or the
validity of the actual numbers of the whalers coming to Shetland,
although we can be more certain about the later dates as there are
other sources of information. Furthermore there is a large gap
of some 20 years in the Hay records on the whale trade, between
1825 and 1844 (the last year that we can be sure is complete is
1824). This break is so long that it is best to treat the two
periods as effectively separate, the first as an early period
which saw the establishment of the whaling industry in the
Shetlands, and the second, later, period as that in which
the well established industry operated with a long tradition of
Shetland involvement and participation behind it. This means that
the depression of whaling from the mid-1820's is not covered and
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therefore we are unable to assess the effect of this on the
Islands. It is this earlier period that will be dealt with in
greatest detail, since it deals with was the original introduction
of the industry which had the profound effects on the local
society and economy.
Table 2 shows the number of whaling vessels for a thirty
year period, 1796 to 1825, and shows a significant rise in the
last ten years and the continuing importance of Hull.
TABLE 2
ANNUAL NO. OF SHIPS (5 year* averages), WITH NO.
























Source: NLS ACC 3250 Hay of Hayfield.
SA Hay of Hayfield
SA Hay & Co (NRA 0650)
NOTES:
(1) No data for 1807
(2) No data for 1819
(3) The data for 1825 is both partial and suspect. The last
year that can be regarded as complete is 1824. A four year
average would give." 16.5 and 15 respectfully.
Again we cannot draw too many conclusions from these figures,
since they may merely reflect the increasing involvement of the
Hay family in the whaling trade, for they could be taking over
business from other agents, or they had specialised in Hull ships,
with the other agents dealing with other ports. However it does
seem certain that there was a general rise in the number of ships
calling at Shetland for supplements to their crews. There are a
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few years for which we have the total numbers of ships calling at
Shetland; in 1818 there were 34, in 1819 there were 43, and in
1821 this had risen to 66. By 1837 the number had fallen back to
24 reflecting the depression in the industry. The expansion of
trade and the labour shortages brought about by the war led to an
increased use of Shetland (and Orkney) as a source of sailors:
The six years after 1812 were the years actively engaged in
by British ports, and it was not always easy, so large was
the number of British ships, for each to obtain her
complement at these northern ports.38
As we have already seen with the scheme proposed by the
lairds the Bounty regulations and restrictions are important when
considering the extent and form of the industry in the islands.
There was a continual dispute between the shipowners, who wanted
the Shetlanders, and the Government who wished to restrict their
use. At least during the early part of the century when the war
was on this was a major reason for limiting the extent. The
views and opinions of the shipowners cannot be better expressed
as in the two following extracts from contemporary letters, both
written in 1803, The first from Chris Briggs, and clearly
expresses the advantages of using a Shetland crew, notably their
cheapness:
only very few men will be wanted from your place this Season
in consequence of (the) Government obliging all ships fitting
for the Bounty to full man in England and Scotland, and out
of 41 sail of ships for the fishing from this port, all fits
for the Bounty excepting three and the Catherine is one. My
reasons for fitting her without Bounty which is £300 is I
think I can save it in expenses & taking men at your Island
if I do it will induce me to send all my three ships the next
year on the same plan. As the Catherine talcing men at your
Island is therefore a Speculation I hope you will to the
utmost of your power assist me in it by procuring the men as
low as , and at the same time clever active fellows.39
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The following is from Robert Bell & Co. of Hull:
The Greenland Owners here [Hull] have at last got leave to
take on men at Shetland & Orkney as formerly, for the Bounty
but under a promise to relinquish the like claim in future...
however so long as the Minerva continues in the Trade we
shall constantly want the same number of men [in 1803 this
was 12], as the ship took last year which will not be the
case with other vessels as they must be full manned from home
or give up the Bounty.40
It was not until the easing of restictions on the Bounty,
indeed its reduction and final demise in 1824 that we saw a rapid
expansion in the Shetland trade, as table 2 suggests, with the
trade reaching its height in the mid-1820's.
NUMBER OF SHETLANDERS AT THE GREENLAND WHALING
In 1825 it was estimated that as many as 1,400 men were
41
engaged for the whaling at Lerwick. The standard estimates for
the number of Shetlanders involved is normally between 1,000 to
1,500, and it is possible to evaluate how accurate this figure
actually is. For 1822, O'Dell gives figures for total number of
Shetlanders sailing in Greenland whalers at 516 engaged between
th th 42
the 10 of March and the 6 of April . In that year the Hay
family (in the form of the company of Hay and Ogilvy) were agents
for 13 ships, for which we have crewlists for 12, in all totalling
43
some 204 men giving an average of 17 per ship. This is a
higher than normal average; for the five years 1820 to 1824
(inclusive), for which there are detailed crew lists on out of the
84 ships the company acted as agents for, the annual average per
44
ship was slightly less at 14.'66. This figure of approximately 15
Shetlanders per ship is supported by the longer term evidence from
1797 onwards, with only small variations which would reflect
wider labour market conditions in the mother ports as well as
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within Shetland. Between 1796 and 1825 the records for 201
ships, of which there are details of the crews for 168 (none for
the years 1806, 1807 and 1819), give a total of 2,483 seaman, an
45
average of 14.77 (say 15) per ship. There were of course
variations between years, the lowest annual average being in 1805
46
with 11.3 per ship and the highest being 1814 with 19.25.
In 1825 there was a total of 110 ships which sailed from
British ports to the Arctic whaling, 21 for Greenland and 89 for
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the Davis Straits , and even if these all had called at Shetland
(and none at Orkney) and had picked up 15 each, this would give a
total of 1650, and is highly unlikely. There are some years for
which we do know the number of vessels arriving at Shetland. For
instance in 1821 out of the 160 at the northern whaling, 66
collected crew at Shetland, and the Hay's were agents for 19 of
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these. This would give a figure of almost a 1,000 which
represents the highest involvement in the industry. A fair
estimate for the annual number of men going to the whaling would
be in the region of 600 to 1,000, with 600 to 800 being the most
likely figure for average years. An estimate in 1837 gives the
number at between 800 and 1,000, but the Shetland Journal of that
year records a total of only 24 ships calling into Lerwick for
crew, and although the average number per ship had risen, it was
49
not as high as 40 per vessel. What details that have survived
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from the 1840's (1844 to 1849) give an average of 21 per ship.
In the 1850's this had risen, with a figure of 25 per ship in
1852, which year also saw the highest number in any one ship, 36
51
engaged on the Joseph Green of Peterhead. The proportion of
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Shetlanders in the total crew rose slightly over this period.
The crew of a whaler had barely changed, from approximately 40 at
52
the end of the 18th century to an average of 46 in the 1840's.
This suggests that Shetlanders composed one-third of the crew in
the early part of the century, rising to roughly a half by the
1840's.
It is therefore fair to say that some of the estimates of
the number of Shetlanders annually involved in the whaling
industry have been too high, certainly they were not as high as
the 1,400 claimed. It would be closer to the truth to quote a
figure of 600 to 800, with 1,000 at its height. From these
figures we can get some idea of the proportion of Shetlanders in
the total of those engaged in the whaling industry. This can
only be a very vague estimate since figures for the whole period
are rather scanty. Using the figure from above of an average
crew of 45 in ship we can calculate the approximate number of
whalers as in the region of; less than 7,000 between 1815-1819,
declining to almost 6,000 in 1820-1825, to just over 4,200 for
53
1825-29, and to just over 3,700 for 1830-1834. This would put
Shetlanders as being between one-tenth and one-quarter of the
total. With the general decline of the Arctic whaling in the
early/ mid 19th century combined with the rise in the average
number of Shetlanders in the crew, the proportion rose as the
total number declined, the proportion reaching its greatest in
the 1820's with a quarter of all whalers coming from Shetland (and
with a similar number from the Orkney's. If we had reliable
figures for the wages of English and Scottish whalers than am
estimate of the savings from employing nothern crews could be
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given.
This more conservative figure does not mean that the
industry was marginal in its effects on Shetland's economy and
society, as the following section shows. At its height it
employed in the region of one-sixth of the adult male population.
This was at a time when the haaf fishing employed some 3,000.
One of the most important effects was that of the increasing
commercialisation of the economy with greater penetration of
economic relations based on cash. The next section goes on to
examine the organisation of the supply of labour to the industry
in the Shetlands with an emphasis on the effect of the greater
introduction of a cash economy on the social and economic
structure of the islands.
ORGANISATION OF THE WHALING INDUSTRY IN SHETLAND
The basic form of the organisation of the whaling industry in
Shetland, the method by which men were recruited, payed etc.,
hardly changed over the 80 or so years which this chapter covers.
In the early months of the year the shipowners would write to
their agents in Lerwick, informing them as to which ships were
coming that season and the number of men each ship would require.
The agents would then set about raising this number of men ,
either from people they knew from previous years or by
recommendation or from those who had written or asked, requesting
a position. Generally despite the opposition of some of the
lairds there appears to have been little problem in getting
crews.The vessels arrived in Bressay Sound from early March
onwards, staying for only a few days while the crews mustered in
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Lerwick and for the taking on of stores. They then sailed for
the Arctic; to Greenland or the Davis Straits, returning in late
July or early August, when the men would be payed off, although it
was common for the settling up to take until November, or even the
following year if oil money was to be paid. The return of the
whalers was greeted with mixed blessings, since the seamen were
notorious for their drinking and fighting, as Walter Scott, on his
visit to the islands in 1814, put in verse:
Here to the Greenland tar, a fiercer guest.
Claims a brief hour of riot, not of rest;
Proves each wild frolic that in wine has birth.
And wakes the land with brawls and boisterous mirth.54
Things often got out of hand and it was common to enroll special
constables to control the men in their "brawls and boisterous
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mirth", even as late as the 1850's. Scott's claim that those
involved were only English seamen needs to be taken with a pinch
of salt when the Shetlanders included such renowned characters as
"Strong" John Hunter who was "recognised as the champion fighter
56
in the whole Arctic fleet".
When the men signed on they received a month's wages in
advance, paid out by the local agent, and for the length of the
voyage their families would receive some money each month (called
monthly money). This was credited at the agents and payed out in
goods and/or cash as requested. The agents kept detailed ledgers
of their accounts with the whalers, and many of the ones kept by
the Hays have survived. These give an insight into the operation
of the whole system in Shetland.
One of the most significant aspects of the whaling industry
was that it was waged employment operating within the context of a
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local non-wage economy. This adds another layer of complexity to
understanding the working of Shetland economy and society, and
goes some way to helping us visualise the way in which different
forms of social organisation of production co-exist within the
same locality. These are not necessar ally contradictory and
operate at the level of individuals, in as much as they personally
find it not a problem but merely part of their day-to-day
existance. As such it is part of their "taken for granted"
understanding of their world. It is certainly true that some
preferred wage employment over that of fishing for their laird, as
we have already seen with Nicholson's tenants in Fetlar. And
this relates to the contemporary debate where paid labour is often
referred to as "free" labour, which instills into the worker
independence and self-respect, a kind of nobility which forced
labour cannot achieve.
THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE GREENLAND WHALING
Concerning the rates of pay for Shetlanders in the whaling
it is safe to assume that they received lower rates than the
other members of the crew, although probably not as low as
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Jackson suggests. And this difference may be due to the fact
that Shetlanders were generally employed at the lower, less
skilled and therefore poorer paid positions. The supply of and
demand for labour during wartime forced up the general rate of
pay, with a rapid decline after 1815. There was also constant
pressure from the ship owners to reduce the wage rates of the
Shetland men, combined with regular threats that they would move
to Orkney, where they claimed rates were lower.
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Table 3 shows the distribution of monthly wages rates for 1798
to 1823, where possible this has been given in 5 year periods,
for after 1815 it has been given as a 4 year and 3 year period.
. TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF MONTHLY WAGE RATES(in shillings)
1798-1823 inc. (percentage in brackets)
YEAR RATE
20—29 30—34 35—39 40—44
1798- NO. 16 87 73 106
1804 (1) (%) (3) (17) (14) (20)
1805- NO. 3 25 9 11
1810 (2) (%) (2.5) (21) (8) (9)
1811- NO. 10 48 60 55
1815 (%) (2) (10) (13) (12)
1816- NO. 35 90 142 248
1820 (3) (%) (7) (17) (27) (48)
1821- NO. 135 215 49 100
1823 (%) (27) (43) (10) (20)
RATE
45—49 50—54 55—64 65 and above
1798- NO. 98 101 35 2
1804 (%) (19) (19.5) (7) (.4)
1805- NO. 18 21 29 3
1810 (%) (15) (18) (24) (2.5)
1811- NO. 80 105 90 17





NOTES:(1) 8 year period
(2) no data for 1807
(3) no data for 1819
source:NLS ACC 3250 Hay of Hayfield
SA Hay of Hayfield
SA (NRA 650) Hay & CO.
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These monthly wage rates show a distinct cleavage between 1815
(the last year of war) and 1816 (the first of peace), and will be
dealt with separately and in chronological order.
Although for the period during the war there is a wide range
in rates, it is clear that the majority of men received 40/- or
over per month. There were general groupings: in 1798-1804
around 40 to 54/- totalling 59% of all men, in 1805-1810 there
was a rise to 45 to 64/- (57%), and a similar grouping in 1811-
1815 totalling 59% of all Shetland whalers. This is confirmed by
advertisements distributed during the wars guaranteeing
protection from impressment for Shetlanders employed in the
Greenland fishery and stating that; "Mr Hay will pay 40/- to 50/-
per month for men/ boys who have never been. (and)t50/- to 53/-
for experienced seamen, plus fish money". There is little
comparative data to relate these figures to; Bowley gives the
wTages for an ordinary seaman in 1785 at 27/6 a month, and in time
58
of war this could easily double. In the 1830's the rates for
merchant ships sailing from London were advertised at; for East
Indiamen 35 to 40/- per month, for "Private Ships on Long
Southern Voyages" the rate was 40 to 45/- per month, and for
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"short trips to the Baltic or Quebec" it was 45 to 50/-.
After the war there were major changes in the labour market;
with a rapidly expanding supply of men the wage rates fell, this
trend continuing well into the 1820's. In 1816-1820, 48% of
Shetlanders received 40 to 44/-, but over 51% were paid less. By
1821-1823, 70% received less than 35/-. To compare this to an
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earlier time, in 1811-1815 less than 13% received under 35/- a
month.
The rate of wages were directly related to the position of
the men in the crew hierarchy, which was strictly set down in the
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regulations of the Commissioners of Customs. As would be
expected most of the Shetlanders, especially in the early years,
held lowest positions within the crew, but in time as they became
more experienced and when local labour shortages occurred in the
home ports, some did rise up to the higher and better paid
positions. In 1801 for the three ships which give details of
"stations and qualifications"; the Ipswich, Inverness and Nancy
(all of London), almost all are defined as Seamen or 'Green' or as
having one year's experience, the green men receiving the lowest
rates, and so on up the scale. A few however were noted as
having three or four years of experience, and a few had risen to
more senior positions. On the Ipswich both Laurence Moncreif
and Andrew Williamson were Boatsteerers and earning 56/- a month,
and John Louther was a Harpooner at 70/- a month. In 1802 on
the Ipswich, John Louther was still a harpooner at 70/-, and on
the Truelove (of Hull), Francis Johnson and John Smith were both
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boatsteerers at 66/-.
The monthly rates were only one part of the men's wages and
there was a range of other payments which depended on the success
of the voyage. The most important of these was "fish money", an
amount for each whale caught (by tradition whales were regarded as
fish). Again the rate varied from ship to ship and from man to
man, with the higher positions receiving the greatest rate. The
standard payment was around 5/- per whale, although it was sis low
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as 2/6 for the Nancy in 1802 or as high as 10/6. Depending on the
number of whales caught this could make a substantial improvement
to the total wages. In 1801 the Minerva (of Hull) caught only 2
fish and each crewman only received 10/- in total for their fish
money. In 1802, the Truelove (also of Hull), caught some 6 fish,
and although most were only paid 5/- per fish, two boatsteerers
received 10/6 and one man as much as 21/- (position unknown but
more than likely a harpooner), which increased their wages by £3-
3/- and £6-6/- respectively. Some ships paid "oil money" instead
of fish money, which was so much per barrel of oil produced, and
there is one example (the Prince of Brazil) of a combination of
oil and fish money. A few ships also paid "Premium Money", which
tended to vary between 15/- to £1, with a range from 5/- to as
high as £2.
The other crucial factor in determining the total wages was
of course the actual length of the voyage. At the turn of the
nineteenth century these normally lasted for 4 to 5 months, from
mid/ late March to mid July or early August. As the century wore
on the voyages tended to become longer as the ship went further
in the search for whales, and as the Davis Straits replaced the
Greenland waters as the main source of whales.
Table 4 shows the distribution for gross wages for 1800 to
1823. Two things are clear from this table, that there was a
wide range of wages and that there was no one band within which
the Shetlanders were paid. If we check this against Table 5
giving the annual average wages for the same period we cam see
that there were fluctuations in wages, as we would expect. After
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1815 this was due to falling wage rates but the successes of the
industry in the 1820's saw a rise. Again we should not read too
much into these figures given that they are from a relatively
small number of observations and that there is no comparative
data.
TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS WAGES FOR SHETLANDERS AT THE
GREENLAND WHALING 1800-1823 (inc.) IN POUNDS STG.
PERCENTAGE IN BRACKETS
AMOUNT
YEAR under £10 from £10 & under £12 from £12 & under £14
1800- NO. 154 83 70
1804 (%) (46.5) (25) (21)
1805- NO. 27 15 24
1810 (%) (24) (13) (21)
1811- NO. 79 69 110
1815 (%) (17) (15) (24)
1816- NO. 192 87 120
1820 (%) (37) (17) (23)
1821- NO. 144 141 74
1823 (%) (30) (30) (15.5)
AMOUNT
from 14 & under 16 from 16 & under 18 18 and over
1800- NO. 11 8 2
1804 (%) x (3) (2) (.6)
1805- NO. 17 15 16
1810 (%) (15) (13) (14)
1811- NO. 90 55 61
1815 (%) (19) (12) (13)
1816- NO. 64 19 37
1820 (%) (12) (4) (7)
1821- NO. 38 26 53
1823 (%) (8) (5.5) (11)
source:NLS ACC 3250 Hay of Hayfield
SA Hay of Hayfield
SA (NRA 650) Hay & Co.
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TABLE 5
YEARLY AVERAGE WAGES 1799-1823 (to nearest penny)
(5 year averages)











source as table 4
Just as we have seen a general improvement in wage rates for
the war period, so there was also a rise in wages, both in average
and in the distribution. The post war period saw a
concentration at the lower levels of pay: in 1816 to 1820, 54%
received less than £12 in gross wages, by 1821 to 1823 more than
60% earned less than this. Before the war (1811 to 1815), only
32% had earned, under than this. The improvement in 1821 to 1823
was due to a number of very successful voyages boosting the
average figure, with 11% earning over £18.
If we relate these figures to the total numbers of Shetlanders
going to the whaling that we estimated above, in the range of 800
with a maximum of 1,000, we can immediately see its value to the
economy. It was worth something in the region of £8,000 to
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£11,000 a year. The Orkney and Zetland Chronicle in 1825 estimated
the value to the two island groups at £50,000, for that year but
according to these above calculations this is a major
62
overestimate. Using these new figures we can estimate that in
the first quarter of the nineteenth century the whaling added
between £200,000 and £300,000 to the .income of the Islands. The
long term effect of this influx should not be underestimated.
Given this substantial earnings by Shetlanders, it is
important to see how this influx operated within the existing
economy where cash was at a premium. At first it may seem
sensible for the existing system of truck to operate, since this
was the traditional way in Shetland. However this does not seem
to be the case and the great majority of the earnings were taken
in cash. This led to a greater opening up of the local economy,
and relations based on cash became more important th%n before,
indeed this eventually resulted in the islands becoming a major
importer of cash and some of the merchants, the Hays in
particular, developed a degree of expertise in banking matters. In
general this aided the tendency for the local economy to become
closer to that of Britain as a whole, and in terms of financial
and banking matters relations were established with Edinburgh
banks which had a long term effect on the economy.
To return to the form of payment, some of the ledgers in which
the merchants kept their records of accounts with the Greenland
men have survived. They clearly show the means by which these
men were paid. Again these are only records of the activities of
the Hay family, but it is safe to assume that all operated a
similar system. The agent would keep an account for each man,
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giving the amounts that were advanced at the beginning of the
voyage with the rates of monthly money (normally about 20/-). The
man's family could draw on this money while the man was at sea,
and they could ask for it in cash as well as goods. At the end
of the season the man was paid off in goods and or cash, if he was
a regular whaler he might keep the account open until the
following season. From Table 6 it is clear that the majority of
the wages were given out as cash.
TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE OF WAGES PAYED OUT IN CASH










source:NLS ACC 3250 Hay of Hayfield
acct. bks for 1802 & 1803
SA Hay & Co Greenland Bks.1808-12
no data for 1810
includes ships' slop chest
details of the Harmony have not
been included, as substantial parts of the
mens wages were transferred to the account of
J. Henderson a Scalloway merchant.
From these figures it would be safe to assume that between
two-thirds and three-quarters of all wages were paid out in cash.







The agents reckoned that between one-quarter and one-
fifth of earnings were covered by "out-takes"—money for
goods in advance with the rest paid out in cash.65
These figures are confirmed by details from the 1860's, when
in 1867 the Arctic (of Dundee) payed out 77.4% of the wages in
cash (£318-14/6 out of £411-14/6), and in 1869 the Narwhal (of
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Dundee), payed out 83.6% (£255-11/6 out of £305-15/2).
This required a large influx of money into the local
economy, as one local merchant who desired to get into the trade
wrote to Hay:
The Greenland trade no doubt is somewhat lucrative but it
requires a great deal of ready cash, which none but men of
capital can raise65
By this time (1800) the Hay family were certainly "men of
capital". We have seen that whaling wages required the annual
import of significant amounts of money into a society that had
operated mainly without money. This was in the form of paper
money, specie as always was at a premium, and as in other
important areas of the development of Shetland, the Hay family
were intimately involved. From at least 1811 the Hays, acting
as the firm James Hay and Son, had been involved with the recently
formed Commercial Bank of Scotland (based in Edinburgh) and their
notes had effectively supplanted all other papier currency in the
islands. What this money was spient on is only partially
known, but can be stated with a degree of confidence.
We know from the account books of the Hays the range of
goods that were bought from his shop in Lerwick. Besides the
common goods such as oatmeal, a surprising amount was spient on
tea, coffee, sugar etc. Tea especially was changing from being
a luxury to a necessity of daily use, and the Hays had held a tea
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licence from the early 1780's and were major importers from then
on. In the Statistical account many of the ministers were
already complaining of its common use, that it was enslaving the
poor who were prepared to go without their basest requirements
for the substance, as the minister of Aithsting wrote:
The general use of Tea, though lately introduced has made a
very rapid progress. The poorest family in the parish will
not now dispense with it, and will sell their clothes, yea
their meal, to purchase it.66
It was also common for the men on returning to invest in a set of
"Sunday Rests", particularly the younger men, and for the
wealthier to buy a watch costing as much as £3-10/-. For many
this was the first time they had ever had any amount of cash, and
for most it was probably the last unless they were to return each
year to the whaling. The evidence in the truck commission
suggests that some men went to the whaling for many years, some
for over 20, but the turn-over rate is unknown. There are hints
in the contemporary literature that there was a division of labour
within the family, that the younger men and unmarried sons went to
the whaling while the older men stayed at home working their
holdings and fishing for the laird during the summer.
For the future economic development of Shetland one of the
most important uses of whaling income was to provide the capital
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to invest in a boat for the cod and herring fishing. Large
numbers of the boats in the early expansion of these fisheries
were either individually or collectively owned. In the 1820's at
least half of the cod boats were individually owned. This helped
provide a wider base to the local economy, the learning of new
skills and in the boom years (1820's for the cod and the 1830's
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for the herring) good incomes.
It is less clear what the rest of the whalers income was
spent on, much of it more than likely ending up as payments of
rents to the lairds (it is a commonly recounted that the rents of
those who went to the whaling were raised by a guinea and Neil
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states that in 1805 this was raised to 3 guineas ). Some went
on the paying off of debts, and also on investing in a share of a »
boat for the haaf fishing. This then suggests some form of age
division, by which some men went to the whaling to be able to pay
for future security, but still operating within the same system.
And it certainly helped establish the tradition of Shetlanders
going to sea, which has continued up until the present demise of
the British merchant navy.
SHETLAND AND THE LATER GREENLAND WHALING
Shetland maintained this historical role as a supplier of
labour within the context of the structural changes which took
place in tie whaling industry, after the boom days earlier in the
century. The reasons for the decline of the industry were:
political, industrial, and ecological. With the expansion of
"free trade", import duties declined which led to increased
importation of rape seed oil for the textile industry. In the
cities, coal gas replaced oil for public lighting. As stocks of
whales declined , due to over exploitation, the ships were forced
into longer and more dangerous voyages. Many turned to sealing,
an easier harvest, but one with none of the romanticism of the old
trade. The introduction of "steam auxiliaries", from the late
1850's onwards, gave the industry a technical boost. This was
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concentrated in Dundee, where whale oil was used in the processing
of jute, which put the industry on a solid basis, and led to
Dundee becoming the leading whaling and sealing port from the
early 1870's. The rise in the price of bone was a further
mainstay, and thanks to changes in fashion the price rose from
£500 a ton in the 1870's to almost £3,000 at the turn of the
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century.
These changes saw a decline in the number of ships coming to
Shetland, and a shift in the main port from Hull to Peterhead, as
Table 7 shows.
TABLE 7
ANNUAL NO. OF SHIPS (5 year averages) WITH NO. FROM
PETERHEAD. HAY & CO. AS AGENTS: 1845-1871 (inc.)





1865-1871(2) 7 (3) 2.3(4)
notes:(1)there was a brief revival of Hull ships in the
early 1850's
(2)this is a 7 year average
(3)ships which did 2 voyages are counted twice,if only
once the figure is 4.6
(4)there were no Peterhead ships in 1867 & 1869
source:SA HAY & CO. (NRA 650)
Greenland Books
For the one year that there are complete figures, 1846, there
were 27 whalers coming to Shetland; of which 13 were from
Peterhead, and 10 were from Hull. Of these Hay & Co. were agents
for 9, Leask & Sandison for 8, and 5 other agents shared the
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remaining 10. The wages had barely changed from the turn of the
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century; £2 per month for ordinary seamen, and £2-10/- to £2-15/-
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for harpooners. The average wages for the period 1869-1871
were £11-13/6 per man per voyage, all of which show a stability
in wages.
From the mid-1860's it became common for ships to make two
trips a season, the first for a short sealing trips, the second
for a longer whaling trip stopping in the Islands each time to
pick up crew. Generally they required less men on the second
trip then the first. In 1866 the Windward of Peterhead did two
voyages, after that it was mainly Dundee ships: the Alexander in
1867, 1868,and 1869, and the Intrepid in 1868, and 1869. Also
the Erik of London in 1870, and 1871. These are the last records
of the Hays being involved in the whaling, and in his evidence to
the 1872 Truck Commission William Irvine (a partner in Hay & Co.)
said that the company was about to stop acting as agents for
whaling ships, since the small commission was not worth the
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trouble.
One of the reasons why there was an inquiry into truck in
Shetland was the existence of payment in goods in the whaling
industry. A Board of Trade letter describing the system in
Shetland was described in the first report as a "remarkable
document", which emphasised that the agents made their profits
from the goods that they sold the whalers; and that the men were
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tied to agents through advances on future wages. Certain
recent Board of Trade regulations concerning the methods of
recruiting and paying of seamen had been broken in Shetland; for
example none of the agents were registered with the Board and as
228
such were not legally able to hire seamen. In recent years the
Superintendent of the Mercantile Marine in Lerwick had enforced
the payment of wages in full within 3 days of the ship's return
and in the presence of the Superintendent. As late as 1870 the
men were paid their wages minus the deductions for goods, advances
etc. This was an attempt to break the connection between payment
in goods and the men being forced to sign up for the agent who
made those advances. This attempt to end the advances of goods on
credit was behind the ending of agency work by three of the four
companies in Lerwick: Hay & Co., Tait, Messrs Laurenson &
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Tulloch.
The Commission was correct in concluding that the whaling
operated within the existing system of organisation in Shetland
which was one of tacit understandings of obligations formed
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through advances and debts. The problem was the various
functions that one person carried out in Shetland, a combination
of whaling agent, merchant, fishcurer, tacksman etc. etc.., all
within a closed system. The descriptions in the Truck Report are
of a system of organisation, and of employment of Shetlanders in
the whaling which was virtually identical to that of 60/70 years
earlier. The only difference was that it had become part of a
tradition of going to sea, a tradition that it had been
instrumental in forming, where it was commonplace for men to go to
sea. We are perhaps seeing the last generation of Shetlanders
that will go to sea to seek their living, certainly the last
generation that went to the whaling were the hundreds that sailed
on Salvesen ships in the Antarctic right into the 1960's.
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CONCLUSION
Shetland was probably as important for the whaling industry as
the industry was for Shetland. For many decades the Islands
supplied a substantial number of skilled seamen at a relatively
lower cost than the owners would have had to pay elsewhere.
This reduction in costs help sustain the northern whaling
industry after the bounty ended in 1824 and in face of the
greater productivity of the southern industry. However it was
to become increasingly marginal throughout the nineteenth century
surviving due to local industrial factors, and technological
advances.
As for Shetland the industry, as we have seen above, had
significant effects on the development of the Islands. The rise
in wage labour did more than start a tradition of Shetlanders
going to sea for a living. It effectively introduced the men to
capitalist social relations (although within the unique context
of the "culture" of the ship)-relations based on free labour- not
the closed system that they had suffered under for generations in
Shetland. This new "freedom" went far in undermining the
existing relations with the laird, in at least a few notable
cases. We know precious little about the experiences of these
men- and time is running out to collect the oral records of those
that sailed even in the 1950's.
The industry also had profound economic effects for the
islands, and it was a major source of capital, capital which was
used to diversify and expand the economy from the 1810's until
well into the 1830's. Almost paradoxically behind this veneer
of development, this influx of capital helped sustain the
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uneconomic division of land in the islands, as income from the
whaling was used to pay for rents or saved to buy a share in an
open boat for the "haaf". Much more detailed information is
needed if we are to know if there were regional differences within
the Islands, for example the extent to which finances accumulated
from the whaling were used to establish Burra and Whalsay as
important fishing centres.
For the people like the Hays the whaling industry was a
further way of being active in the running of the economy,
building up commercial contacts, accummulating capital from their
sales in their shops and their commission, and financial
expertise from dealing in significant sums of money required to
pay the wages. This was part of a wider trend of a more
influential role played by the local merchants in the local
economy vis-^-vis the lairds. In the later phase of the whaling
it is clear that the whaling operated within the existing system
of truck, although not to the same degree as the haaf or cod
fishery. From the records of the Hay family we have been able to
get a look at the importance of this great industrial enterprise
upon the history of the Shetlands.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY: HERRING
We've got to go ahead. No half measures now.
The money will be flowing like the river. As
one man said in Wick: the creels of silver
herring will turn into creels of silver
crowns.1
In the Silver Darlings Gunn describes the way in which the
commercial exploitation of the herring changes the way of life of
a people. As such it highlights the way in which natural
resources are transformed through human endeavour into
commodities. The same endeavour creates new forms of social
relations. The herring fishery was for several centuries one of
the greatest extractive and commercial enterprises of modern
Europe. The great northern herring fishery played an important
role in the creation of the modern world economy, and was at the
centre of many of the international disputes of the sixteenth to
eighteenth centuries.
Shetland, owing to its geographical position, climatic and
environmental features, was placed at the centre of this industry
for over four centuries. Above all others the herring fishery
brought the islands into the ambitions of the major European
powers and hence directly into the evolution of the modern world.
The Shetlanders were slow in exploiting the herring themselves
and it was primarily left up to external powers until the late
eighteenth/ early nineteenth centuries.
The creation of an indigenous industry was an important
phase in the history of the islands, not the least being that it
was under local control. It expanded the economic base of the
islands, and it increased the investment in boats and harbour
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facilities as well as in new skills. At its height, in the
1820's and early 1830's, the industry gave the illusion that it
would establish a new, wealthier, and more modern Shetland.
With its collapse in the 1840's, it exposed the inherent weakness
of the Shetland economy, especially its basis on redundant form
of social relations.
Most of that which has been written about the Shetland
herring industry has concentrated on the fishery in the late
nineteenth century. This chapter will deal with the historical
background to the creation of the indigenous industry in the
early nineteenth century, and the important part played by the
Hays over a period of more then sixty years in establishing and
running the fishery. First to begin with a quick survey of the
historical importance of the fishery both to Shetland and to the
modern European world.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
It was herring which transferred the maritime predominance
from the Hanseatic League to Holland and the British Isles.
The herring fishery had been the foundation of the Hansa
supremacy. The prosperity of Britain, Holland and Flanders
has been built up on herrings and wool. 2
Jeudine's statement highlights the importance in a pre-
industrial world of the control and exploitation of basic
commodities. The control of the produce of the sea has always
been of historical significance in economies. None more so than
the herring, the control of which, as the above quote suggests,
straddled the transition from the old medieval world to the new
capitalist world. Shetland was at the centre of that historical
development.
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Shetland became important for the herring fishing in the
fifteenth century when the herring migrated from the Baltic to
the North Sea. The fish would appear off Shetland's coasts in
May/ June, then they would move down the east coast of
Britain. The earlier in the season the fish were caught the
better the quality, and therefore the higher price at market.
At this time the fish were mainly caught while at sea. The
Shetlanders only caught those which swam close to the shore or
into the voes, which mainly occurred towards the end of the
season. To the locals then before the nineteenth century the
I
herring fishery was much less important than the white fishery.
The German merchants also regarded herring as being of
secondary importance to the their stockfish trade, but it was
still a profitable sideline. Figures for 1629 to 1633 show that
on average there were some 270 tons of herring exported annually
from the islands to Hamburg. There are no other figures for this
period to compare these with, but they do seem rather large. To
put these figures into context , they are far behind the Dutch
3
who exported 40,000 tons annually to the Hamburg market. At
this time Hamburg was one of the major trading cities for herring
supplying much of the German market. There is no evidence for a
continuous industry in herrings based in the islands and it
appears to be generally sin opportunistic fishery which helped
supplement the more important ling and cod fishery of the
islands.
Above all others it was the Dutch who were able to
exploit successfully the herring. In the early modern period
their catching/curing skills and technological advances combined
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with trading knowledge and market penetration of the crucial
German/Baltic markets made them virtually unassailable. They
also provided the model for the organisation of the fishery that
other countries were to attempt to copy for centuries. They
helped to create the herring as one of the most important staple
foods of modern Europe, up until the beginning of this century.
The technological advances made by the Dutch were the
development of the buss in the early 1400's and in the early
4
1500's the introduction of the large dragnet. These allowed
the Dutch to catch more fish and to cure them onboard. They
also developed a superior quality cure. These developments
combined with Dutch commercial supremacy, in particular during
the seventeenth century, gave them virtual total control of the
vast herring industry, much to the envy of other states. The
importance of the herring fishery ( the Great Fishery - Groote
Visscherij - as it was known to contemporaries) to the Dutch
economy should not be under-estimated. As a seventeenth century
writer commented:
The Dutch catch more herrings and prepare them better than
any nation ever will; and the lord has, through the
instrument of the herring, made Holland an exchange and
staplemarket for the whole of Europe. The herring keeps
Dutch trade going, and Dutch trade sets the world afloat.5
Wallerstein refers to the salt herring industry as the "Dutch
6
Gold Mine." The value of the catch was large; at its height it
has been estimated at being worth between one and three million
7
pounds sterling annually. Of this approximately 35 to 40% in
8
value was caught off Shetland.
In mid-June the Dutch busses would gather in Bressay Sound
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th
for the fishing to begin on the 24 of June (St. John's Day).
This was of great commercial importance to the islands (see
chpt.2) The Dutch had strict codes by which it regulated the
herring industry thus maintaining the superior quality of their
cured fish. It was this guarantee of quality that effectively
excluded the inferior Scottish and English cured fish from
continental markets. From then on the fleet followed the
migrating herring south down the east coast of Britain to East
Anglia, the fish being sent to the markets in fast ships called
jaegers. It is almost impossible to give an accurate figure on
the number omjsses involved since contemporary propaganda tracts
9
inflate the numbers with as many as 3,000 claimed in 1633. A
more conservative figure of approximately 500 (with possibly more
10
at its height) is probably more accurate.
The very success of the Dutch herring fishery meant that it
was a target for attack at time of war. International conflict
was endemic during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and
the Dutch fishery suffered heavily as a result. In 1652 the
English destroyed 50 busses and in 1703 the French attacked the
fleet in Bressay Sound burning anything between 100 to 400
11
busses. These great losses led to the decline of the Dutch
fishery in the eighteenth century, although it remained the
single largest. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth
century numerous states, following classic mercantilist policies,
12
had attempted to establish their own fisheries. In the case
of Britain these had been generally unsuccessful. By the end of
the century, Prussia, France and Denmark all had herring fleets
on the Dutch model fishing off Shetland.
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Within the islands there was a growing awareness of the
potential importance of the fishery during the eighteenth
century. As early as 1718 Thomas Gifford had drawn up a scheme
13
for a local herring fishery. In the 1730's he mentions that
there were plans to use Shetland as the base for a British
Herring industry, an idea that was to be revived some 50 years
14
later. In the 1740's Nicolson of Lochend's tenants caught a
15
few herrings. In 1772, Gideon Gifford (Thomas Gifford's
grandson) had at least one boat which fished for herrings, as
16
well as receiving them from his tenants. Gifford's tenants
fished for the herring late in the season, in November when the
quality was poor, the fish having spawned by then (or "spent").
From the 1760's William Hay was dealing in herrings caught
by his tenants and exporting them via a Lerwick merchant, James
17
Sillars. Like Gifford's fishing this was seen as a valuable
support to the dominant haaf fishing, as we can see from Thomas
Bolt's comments to Hay in 1769:
I am glad to see you have any prospect of herrings the
miserable ling fishing will require a help.18
In September of that year some ships were sent from Leith for
herrings and William Hay could write "one of which is principally
19
coming for mine". Others besides Hay and Gifford had seen the
value of the fishing. In the early 1770's John Bruce of
Sumburgh was shipping herrings from Scalloway to Hamburg onboard
the Nelly and the Dolphin. He offered Hay 14/- a barrel for his
fish (15/- if delivered to Scalloway), an offer his son James
advised him to take even though his father had more ambitious
plans:
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I am afraid you'll be disappointed in your Great
Expectations from the Herring Scheme.20
The Hays were never to lose their interest in the herring fishery
S
and James so pesimistic above was to be the first to attempt to
establish a proper industry in the Islands.
This growth of interest in herring was not independent of
conditions in the islands. We have seen that there was a
depression in the haaf fishing from at least the late 1760's to
the mid 1780's. In the light of the crisis in the local economy
the potential of a herring fishery was at long last being
recognised. In particular in 1781 John Bruce wrote a long
memorial to the government trying to interest them in promoting a
Shetland fishery (see chapt.4 for discussion of this memorial).
One of the insights of his otherwise rambling plan was that in
Shetland small boats could be used, it was not necessary to use
large vessels like the Dutch busses:
It is possible that an open boat of four or five tons burden
upon the coast of Shetland may catch as many herrings as
Vessels of 20 tons and at a much smaller price.21
The great advantage of Shetland was that it was close to the most
valuable herring and could be used as a home base. There was no
need to cure the fish onboard as the Dutch did. This idea was
not to be taken up until the 1820's, when it was a great success.
Bruce's memorial is also related to a contemporary debate
over the expansion of the fishing industry as a way of developing
the Highlands and Islands. Bruce, using arguments similar to
that of John Knox but predating Knox's View of the British
Empire by three years, tried to get the British state to
intervene and establish a Shetland fishery. General interest
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was such that in 1785 a Parliamentary Committee was set up to
"inquire into the state of the British Fisheries", sponsored by
Henry Dundas and under the chairmanship of Henry Beaufoy of Hull.
The Committee also included George Dempster of Dunnichen who was
concerned with the establishment of a fishery in the Highlands.
The various reports of this committee show that there was a
genuine interest in Shetland and several locals put forward
reports and schemes. Others connected with Shetland through
trade also gave evidence to the committee's hearings. James Hay
in his position as a major local merchant was asked to present
evidence and was also involved throughout 1785-86 in a lengthy
correspondence with George Dempster. The third report of the
Committee contains the greatest amount on Shetland (See chpt.2).
In April 1785 William Hay presented before the Committee a
"Fishing Scheme" which argued for the establishment of two
22
fishing villages in Shetland, one in Papa Stour, the other in
the Skerries, islands to the west and the east of the mainland.
In the villages the fishers were to operate within a "free" or
wage labour system, not within the fishing tenure as currently
existed. The fishers were to be supplied with the boats, nets
and other necessary equipment which was to paid off from the
catches. Hay recognised that this would be difficult to
introduce in the face of opposition from the lairds but he was
optimistic:
If they [the fishing villages] do thrive & succeed, their
Nighboor Inhabitants will naturally either throw of the Yoke
& resort to them as an asylum...or Oblige their landlords to
give them Adequate & Independent terms.23
Although his scheme was rejected by the Committee he still hoped
243
that it would be possible to establish the villages and that
enlightened self interest would prove to be the great motivator
of the lairds, once a scheme had been tried and proven successful:
...if a fair experiment was once made, even with strangers &
proved Succesfull. Its probable Our Country Gentlemen from
regard to their own Interest (Which methinks should
manifestily appear) Would adopt the same Mode or perhaps
Improve on it.24
It was to be Hay along with some "strangers" that were to attempt
the experiment; unhappily for Hay (and for the future of the
Shetland peasantry and the future social/ economic development of
the islands) it was not to prove to be successful.
The decision of the committee was that they should
concentrate their activities on the West Highlands and not
Shetland. Hay did not give up his idea of establishing a
herring industry in the Islands. In this he was encouraged by
George Dempster, who had put Hay into contact with others who
wished to invest in a Shetland herring fishery.
THE NORTH SEA FISHERY ADVENTURE
In Febuary 1786, William Allison & Son of Dundee contacted
25
James Hay regarding a proposal to set up a fishery. Hay,
26
urged on by Dempster, responded positively . On March the
th
20 Hay set out in a "Proposition to the Dundee People" his
scheme to establish a Shetland fishery jointly between himself
27
and the interested Dundee merchants. However, nothing came of
this plan. Then in the summer of that year Hay travelled to
Great Yarmouth, at that time the port with the largest herring
fishery in Britain. Both George Dempster and Thomas Wood (a
Hull merchant) had already suggested to Hay that the "Yarmouth
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People" would be interested and willing to take part in a
28
Shetland fishery. By September of 1786 Hay had reached an
agreement with a number of Yarmouth merchants: messrs Manning,
Meek, Walker, and Hoary, ( hereafter referred to as Manning &
29
Co.) to prosecute a herring fishery the following year.
The "North Sea Fishery Adventure", as the operation was
named, is a "classic" example of eighteenth century
entrepreneurial action, the investment of risk capital in
production in the hope of seeing a profitable return. The
history of this "adventure" is worth giving in some detail since
it not only shows the ways in which businesses were organised in
the eighteenth century, but also the ways in which the
combination of legal restrictions and the following of the Dutch
model eventually led to failure.
The original capital outlay was to be £2,000 sterling, to be
held in twenty shares of £100 each. The Yarmouth merchants
were to have fourteen, and Hay was to have six. Together they
were to fit out four busses of sixty to seventy tons burden and
one vagger to transport the fish to market. Hay was to supply
five Shetlanders for each vessel, as they would be cheaper than
English seamen. The original plan was for the boats to be
fitted out and manned at Yarmouth, so that they could receive the
bounty. So that this could be done, the yagger was to sail to
Shetland in March with the stores for the summers' fishing. It
would pick up the Shetland crew members and return to Yarmouth.
There the vessels could muster for the bounty and then return to
Shetland in April to fish for cod and ling before the herring
30
season started in June. Lerwick was to act as a base for the
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boats giving them greater flexibility than other herring vessels.
This already shows the two problems that were to dog the
"adventure" throughout, the restrictions of the bounty and the
cost of crews. To receive the bounty a ship had to be mustered
in its home port in this case Great Yarmouth. The only advantage
in using Shetlanders to crew the vessels was their relative
cheapness, partly by being paid lower rates and partly by being
employed for a shorter time. If they were going to have to be
shipped to Yarmouth in March/ April this increased the cost of
employing them. This also made it more difficult to get crewmen
since they would be required in March when there would be
competiton for the available labour, from the Greenland Whalers
who paid higher wages. Hay was attempting to get men at 20/-
per month whereas the Whalers were paying 30/- to 50/- per
31
month. Hay had problems in getting enough men, so it was
decided to send the boats from Yarmouth direct to Lerwick and
muster the crews at the Customs house there for the bounty. The
four busses were to set sail from Yarmouth at the end of March,
to return in mid-September.
The boats first fished for white fish using long lines.
Then in June they fished for herrings using nets. The records
for the herring catches have survived, but not for the cod and
ling. Similarly only details of the sales of the herring have















ACCOUNT OF HERRING SALES 1787
(in pounds sterling)
130 Barrels at HAMBURGH for 163-11/-
40 " " LEITH for 41—8/3
428 " " LONDON for 498-4/-
598 703—3/3
source:NLS ACC 3250 Hay of Hayfield
Box 83 file 2
Overall the first year of the adventure showed a general
loss of £216-8/4. This was mainly due to the non payment of the
bounty. The Collector of Customs at Lerwick had refused to give
the busses licences for the bounty because the ships were from
Yarmouth and not from Lerwick. In reply Manning & Co. , sent a
memorial to the treasury and to their MP, Henry Beaufoy, who*one
would have suspected to be sympathetic to their cause since he
was chairman of the Fisheries committee. However this problem
of the bounty was never overcome. The Customs were sticking to
the letter of the law, which was proving to be restrictive on
such a flexible scheme where ownership was spread between a
number of merchants in two ports.
Even given these problems the company still looked forward
optimistically to the next season's fishing. Hay was even
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considering the building of extensive warehouse and wharf
facilities in Lerwick and even of employing some Dutchmen to
improve the quality of the cure. However during that year the
relationship between Hay and the Yarmouth merchants deteriorated
as the problems of getting the bounty paid were not overcome, and
the cost of fitting out in Lerwick was greater than first
expected. The Yarmouth merchants blamed Hay for both of these
problems. There was a further loss that year with extra costs
coming to £1,296-9/3.
The fishing was again tried in 1789, but by now there was a
split between Hay and the Yarmouth men who no longer wanted
anything to do with him. It was decided that if the fishing was
not successful that year then the adventure would be wound up.
Once more costs at £2,416-9/-, were more than earnings at £1,576.
Interestingly that year showed the great potential of the
Shetland v fishery when the yagger was able to get to the Hamburg
market before the Dutch, and sold 21 barrels for £194-12/9.
However the "adventure" was still wound up, a lengthy process
which went on until 1791.
The total financial outlay had been in the region of at
least £7,500 and Hay complained bitterly of this since no more
than £300 had actually been spent in Shetland. He claimed that
he had sacrificed his existing stockfish business for the
"adventure", and that he had made a substantial personal loss of
32
£1,100 (he was to later claim that it was as high as £2,600).
Besides being a large financial loss, it was also a major
personal setback for Hay and he was to turn his attention away
from the herring fishery for almost twenty years. The failure
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also reflected the way in which existing state mercantilist
policies inhibited particular forms of commercial development.
The existing bureaucracy was not able to accommodate the scheme
as proposed by this adventure. The bounty system was to aid the
establishment of a British herring industry on the Dutch model of
large decked vessels of 60 plus tons, which could cure the fish
onboard while at sea. Therefore it was paid for tonnage of
vessel not on catch. As the above shows, the costs of fitting
out such vessels were very high, indeed they required the bounty
to be profitable. No one was yet prepared to take Bruce's
advice and use smaller boats using a land base, for which
Shetland was ideal.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HERRING FISHERY
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The process by which a successful herring industry was
finally established in Shetland was certainly a long one. Once
more it was James Hay who was instrumental in its formation.
This time after a few problems at birth the fishery "took off"
and appeared as if it would transform Shetland in the 1820's and
1830's. The scale of its success was only matched by the depth
of its final failure. These events are of central importance
for understanding the social "regression" of the mid-nineteenth
century.
It was not until 1809 that James Hay (together with his son
William) was next involved in attempting herring fishery. In
that year the Don was registered and fitted out for the deep sea
white herring fishing as under the regulations of the act of 48
Geo. Ill Cap. 110. Once more this was on the Dutch model; the
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Don was a large ship of 80 4/94 tons burden, and required a
substantial amount of stores, equipment, and provisions as the
licence reveals. The equipment included 24,290 square yards of
nets and 800 fathoms of hand lines. The provisions for the crew
consisted of: 7 cwt. of biscuits; 3 cwt oat bread; 10 cwt.
potatoes; 2cwt barley; 4 bolls oatmeal; 6 barrels beef; half a
cwt. of sugar; half a cwt. molasses; 10 gallons of whisky; 6
dozen porter; 6 lb. tea; 14 lb. of coffee; and 27 lasts of
33
water. It certainly seemed that there were some advantages
in being a herring fisher over that of a haaf fisher. This time
there were no problems over the payment of bounty and Hay
34
received £320 for the Don for the 1809 season. Although there
are no records for the catch for that season Hay felt that it was
worthwhile to make a second attempt the following year. And of
course a vessel of this size was very useful for smuggling as
well as catching herring.
In 1810 after some initial problems with the loss of nets at
the beginning of the season it appears that it was a better year
for catches than 1809. Hay ran out of barrels for his herring
and had to buy 500 extra from Francis Yates (its is possible that
Yates was also involved in the herring fishing on his own
35
account). That year also saw the first shipment of herrings
to Ireland which was to become one of the most important markets
36
for Shetland produce. The other was to the West Indian market
where herring was used as a cheap food for the slaves.
There are no records for 1811, but by 1812 the Hays were
fitting out at least two other ships, the Margaret (burden of 73
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8/94 tons) and the Many. They both started the season by
37
fishing for cod, then changed to herring at the end of June.
In 1813 the Hays had, at least, four ships. Besides the
Margaret and the Don there were also the Catherine and the George
38
Rose. Also in that year the Hays brought fourteen Dutchmen to
Shetland to teach the Shetlanders the full range of skills
required for the herring fishing, in particular to improve the
quality of the cure. They were successful since 500 barrels of
39
Shetland herring were sold in Libau for £1,672 (after charges).
James Hay was later to claim that the cost of equipping the 4
vessels and employing the 14 Dutchmen came to £8,000 and that a
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substantial loss was made that year. However, the Hays
continued to fit out vessels for the herring fishery in the
following years.
This period reveals the continual problems faced by those
trying to establish a Shetland herring fishery on the Dutch
model. Besides the "natural" problem of the unpredictibility of
the seasons, there was the high fixed capital costs of expensive
ships and shore stores and equipment, which could not be covered
in poor years. Part of these costs were written off because the
herring like the cod fishing was used as a cover for smuggling.
In the early nineteenth century Shetland did not experience the
contemporary expansion of the industry as in Caithness and other
parts of the North East (as described in Gunn's The Silver
Darlings). Nor were there any obvious reasons for the rapid
expansion of the 1820's/ 1830's. What can be stated is that
over a lengthy period of time a number of Shetlanders had
acquired the necessary experience in catching, curing, and
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trading that were the prerequisites for future development. One
of the most important reasons for the succesful fishery was the
shift from copying the Dutch by using large expensive vessels to
a Scottish system of smaller vessels (often half decked). In
1781 John Bruce had recommended the use of boats of only five
tons. It seems to have taken his fellow Shetlanders forty years
to take his advice. In Caithness it was not until 1814 that the
boats used in the herring fishing were of the size of those used
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at the haaf. In Shetland the shift was due to four reasons:
1) the rapid expansion of the herring fishing out of the confines
of Caithness; 2) the introduction by a few significant
individuals of smaller cheaper vessels on the Scottish model; 3)
the tendency for the local economy to be integrated into the
national economy and; 4) the realisation by the lairds that the
herring industry could be organised within the existing form of
organisation of production, the fishing tenure system of the
Zetland Method.
The new information given above and the recent research of
J.R. Coull calls into question the existing wisdom that the
herring industry was established by a few innovating landlords:
The initial impetus in the establishment of the herring
industry was due to the exertion of a small influential group
of landowners.42
Certainly the form that the industry was to take was greatly
influenced by their involvement, particularly once they realised
that they could organise the herring fishery alongside the haaf
as part of the fishing tenures. However the origins lie outside
the lairds but the future of the fishing was limited by their
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social organisation of production. This highlights the problems
faced by the Shetland economy in the 1820's and 1830's. These
were times of the greatest expansion under local control.
Shetland at this time would appear to be a model for economic
development; industry was locally owned and locally controlled
and managed, and there was even the import of capital which was
used to finance local economic development. Yet in twenty years
all the hopes were in ruins and the fishing had collapsed. Much
of the burden of responsibility lies with the pernicious Zetland
Method and the failure of the "capitalists" to break that system.
First the industry in the 1820's/ 1830's.
In 1820 the "Shetland Herring Co." was established; its
shareholders included Charles Ogilvy as well as James Hay & Son.
A year earlier J. Hay & Son had made enquiries about getting some
boats from other areas of Scotland to attempt a fishing off
Shetland. Then in 1821 two boats from Orkney with crew from
Fife and Peterhead were engaged for the season. One, the Hope,
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for Francis Yates, the other, the Experiment, for Hay. From
then on the industry rapidly expanded, going from strength to
strength.
During the 1820's both the number of barrels cured and the
number of curers increased. From only 2 curers in 1821, William
Hay and Francis Yates, to 10 in 1825, and 18 in 1826 (including 3
from outside Shetland), In 1821 there were only 437 barrels
cured (less than Hay was curing in the 1810's), in 1825 this had
44
risen to at least 2,000, to 3,348 in 1826, and 8,000 in 1827.
As early as 1827 Shetland herring were being shipped to the West
45
Indian slave market at the price of 18/- per barrel. The
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Orkney and Zetland Chronicle summed up the general feeling of
optimism of the mid-1820's when it wrote that there were:
...herrings sufficient to supply the whole world might be
caught if the proper means were employed.46
In particular Bruce of Sumburgh was picked out for praise and the
success of his Cunningsburgh tenants at the fishing:
This season, in particular, it has through the patriotic
exertion of Mr Bruce of Sumburgh, made a considerable
advance, and in a short time the most beneficial consequences
to the whole islands may be expected to ensue.47
In a similar vein a later issue confidently states that in the
coming season (1826) the curers were preparing to cure 10,000
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barrels some five times the previous year's amount. The
solid achievements of the 1820's were transformed into the great
successes of the 1830's, and it certainly seemed that the "proper
means" had been found.
During the 1830's the annual average number of barrels cured
were 22,000, the high point being 1834 with 43,000, some 10% of
49
the total Scottish catch. Goodlad gives the following figures
for the total number of cured barrels of herring in the 1830's.
TABLE 2










notes: (1) Coull gives a figure of 43,000 for 1834.
Source: Goodlad, A. Shetland Fishing Saga
Lerwick: Shetland Times 1971 p.173
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It is possible to give an estimate of the value and
profitability of the fishing in the 1830's. The following
figures are taken from the calculations of Arthur Anderson as
50
published in his paper The Shetland Journal. In 1836 the
Shetland catch was 27,000 barrels (again there is a discrepancy
with the figure given by Goodlad) which were sold at 30/- each,
valuing the total catch at £40,500. Costs were estimated at
only half of this of this sum. The fishers received between 5/-
and 7/- for a barrel. Since so many of the fishers were paid
within the truck system they would probably receive the lower
rather than the higher figure. Also if the boat and nets were
held in debt then the catch is divided between the crew and the
boat owner. Anderson therefore gives an estimate of only £4,500
as the total income for the 2,500 fishermen, or only 1-16/- each




THE PROFITABILITY OF THE HERRING FISHING:
ARTHUR ANDERSONS CALCULATIONS FOR 1836
Profit on the barrel:
Price paid to the fishers 5/-
Barrel costs 3/-
Salt- 2 bushels 1/2
Cooperage, packing etc. 1/-
Freight to market 2/-
Insurance, shipping expences etc. 6d
Wharehouse rent & superintendence 1/-
13/8
Salesmans commission & guarantee
at 5% on the market price of 30/- 1/6
15/2
Price at market 30/-
Net profit per barrel, yielded to
the landlord, curer, dealer,
and exporter 14/10
source: The Shetland Journal
No. VIII May 1837
On the total of 27,000 barrels this gives a total profit of
over £20,000. The figures are not entirely accurate and
cetainly should be regarded as too high in terms of profit and
too low in terms of average earnings per boat and fisherman.
The price per barrel is probably too high since most of the fish
were of low quality and sold in the poorest markets. The
incomes are too low because most of the fishers were only active
for part of the season, after the haaf had finished (see below).
Finally the article from which the figures are taken was written
by Anderson as an attack on the lairds and therefore puts the
lairds in as bad a light as possible, emphasising the
exploitation of the tenants by the lairds by showing the large
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profits in relation to the low incomes of the fishermen. Gray-
gives a figure of 20/- a barrel as the average for the period,
and the Shetland herring being of poorer quality would have sold
for less than this. If we assume Anderson's other calculations
to be correct then the profit per barrel falls to only 4/10, and
quite possibly less, than this, giving a profit of £6,525 for
1837 (on Anderson's figures). Taking 20/- a barrel as the price
for Shetland herring, and taking the production figures of table
1, the value of the fishery between the years 1833 to 1838
(inclusive) was about £160,000. This is a significant figure in
terms of the size of the Shetland economy and shows a great
growth over the size of the economy in the eighteenth century.
It seems that the Shetlanders both caught less herring on
average than the north east fishermen and also received less for
their fish. The above gives an average catch for 1836 of 54
barrels, a later issue of the Journal gives an average over the 4
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previous years of 60 crams per boat. A cran is approximately
one and a third barrels when fresh but after curing and settling
it averages about a barrel. Gray gives a higher figure for the
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average catch of the north east fishermen of 100 crans. At
this time the east coast fishermen were receiving about 10/- per
53
cran, compared with the 5/- to 7/- in Shetland.
The actual organisation of the fishing was similar to that
in the rest of Scotland, but with an important local difference.
The merchant, curer, or laird supplied the boat and the equipment
on credit which was repaid from the catch. The difference was
that unlike the Scottish curers the Shetland ones did not set the
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prices at the beginning of the season but at the end, a practice
taken from the haaf fishing. . Therefore the existing system of
advances and credits continued with accounts only balanced at the
end of the season, so the tenant remained in debt. The boats
were either built locally or bought second hand from the north
east. Gray gives the cost of a boat with a 30 ft. keel at £60
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to £70 with the same again for the nets. Ployen gives a
similar figure of £120, half for the boat and half for the
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nets. The costs in Shetland were probably lower since they
were so many second hand boats in the fleet, often older and
smaller than the east coast vessels. The different sources of
origins of the boats and their different ages are reflected in
their variety of build and rigging, as described in 1839:
Some of them are sharp both fore and aft, some have a flat
stern and a broad bow, some have one mast with a large spret
sail, foresail and jib, others have two masts and a big lug-
sail in short, there is the greatest variety.56
At the height of the fishing there w«*<_ at least 200 half-
decked boats at the fishing, giving an investment in shipping and
nets of £24,000. There was. also the value of the nets in
the 300 open boats used, and this would have been less than that
of the decked boats. A figure of £30 worth would not be an
overestimate, giving a further £9,000. There was extensive
■ffee-t
depreciation of the herring, particularly of nets, and this would
have been £2,000 to £3,000 a year. So for the 1830's there
would have been a total investment in the fishery of some
£60,000. Furthermore there was the shore investment in the
necessary stores for carrying on the trade, warehouses, harbours,
barrels, salt etc.. It is difficult to give an accurate
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estimate of this value, but assuming Anderson's figures to be
correct this suggests a figure approaching £70,000 for the years
1833 to 1837. In 1837 Hay & Ogilvy had barrels in storage to
57
the value of £8,000. This gives some idea of the economic
scale of the operation in the 1830's.
The herring stations employed large numbers of women in the
gutting and packing of the fish. They were employed on a casual
basis and paid on piece rates. Ployen believed that they could
earn as much as 2/- per day which he regarded as a significant
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amount for a woman to be paid. The best paid labour was that
of the coopers, a skilled trade, whose numbers rose as the
fishing expanded. In 1833 there were 78 in Shetland, in 1834
this had risen to 120, then to 126 in 1835, after which the
m
nubers declined as the fishing continued at a lower level, to 105
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in 1836 and to 109 in 1837. In the late 1830's Hay & Ogilvy
alone had 40 coopers. A master cooper could earn as much as £30
60
a year, although the majority would receive less than this.
The Hays, in the form of Hay & Ogilvy, were active in all
these developments, indeed they were the single largest concern.
For most of this period they accounted for half of all the salt
imported: in 1826 thay imported 6,000 of the 13,000 bushels used,
in 1834 it was more than half of the total of the 106,000
bushels. As we have seen they were major curers from the very
start of the industry and had stations throughout the islands, in
particular in Lerwick and Scalloway. In 1834 they cured three
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quarters of the west side total, 9,389 barrels out of 12,531.
Out of the 200 half-decked herring boats Hay & Ogilvy operated at
least 100. Their harbour facilities at Freefield (Lerwick) and
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at Blackness (Scalloway) were the best and largest in the
Islands. In 1839 they alone employed 40 coopers.
From its height in 1834 the industry quickly declined, while
the Scottish fishing continued to expand on the back of rising
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prices. The late 1830's saw a collapse in production as
landings fell to 5,000 barrels; the early 1840's were also
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disastrous. Besides a brief upturn in the 1850's - in 1857
the catch rose to 17,000 barrels - the herring fishing remained
at a very low level until the 1880's. Within the islands there
was a huge destruction of capacity and capital investment as many
of the half-decked boats were left to rot on the beaches that
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they were drawn up on. The collapse of the industry was one
of the main reasons for the bankruptcy of Hay & Ogilvy and thq
Shetland Bank (see chpt.9), and as such brought to an end a
period of internally controlled economic development. The
reasons why this happened are only partially natural, in that the
annual migratory fluctuations in the herring (and probably also
demographic changes) inevitably lead to wide variations in
catches from year to year, and over time there will be several
years running where landings will be poor. In the case of
Shetland what is both interesting and important is the social
reasons which meant that the industry was built on weak
foundations. When a series of unfavourable factors came to the
fore the industry collapsed.
The most apparent reason for the weakness of the Shetland
industry was the general poor quality of the cure, a factor that
was recognised by contemporaries. Ployen on his visit commented
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on this, as did the local newspaper, The Orkney and Shetland
Journal, this meant that the Shetland fish had a poor reputation
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in the markets and fetched low prices. This low quality
virtually excluded the fish from the important German/ Russian
markets, and led to a dependence on the poorer Irish and West
Indian markets, both of which faced significant structural
changes at this time. With the emancipation of the slaves the
market for herrings rapidy declined to such an extent in 1839
that the Orkney & Shetland Journal pessimistically stated:
It therefore appears that this market, to which so large a
porportion of the Shetland cured herrings used to be
exported, is no longer to be depended on.66
If the slave market could no longer be depended on then the
curers were forced to fall back on the Irish market. During the
1830's there was annually shipped to Ireland between 5,000 and
8,500 barrels. But from the late 1830's Shetland became almost
completely dependent on this one market. In 1840 out of a total
cure of 4,397 barrels Ireland took 2,870, and in 1841 this was
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9,346 out of 14,337, and in 1842 it was 5,267 out of 8,050.
In 1843 the market virtually collapsed and took less than 10% of
68
that year's catch. Poor quality fish therefore could only be
sold in the poorest of markets, and when these, for their own
f
reasons, disappeared then the market for Shetland produce
disappeared with them.
The reasons why the Shetland cure was so poor, cannot be
.just put down to the lack of experience as Ploven suggested.
Certainly the expansion of the 1820's/ 1830's brought many new
people into the business, but there were many others who were not
new and unskilled. The Hays had been curers for over 50 years
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over two generations. Likewise, Francis Yates had been active
since 1811. From the mid-1820's several curers had come from
the south to Shetland, mainly from the west coast, in particular
69
from Rothesay. Anyway inexperience was not a problem which
prevented the expansion of the mainland Scottish fishery. The
single most important reason for the low quality cure was the low
quality fish used. Coull writes that in 1833:
...less than one-sixth of the export [herring] was branded
"full", indicating the generally poor quality of the Shetland
cure dominated as it was by "spent" herring.70
"Full" herring are those caught early in the season with their
roes and high in fat, the best condition for a good cure.
"spent" refers to those which have spawned and have a low fat
content down ■ from 20% to less than 10%, which makes a much
inferior final cure; these are caught towards the end of the
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season from mid-August onwards. This seems almost paradoxical
in the light of the long history of herring fishing around
Shetland. The very importance of the islands was because of the
high quality of the fish found in its waters. The fish caught
early in the season reached the highest prices in the continental
markets. It would appear that the Shetlanders were ignoring all
the lessons of history by concentrating their catch on the poor
quality fish. This was due to the herring fishing being mainly
carried on late in the season after the haaf fishing had ended:
Throughout the period the herring season was concentrated in
time between late July and mid-September after the Haaf
season.72
262
This conclusion is supported by the evidence in the Truck
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Commission and in the Orkney & Shetland Journal which wrote in
1839 that:
Unlike the Dutch who start to fish in June...in Shetland this
is not until August, since by this time the Cod & Ling
fishery is then over and the herrings are closer to the shore
the result is a poor quality product that fetches low
prices.74
Certainly there was a substantial part of the industry that
operated outside the confines of the restrictive haaf fishing,
but this was small compared to that which operated within. Hay &
Ogilvy owned stations in both Skerries and Lerwick which operated
throughout the season. Arthur Anderson attempted to establish
an industry of free fishers based on the island of Vaila that
would break the grip of the haaf. He offord premium payments for
fish caught early in the season. However his attempt ended in
failure (little is actually known about Anderson's company
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besides the fact that it failed). Besides these it appears
that the structure imposed by the haaf fishing dominated the
fishing. Of the 500 boats involved in the fishing, some 300
were sixerns, and many of the half-decked boats were owned by
"innovative" lairds such as Mouat of Gardie and Bruce of
Symbister. Behind the great, but brief, decade of optimism lay
the continued domination of the haaf fishery and its associated
form of social relations. This was recognised as early as the
1840's when James Thomson could sum up the problems of the
Shetland herring industry:
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In August the quality of fish is mixed, and in September
mostly lank or spawned. It is from this inferiority of fish
that Shetland has to date the loss of the herring fishery.
When the West India demand was taken away, then the fishery
began to fall off, and so long as the fishermen are bound to
fish for cod till the 12th of August, so long must the catch
of herrings be exposed to inferiority of value...this fishing
has for years been dwindling away, and so unpromising is its
present state that when the material of nets is worn out, it
will not likely be renewed.76
Goodlad came to a similar conclusion about the signifance of the
haaf in limitating the herring industry:
It can thus be seen that the locally based herring fishery in
Shetland before 1880 was largely a secondary industry,
subordinated to the ling and cod fisheries by its capital
requirements and later by its irregularity as a result of
annual variations in the migration of the North Sea herring.
The industry was almost wholly sponsored by local capital and
prosecuted under the social system evolved from the haaf and
cod fisheries.77
Therefore it is clear that there were important social reasons
for the failure of the herring fishing. The promises of the
1820's, of a wealthy Shetland based on a dynamic herring fishery
had proven to be false. This had not been due to the lack of
capital or interest, for the fishery had support from all sectors
of Shetland society. Its failure was due to the very structure
of that society and the way in which production was organised.
The herring fishery could not break the 'Zetland Method' because
it had become an integral part of that very system. As such it
reveals the strength of the existing system and the failure of
the long held dreams of James Hay.
The herring fishery did not die completely after the
collapse of the 1840,s, it continued at a very low ebb until the
last quarter of the century. There was a shift in markets away
from Ireland to the Baltic, especially to Prussia. There was an
early fishing in the mid-1840's, but nothing developed from that.
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Then there was a brief expansion in the 1850's, but that was
followed by some very bad years when the prices were very low:
...the price of spent herrings were so low that in the late
1860's and early 1870's it was hardly worth catching the
herring, and the trade withered away to practically
nothing.78
James Methuen, who was at this time the most important fish
curer in Scotland, particularly for herring, with stations
throughout Scotland, had two stations in Shetland at Cumlywick
and Sandwick up until 1869 when the laird took over the fishing
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for himself. This was for the late fishing. A few others had
boats for the late season; J. Robertson had 20 boats and Harrison
& Son had 10, but these were only extentions of their haaf
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activities. At this time Hay & Co. were the principal
herring curers in the islands, but even they were making little
if anything from the fishing:
They [Hay & Co.] are carrying it on just now at a very heavy
sacrifice, year after year, in the expectation that the
herring will come.81
This was said in 1872 and the herrings were to finally come
within a decade.
The revival of a Shetland herring fishery began in 1875
when Hay & Co. engaged 11 boats from Orkney for the summer
fishing. Even though the weather was bad the attempt was a
relative success. In 1876 there were 88 boats, only three of
which were Shetland owned. Both that and the following season
were poor. Then in 1878 a Wick curer came to Shetland and
engaged a few local boats for the early season and was very
successful. That year there was also a large late fishery with
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117 Shetland boats. By now the fishery had been established
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on a solid foundation and was to go from strength to strength, as
Coull writing on the 1880's makes clear:
...Shetland fishermen were seeing the summer fishery as their
main activity, displacing the "haaf" fishing for cod and ling
which had held pride of place for well over a century.83
The period from 1880 to 1914 is one of the best known and well
documented and studied in Shetland history and little new can be
added here. The major difference between this fishery and the
earlier fishery was that the control of the industry lay outside
the islands. The fishing was dominated by curers and boats from
outwith Shetland, as Smith states:
The consequence for the industry in Shetland was its
incorporation as a fully integrated part of the Scottish
east-coast herring fishery region, based on the overwhelming
preponderance of Scottish curing firms, which formed the
basis of the industry, both through capital investment and
trade expansion.84
There were some local firms which could compete with the
incomers, in particular Hay & Co. and T.M. Adie. However in
1884 out of the 80 curers active, 66 were from outside Shetland.
At the peak of the fishing in 1905, out of the 1700 boats fishing
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off Shetland only some 400 belonged to the islands. As early
as 1883 the herring fishery was recognised by many giving
evidence to the Napier Commission as bringing greater prosperity
to the Shetland people. The price was fixed before the start of
the season. One gave the details of his agreement as being; 15/-
for the first 150 crans then 14/- for amy over, then from the
first of August it was £1 a cran for the first 250 crans and 14/-
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for the over catch. Before the going price was 10/- a cran
87
only very rarely was it 12/- or 13/-. Answer after answer
made it clear that it was the coming of the Scottish curers that
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had improved prices; as one fisherman put it:
they [the Scottish curers] have done good to Shetland, and I
will tell you how. They have raised wages...This is a
Scotch island , but it is those who have come from the
mainland of Scotland who have done good to Shetland. It is
my belief that if they had not come, fishermen would have
been receiving now the same wages as that current when I was
a lad.88
The herring industry employed many hundreds of women and children
at the stations and there wages had risen as well from 6d a day
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plus food to 8d a day plus food.
Shetland had become fully integrated into the wider
Scottish/ British herring industry, which extended along the full
length of the east-coast. These incoming curers brought with
them the Scottish methods of employing boats which broke the
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existing system of being tied to one curer and one station.
This transformation to Scottish control occurred when the haaf
fishing had declined and the lairds had turned their attention to
agricultural change, and when the old system had finally been
broken by the Napier Commission. This later herring fishery was
a very different creature than that of earlier attempts. It is
worth noting that even given this great economic expansion
Shetland's population continued to decline, only Lerwick, Burra
and Whalsay showing an increase. Indeed Lerwick saw immigration
from the east coast fishers, creating the "Lerwick Scotties" a
social group that is still seen as being distinct today.
CONCLUSION
The herring fishery in its several forms has been one of the
greatest influences in forming the history of the Shetland. The
financial investment was far beyond any other industry in the
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islands. It is difficult to underestimate its importance in
creating the character of Shetland. Much of that character,
like so much else in the history of the islands, is that of
failure; the failure to establish an industry in the 1780's,
the failure to continue the successes of the 1820's and 1830's,
the failure to overcome the great social restrictions of the
"Zetland Method". It is perhaps an accident of fate that the
life cycle of the herring and the needs of the haaf fishing meant
that they were almost mutually exclusive. In the end the real
failure was that of the Hays and others like them to break the
stranglehold of the haaf and of the fishing tenure system on
Shetland society and economy. This highlights the importance of
social relations in economic organisation. Advances had been
made and all were not to be lost {see next chapter), but these
were not enougth. The collapse of the herring and the
bankruptcy of Hay & Ogilvy meant that a new structure had to be
created out of the chaos. This was done within a short period
of time, but it was a system which was to be built upon the
existing structure of the haaf and the fishing tenure, not on the
free market and free labour. That was the system so well
documented in the Truck Report.
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CHAPTER 8
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY: COD
The tale of the cod-men will not be of
profit or loss. Nor will it be dry statistics
of fish landed or of export values, but of- the
romance of effort which brings wealth to the
nations, but rarely to those who make it. 1
Captain Halcrow certainly wrote a romantic history of the
cod fishery and this chapter does not try to emulate him, instead
it locates the fishery in the general historical development of
nineteenth century Shetland. Like the herring fishery the cod
fishery was the product of local initiative and enterprise, and
like the herring and whaling industries the Hay family played a
central role in the establishment and development of the fishery.
Like the other fisheries it was part of an international industry
stretching the full length of the Atlantic/ North Sea, from
Newfoundland to Norway. Shetland had to compete with their fish
in the main markets. Like the other fisheries it required large
capital investment and the accumulation of skills and knowledge
in production and marketing. During the stagnant period of the
1840's to 1870's the cod fishery was the only dynamic industry
within Shetland. However, it was operated within the confines
of the existing social organisation, and as such reinforced the
conservative nature of Shetland society (see chpt.9).
The cod fishery was at its height during the 1860s' and
1870's, when the herring fishery was at its lowest point. The
two fisheries were inversely related, expansion in one usually
meant the decline of the other.
. Started in the 1810's (at the
same time as the herring) the cod fishery declined in the 1830's
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while the herring rapidly expanded; when herring was in the
doldrums from the 1840's onwards the cod fishery went through
several phases each one developing upon the other, and with the
herring boom of the later part of the century the cod fishery
slowly died out. The cod fishery was able to survive and indeed
be successful while operating within the confines of the social
organisation of the time. On the one hand this shows a greater
degree of flexibility within the system than at first evident,
and on the other that there were certain aspects of the cod
fishery (technical and natural) that allowed it to be successful.
In the haaf fishing, cod had always been secondary in
importance to ling, to such an extent that cod can be regarded as
a by-product of the ling fishery. Although cod like ling is a
demersal fish it has a tendency to swim throughout the water
rather than to keep close to the bottom as ling does.
Therefore the catches of cod were restricted since the long lines
were laid to catch ling. Cod was also regarded as producing an
inferior cure to ling and the fishers received a lower price for
them, between a half and two-thirds of that for a ling.
Shetland had established a niche for itself in the international
markets for stockfish through specialising in ling. If it had
concentrated on the production of cod they would have come into
even more direct competition then it already did with the cod
from Newfoundland and Norway. This is not to say that the
possibility of a cod fishing alongside that of the ling had not
been recognised.
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EARLY HISTORY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COD FISHERY
There were several attempts at employing vessels at the cod
fishing in the eighteenth century, using sloops rather than the
small open haaf boats. Arthur Nicolson of Lochend fitted out
his sloop for this purpose in 1742/43, but it was plundered by a
French privateer, and after this setback he does not appear to
2
have attempted again. During James Hay's herring "adventure"
of the 1780's (chpt.7) the Yarmouth ships were to fish for cod
with long-lines before trying the herring. In his instructions
to John Hill, one of the captains of the Yarmouth vessels, he
tells him to proceed to the "Ground called the Foula Shaald",
there to be met by the other boats. The cod were to be split
and washed then salted in casks "after the Dutch Method". The
fish were then to be delivered to William Anderson in Papa Stour
3
for drying. In 1788 a cod bank was accidently discovered 35
miles south-west of Foula by John Slater, a Shetland captain of a
merchantman. This may have been the same bank that Hay referred
to above. Its position was not to be re-discovered until 1817,
4
by which time the fishing had become established. Goodlad does
some informed guesswork using contemporary, but still secondary,
sources to calculate the actual date that the fishery started.
He suggests that it was in 1809/ 1810 that there was a conscious
attempt to put a cod fishery on a firm footing separate from the
5
haaf fishing. The following evidence from the Hay records
confirms this.
In 1810 Hay fitted out the Mary for the cod fishing, this is
the first concrete evidence of a ship being fitted out soley for*■ *\
cod fishing. For April and July she fished mainly off Fair
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Isle, with a total catch of 5 tons and 12 and three quarters
6
hundredweight (3,679 fish). Although the evidence is patchy it
appears that boats were fitted out for the following few years.
In 1812 besides the Mary, the Margaret, under Peter Vandooler
(persuraably Dutch), was also sent to the cod fishery, and again
th
both vessels fished off Fair Isle. Between April 30 and June
rd
23 they together caught 5 tons 14 cwt., after which they
7
concentrated on the herring fishing. This suggests a close
connection between the cod and herring fisheries in the intial
period of establishment to cover costs and maximise usage of the
boats. The only other person in Shetland who was involved in
the fishery was John Ross of Sound who fitted out a boat in 1811
only to be seized by a Danish privateer, although it was later
8
recaptured by a British warship and returned. Ross continued to
send vessels to the fishery, in 1815 James Christie a captain of
one of Hay's boats wrote to Hay informing him that his catch was
9
not as good as "Mr Ross' ship". At this early stage in the
industry the cod vessels were undoubtedly used as covers for
smuggling, for both Hay and Ross were renowned smugglers, and the
boats could easily distribute the spirits from the more isolated
parts of the islands. This helped with the original high costs
of fitting out the vessels, and helped sustain the industry in
times of low returns. However it also reduced the efficiency of
the ships.
Hay's cod fishing activities soon found him in dispute with
the heritors of Lerwick. The main bait for the cod fishery were
mussels and these were caught by dragging the mussel scaap in
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Bressay Sound. All the heritors had collective rights over the
use of the mussel scaap and they believed that Hay was destroying
the source for all of them. There was probably also a degree of
jealousy at Hay's success. In 1813 Hay was called to appear
before the local Admirality Court to defend his actions. In his
memorial to the court Hay stated that mussels were the best bait
for the cod fishing, a fishing which had only recently been
established by himself and Ross, and which had already proven to
be more productive than the fishing methods of the haaf:
...last year [1812]...Mr Ross of Sound eqipped a boat which
proved more productive than 20 men by the old way of
fishing. 10
This would not have endeared him to his opponents. Hay also
defended his position by arguing that it was speculators (in its
old sense of entrepreneur) such as himself that were the source
of a nation's wealth:
As granting the Defendant to be only a Speculative Adventurer
He may thereby very Essentialy influence his own interest.
Yet the Experience of almost all Country's of every Age has
proved beyond doubt the benefit & Utility of Speculation, to
which Britain owes its present Excellence in Agriculture,
Manufactures, Fisheries & every branch of Trade.11
This is the most explicit defence that James Hay ever produced
for his entrepreneurial activity. Despite his spirited defence
he was found against and was ordered to stop his dredging for
mussels in Bressay Sound. This however did not prevent the
continuation of the fishery. In 1813 Hay fitted out at least
12
two ships, the Swift and the Catherine.
The Hay family was therefore instrumental in establishing
the cod fishing. Like the herring it followed a similar
historical pattern, an interest in developing the industry over a
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long period of time, then investing in boats when conditions and
capital accumulation allowed. This suggests a great deal of
continuity in the economic interest between generations of the
Hay family, and this was possible since father and son were
operating together. It also highlights the importance in
organising innovative commercial/ economic activities in the
eighteenth/ nineteenth century of the slow amassing of knowledge
and skills, commercial contacts, and capital accumulation, not
only for making the original investment but to survive the
inevitable failures. By the early nineteenth century the Hay
family were in such a position and they took the lead in the
internal developments that were taking place in the arena of
production within the Shetland economy and not merely in the
area of trade.
By the end of the decade the cod fishing was well
established, and the re-discovery of the cod bank off Foula aided
the expansion. In 1819 there were 24 vessels at the cod
fishing, but that was a poor year for catches and profits were
13
derisory. Goodlad estimated them at only £5-5/- per boat.
The numbers fell back to 14 by 1821. An increase in state
encouragement in 1821 aided the industry. Previously there had
been a debenture of £3 per ton of fish caught, and to this was
added a bounty for the vessels of £3 per ton for boats 20 tons or
over. Although there were yearly fluctuations, generally the
1820's was a decade of expansion for the fishery. It became a
significant factor in the total production of the islands as well
as a large employer of men and capital. In 1826 there were 57
decked vessels at the fishing, many of which belonged to the
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fishers themselves, employing nearly 600 seamen. The vessels were
valued at between £200 and £500 apiece, and the total value was
in the range of £20,000. In one week that year it was said that
15
there were 50,000 fish caught at the deep sea cod fishing. This
shows the extent to which there was available capital within the
economy at this time and the interest in investing that capital
into new areas of production.
In the 1820's the boats used to fish from May to early
August, and on the whole there was little variation in this.
Occasionally some would sail as late as June, and in 1821 the
Margaret sailed as early as March, but this is the only recorded
16
case of such an early voyage. When the fishery was organised
around the local cod banks then the boat was able to return every
week to land the fish to be dried and cured and to take on
further stores and supplies.
As the above suggests there was a widespread x ,
ownership of the cod boats, indeed at this time more than half of
17
the vessels were individually owned. Contemporary sources
suggest that money earned at the Greenland whaling and probably
18
also in Naval service was invested in vessels. Within this
context of many owners Hay & Ogilvy were the single largest owner
and operator of boats. It is not clear from the figures how-
many ships the company owned outright or if they were "owned" by
the crews but who were in debt to the company for the vessels
(for details on the methods of owning see below). The company
operated: 10 ships in 1821; 7 in 1822; 8 in 1823; 8 in 1824; and
19
9 in 1825. The company was instrumental in sustaining the
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industry in the early part of the decade.
In the 1830's the fishery suffered a depression in which
many of the smaller operators went bankrupt. The larger
companies with greater resources and diversified interests were
able to continue the fishing on a smaller scale than in the
twenties, although in 1837 there were 1,600 tons of cod produced,
20
mainly going to the Irish market. At this time some of the
21
Hay & Ogilvy's larger boats went as far as the Faro Islands.
Their success encouraged others to do likewise and became common
by the end of the decade and the number of vessels began to rise
again, although this was partially due to the shift in resources
brought about by the decline in the herring fishing. In the
1840's Shetlanders were also being employed on southern cod boats
which were fishing off the Faroes and Iceland.
PRODUCTIVITY AND PROFITIBILITY OF COD FISHING
Similarly to the herring the impetus behind the cod fishing
was to establish a profitable and productive industry. Hay
defended his involvement in the industry on the basis that it was
a significantly more productive fishery than the existing methods
used at the haaf. Against this was the lower prices received
for the cod and the greater costs of buying and outfitting a cod
vessel. Also like the herring, state encouragement in the form
of bounty and debenture were important in maintaining the
industry by reducing the fixed costs to the investor, and
increasing income to the fishermen.
Table 1 below gives a guide to the average catches of the
cod boats in the early 1820's.
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TABLE 1
ANNUAL AVERAGE CATCH PER VESSEL 1821-1825 inc.
(to nearest cwt)
catch
YEAR No. of ships tons cwt.
1821 7 8 5
1822 6 8 2
1823 8 9 1
1824 8 6 8
1825 7 8 8
source: SA Hay of Hayfield
notebooks & journals of cod
fishing, various vessels 1821-1825
If these figures are compared with those from the most
productive of the haaf boats than we can get a rough idea of the
relative productivity of the cod smacks. The haaf boats from the
north-west were the largest and with most lines, they would catch
at most 600 ling weighing at best one and a half to two tons.
The cod ships had a larger crew, normally eight men and a boy,
than the six man open boats. The prices for cod were also less;
in 1826 it was £10 a ton compared with £20 a ton for ling (1824,
23
in 1825 it was £21 a ton for ling). To the value of the cod
the value of debenture and bounty needs to be added to give an
idea of the worth and income of the fishery.
The debenture was £3 per ton, adding 30% to the value of the
catch, the bounty at £3 per ton burden for ships over 20 tons
which added an important if variable amount. For example the
24
total value of the catch of the Peterhead Packet in 1826 was
£116-4/3 (cod: £108-5/-; saithe £7-19/3 selling at only £7 per
ton), and it received debenture and bounty of £55-11/-. The
costs for that season came to £33-4/4, made up of salt £13-5/4
(199 bushels @ 1/4), and curing £11-19/3 (calculated at 20/- a
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ton). The remainder was divided equally between crew and the
owner of the boat, each receiving £69-5/6. If there was no
debenture and bounty, each would have only received £41-10/-.
Similarly the Bee's catch for 1826 came to £90-12/6 and it
received debenture and bounty of £36-4/10. Costs charged against
the Bee came to £25-18/6, giving the crew and the owner £50-9/5
each. If there were no debenture and bounty this would have
only have been £32-7/-. Together the debenture and bounty
increased the value of the catch by over 40%. However more
significantly they increased the income from the fishery by in
the case of the Peterhead Packet by 67%, and of the Bee 56%, more
than they would have been otherwise. In 1825 William Hay received
for 7 of his ships total bounty of £452-7/6. This effectively
meant that there were state subsidies of incomes in the fishing.
The above indicates that the cod fishery was more productive
and profitable than the haaf fishing although it relied heavily
on government subsidies to maintain this position. Against this
must be kept in mind the greater cost of outfitting and risk
involved. The great advantage of the cod fishery was that it
did not conflict with the haaf fishing, for the cod were caught
in banks generally away from the main haaf areas, and it does not
appear that there was conflict over labour at this time. The
cod could be cured for and sold in the traditional markets for
Shetland fish. It did not require the new skills and markets of
the herring industry.
Then in 1829 the subsidies were ended and this threw the
industry into a crisis which marginalised the cod fishing in
Shetland for more than a decade. Only those who could afford to
283
maintain the boats through the lean years, like the Hays, were
able to carry on. At this point investment was shifted from the
cod into the herring fishery, and as the latter expanded the
former continued at a low level throughout the 1830's.
ORGANISATION AND OWNERSHIP OF COD VESSELS
There were 3 basic forms of organising the cod fishery in
relation to the ownership of the vessels:
(1) Vessel jointly owned by the crew.
(2) Vessel owned by an individual or company and proceeds divided
between owner and crew. (commonly called the half catch system)
(3) Vessels owned by an individual or company who employ the
crew.
In the early days of the fishing the first and second forms
were the most common, the third form developed as the structure
of the fishing changed. The final phase of the fishery, the
Faroese fishing was organised almost entirely on the half catch
system. It is perhaps surprising the variety of methods of
organising the fishing, particularly in the formative period.
This suggests a high degree of flexibility and experimentation
within the industry.
(1) There were two versions of the first form of ownership, one
where the whole crew owned the boat, the other where only some of
the crew owned the boat and they employed further fishers to make
up the numbers. The crew would have shares in the boat, either
equally or in relation to their initial investment. The profits
were divided pro rata to the shares held. This appears to have
existed in the early stage of the fishery when many boats were
individually owned.
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(2) In this form, where the owner was not a member of the crew,
there were several methods of calculating the division of the
proceeds which also changed over time. In 1815, for the Mary,
the catch was divided one-third for the owner and two-thirds to
the crew, but the bounty was divided in the reverse proportions.
This then changed to the crew receiving the value of the fish and
the owner'the bounty and debenture. In 1821 the contract for the
Anne Eliza stated that:
It is agreed that the fish caught during the Voyage shall
wholly belong to the Captain and Crew as their share of the
proceeds of the voyage and in l*t€u of all claim for wages,
Provisions, lines, mens fees, and all other expences in the
voyage and that the bounty payable for and in respect of the
fish as well as Vessel shall wholly belong to the said
William Hay as hire of the vessel. 27
Those that signed up for that season were also obliged to hire
others to make up the full crew of 12. Similarly, in 1820, the 7
crew who signed for the Ann had to employ two others, to be paid
from their shares, "the other two men being fee'd or hired by the
sharers". In 1822 the crew of the Margaret employed 5 men at
28
wage rates from 30/- to 42/- per month. By 1823 the system
changed to the total proceeds being divided equally between owner
and crew, a changed that was recognised in the contracts:
...with this difference that instead of the crew having the
Fish & the Owner the Bounties each party is to have half of
the net proceeds of the fish & the several bounties. 29
This then appears to have become the standard form of organising
the fishing and remained so for the rest of the history of the
fishery, with the exception of the Davis Straits fishery of the
1840's (see below). The vessels themselves occasionally had
multiple owners, as the case of the Alert (21 52/94 tons) shows.
The Alert was bought in 1817 by Donald Bain, a merchant in
285
Burravoe, and he sold her in 1818 to a group of Lerwick
merchants: John Robertson, James Robertson, David Leisk, and
William Sinclair. In 1819, William Sinclair sold his one sixth
30
share in the vessel to William Hay for £30.
(3) The third form of wage labour was certainly rare at the
begining of the fishery, except where it was operated by the crew
themselves (above). Futhermore it is not clear when fully
employed crews were first introduced. In 1838 the "Shetland
Fishery Co." was advertising for seamen for cod smacks at 40/- a
31
month. And by the 1840's Hay & Co. were employing the crews
of their ships which were fishing off the Davis Straits and
32
Greenland. .And it appears that wage labour existed only for
this period of the Davis Straits fishing. These men were on
rates similar to that of the Greenland whaling, indeed the
structure of the industry was very similar to that of the whaling
industry.
Details for the 1840's ( details only for 1846-1851) give an
average of 20 men per ship, these vessels being much larger than
the earlier ones. And includes the most famous of Hay's ships
was the Janet Hay, a large ship of over 100.feet and a carrying
capacity of 150 tons and a crew of 22. The captain could earn
as much as £30 for a single voyage, which could last as long as
four or five months. The rest of the crew averaged
approximately £6, perhaps as much as £7 or £8 if the voyage was
long and successful, the monthly wage rates normally being
between 30/- and 40/- , with fish money at 1/- a ton. It was a
hard way of making a living and the majority of the crews were
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young men, almost all in their twenties and thirties, with the
apprentices as young as fourteen or fifteen. Even the captains
were relatively young, in their mid-thirties, although the
captain of the Janet Hay, Thomas Peterson, was 50 in 1848. This
confirms the speculations of Goodlad, and the evidence in the
Truck Commission. The oldest crewman was most likely the cook,
often a seaman coming to the end of his working life.
The fishery as it entered its later phase (the Faroe fishery)
was organised almost exclusively on the Half catch system. By
then the ships were large and the voyages to distant waters.
The costs of operating such a trade was outside all but the
wealthier in Shetland society.
REVIVAL OF THE COD FISHERY
The revival in the fortunes of the cod fishery dates from
1838 and from the exertions of Arthur Anderson. Anderson's
company "The Shetland Fishing Company", was improving the cure of
the fish which was on the whole regarded as poor. He also used
his own mark so that the superior fish would not to be confused
with rest of the Shetland fish. Anderson also restarted exports
to Spain, which had virtually been closed due to high import
duties. There was some serious problems with the operating of
the company and it was wound up in 1847, possibly for personal
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reasons. Still Anderson had shown the lead and the cod
fishery continued to expand and was seen as being one of the most
profitable areas to invest in. In the 1840's, when William Hay
was busy trying to rebuild his fortunes after the collapse of Hay
& Ogilvy he invested in the cod fishery rather than the herring
fishery since its returns were so much better:
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One principal subject of my coming South is to try to get
money to purchase 2 or 3 vessels for the cod fishing at
Davis's Straits... and it will disappoint me much if I do not
make as much on £100 laid out this way as on 3 or £400 laid
out in any other way. 35
The records for the Hay & Co's cod boats in the 1840's show
the Davis Straits as the main destination (see above). These
vessels left in May, returning anytime between August to October.
The average voyage was about four months, although five months
was not uncommon. In 1850 the Thomas Graham made an
experimental early trip to north Norway, leaving on February the
24th, returning to Shetland on April the 22nd, in time for a
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second voyage this time to the Davis Straits. There was then a
shift to grounds off the Faroes in the 1850's. Later when the
smacks were making three trips a season they would go twice to
the Faroes and finish with a voyage to Iceland or even Rockall.
The cod fishery reached its peak in the decade of 1863 to
1874, based on a fleet of up to 60 or 70 boats at its height.
Few were as big as the Janet Hay, and most were 50 tons or so
with a carrying capacity of about 30 tons, and a crew of 12 to
15. This made it a significant employer, and Goodlad estimates
37
■that there were 1,000 fishers in 1860, at a time when there
were over 2,000 men at the haaf.
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From the evidence to the Truck Commission we can get a
clear picture of the scale and organisation of the fishery at its
peak. Details are given for two years 1867 and 1871. In 1867
there were 61 cod smacks at the Faroe fishery with a total crew of
699. Giving an average crew of 11.5; and the average size of
the vessels was 38 tons (a little less than that given by
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Goodlad). And the total catch (dry weight) was slightly over
700 tons. In 1871 there were 63 vessels at the fishing with a
total crew of 816 men. The average crew was now 13; and the
average tonnage of the vessels had risen to 44.6, indicating new
investment in larger vessels which replaced the older and smaller
ones.
For 1867 we have information on the wages of 509 out of the
699 fishermen. They were credited with: £6,618-13/6 for the
fish plus a further £146-3/- for stock, and against this they
were charged £514-16/6 for fishing expenses. This gives an
average wage of approximately £13-6/- per man for the season.
In 1871 there are details for 605 out of the 816 fishermen.
They were credited with: £6,689-4/10 for the catch, and £716-16/-
for stock, and debited £762-13/4 for fishing expenses. This
gives an average wage of approximately £10-18/-. These are not
great sums for the hardships endured and not all that much more
than the return from the haaf fishing.
Like the haaf fishing the cod was operated as an extension
of the Shetland system of credits, and advances with the
inevitable debts. In poor years debts were built up, and in
good years they were (hopefully) reduced. 1866 had been "a
remarkably "lean" Fishing" and of the 509 fishers that we have
details for in 1867, 219 of them carried forward debts from 1866.
Since 1867 was a better year, by the end of the season only 125
remained in debt. And total debt had been reduced from £1020-
6/1 to £570-10/-. 1870 had been a good fishing and only 53
carried debt forward to 1871. However that was a bad year and
240 (out of the 605) fishers were in debt at the end of the
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season. Total debts rose from £182-6/3 in 1870 to £1041-9/6 in
1871. The owners of the vessels were willing to advance money
and goods to the fishermen. In 1867 the fishers received £3,121
of their wages in goods, and in 1871 this was £4,147 (these
include goods advanced for the fishing). The Commission was
correct in stating that the Faroe cod fishing operated within the
Shetland Truck system. At the end of the season a large
porportion of the fishermen were in debt to the owners and during
the fishing all were in debt to some extent.
DECLINE OF THE COD FISHERY
The fishing went into decline from the mid-seventies and had
virtually finished by the end of the century. The main reasons
for this decline were increased competition from the Faroese who
were copying the Shetlanders in establishing their own fishery.
There was a growing problem of maintaining good catches, and the
main cod banks were coming under more and more pressure from
increased number of boats fishing. In the 1880's when steam
trawlers were introduced this made the situation worse and some
of the old grounds were fished out. There also appears to have
been a migratory shift of the cod northwards. By this time in
Shetland alternative employment was becoming available as the
herring fishery expanded, as much money (if not more) could be
made in better conditions at the herring than at the cod. It
became increasingly difficult to get Shetland crews for the
boats. By 1900 the fishing was effectively finished; in 1904
the last few Shetland boats had Faroese crews, and in 1908 the
39
last Shetland boat was sold to the Faroese.
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CONCLUSION
The organisation of the this later fishery showed some
important differences from the earlier. It was organised around
a number of family firms, of which Hay & Co. was only one, and at
the height of the fishing there were some 10 firms. These
included: Garriock & Co. (who replaced Hay & Co. as the single
largest operator), Joseph Leask, Charles Nicolson, the Zetland
North Fishery Co., George Johnson, G. Harris & Son, and T. & M.
40
Adie & Sons. These firms structured their cod fishing
activities around thier other business interests in curing,
trade, and general commerce. The result was that the cod
fishery operated as part of a diversified structure, within
which, even at a relatively large scale, the industry could
survive the inevitable poor years and individual failures. On
the whole the fishery was a profitable one for the firms, perhaps
less so for the crews.
However this very diversification had its shortcomings. It
operated as part of the peculiar social co-habitation that was
mid-nineteenth century Shetland society (see chpt.9). The above
companies and individuals were integrated into Shetland society,
and they helped sustain the system of organisation of production
detailed in the Truck Report.
The cod fishing was an important phase in the historical
development of production in the Shetland fishery industry. It
is important that in the face of the failure of the herring
industry that the cod fishery not only survived but was
relatively successful. Also of all the fisheries the cod showed
the greatest flexibility and development, finally becoming a long
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distance deep sea fishery. How was this possible in light of
the restrictions highlighted in the last chapter?
The very failure of the herring was a major reason for the
success of the cod. The decline of the herring fishery in the
late 1830's led to investment in the cod industry led by Arthur
Anderson. When Hay & Ogilvy went bankrupt in 1842, the herring
fishery was literally at an end. The herring industry was no
longer seen as a worthwhile investment. However the 1820's and
1830's had seen the creation of a number of smaller family firms
that shifted resources into the cod fishing. The cod fishery
was not affected by the haaf fishing for several reasons, the age
structure (as suggested above) of the industry did not interfere
with the requirements of the haaf. There was plenty of surplus
labour in Shetland with the decline of the herring and with a
depression in the Greenland whaling. It was possible to
organise the cod fishery alongside the other concerns of merchant
and laird in mid-nineteenth century Shetland.
In conclusion then the cod fishing was an important aspect
of the economic history of Shetland in the nineteenth century,
particularly after the collapse of the herring fishery.
However, it did not replace the haaf fishing as the central
economic institution in Shetland. And it continued to be
organised within the same closed social system that had a
strangle^hold on the Islands. The failure of the cod (and
*
herring and whaling industries), and the failure of the so-called
"merchants" was the maintenance of this system. And it is that
social system that we need now examine.
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SHETLAND SOCIETY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
...the truck system in an open or disguised
form prevails in Shetland to an extent which I
believe is unknown in any other part of the
United Kingdom, and makes its depressing
influence felt in all the ramifications of the
industrial and social life of the natives...as
a rule, the chatacter and habits of the
natives have become so assimilated to it, that
they are either unconscious of its working
that they would probably themselves be averse
to any change. 1
The last chapters have concentrated on the economic
development of the islands in the nineteenth century. It is now
time to return to the important question of the social
organisation of the islands in the mid-nineteenth century. Most
of this chapter deals with the slow social changes that took
place in Shetland up to the 1880's. This was not an even and
slow development but related to the state of production in the
islands and the various crises that occurred in the economy. As
such Shetland gave the appearance of moving backwards socially or
at least stagnant (if such terms can be used when applied to
social relations) for much of the mid-century period. The
failures of the 1830's and the collapse of Hay & Ogilvy led to
the strengthening of the old forms of social relations which were
always present, lurking beneath any developments waiting to
reassert itself when the new ways end in failure.
There is a series of important social documents produced
over this period from which we can construct the structure and
organisation of Shetland society in the mid-nineteenth century.
These include the New Statistical Account compiled in 1840/41 a
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time when the economic advances were in a state of crisis and the
social organisation was drifting back to the fishing tenure
system. Then there was the Second Report of the Truck
Commission (1872); the evidence to the committee is a remarkable
valuable document detailing the social organisation of the
Islands. After this was the Napier Commission (1883), which
makes an interesting comparision with the earlier evidence,
showing a tenantry more ready to crticise their betters. This
was when the new herring fishery under the Scottish curers had
been established and was restructuring Shetland's society and
economy.
The previous chapters have shown that there had been a
general failure to introduce capitalist social relations into the
islands, if we understand those relations in terms of free labour
within the sphere of production. For most Shetlanders they only
encountered free labour when they left the islands on the
Greenland whalers or increasingly the merchant navy- The cod
fishing was the only possible exception and even here it was
operated within the structure of the existing system, partially
because of the age structure of the fishery and partially because
of an increased flexibility in the existing method of social
organisation. The nature of this system is described below, but
some account of the reasons behind the changes are required.
One of the most significant developments was an increasingly
subordinate direct role played by the lairds in the actual
running of the economy. There was a greater use of factors and
tacksmen in the running of the estates. This was to some degree
a continuation of a process that had been going on at least since
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the 1780's when James Hay (and others) took over the islands'
trade. It was also the culmination of the tendency towards the
Shetland laird becoming a part of the wider Scottish and British
society. In the eighteenth century a few of the richer lairds
owned property in Edinburgh. In the nineteenth century they
were educated south and took up professional careers south,
primarily in law and the armed forces, a significant number going
out to India. To this end they were little different from the
rest of the British middle-class (particularly the non-commercial
section). Those that were absentee landlords were more concerned
with the financial returns of their estates than the day to day
management of them, which they left up to tacksmen and factors.
Some became interested in the running of their estates either as
something to do in their retirement from professional life or, in
at least one notable case, a fit of feudal-like demagogy.
It is within this context that much of the landed estates
were turned over to others to run them; those that took up the
role of tacksman and factor are commonly referred to as being
merchants since they continued to operate these interests as part
of more diverse commercial activities. They saw, as we shall
see, no contradiction in operating the haaf fishing and cod
sloops, for they merely saw them as being complementary and less
risky within the historical context of Shetland economy and
society. These men had been in their time factors and tacksmen,
often lairds in their own right they were well acquainted with
the ways of running an estate profitably.
Before going on to discuss the social structure it is
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necessary to set this in the economic context of the crisis of
the late 1830's / early 1840's. In the last two chapters we
have seen the crisis in the herring and cod fisheries; the major
outcome of these were the twin bankruptcies of the Shetland Bank
and of Hay and Ogilvy. This was a significant event in Shetland
and had long term repercussions for the future social and
economic development of the Islands.
THE BANKRUPTCY OF HAY & OGILVY
The production problems of the late 1830's and early 1840's
were great enough to be called a crisis. The single most
significant indicator of the depth of this crisis was the
bankruptcy of Hay & Ogilvy. The important point of the failure
of Hay & Ogilvy was not only that it revealed the weakness of the
Shetland economy but that it reinforced the "Zetland Method"
around a new social alliance of lairds and merchants. Several
firms were able to take a more active role in the running of the
Shetland economy once Hay & Ogilvy went bankrupt. This resulted
in a more varied, and possible more flexible, economic
organisation of the islands. It did not result in any farther
major development like that experienced in the 1820's and early
1830's.
The failure of Hay & Ogilvy in 1842 was a watershed in
Shetland's economic and social history. Hance Smith has called
2
it "a fact of the greatest historical significance". In the
1820's and 30's they had been at the forefront of what at the
time appeared to be a new economic order based on the herring and
to a lesser extent the cod fisheries. The collapse of the
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company brought to sin end the most promising aspects of those
developments and shook confidence in the strength of the economy.
The result was the continuation of the conservative attitude as
to how Shetland society and economy should be organised. The
society described in the New Statistical Account and in Truck
Commission report of 1872 (see below) was little different from
that of a century before. It was as if all the ambitions and
efforts of James Hay had come to nothing. Shetland had not
"progressed" in any sense of the word; the economy had
diversified but even there to only a limited extent.
The collapse had important immediate effects, since the well-
being of so many depended on it either directly through
employment or indirectly through their trading and commercial
activities. Hance Smith has written that:
The consequences of the bankruptcy were considerable.
Foreign trade was completely paralysed for about two years,
as the firm had a virtual monopoly...hundreds were thrown out
of work in Lerwick and Scalloway. 3
Nicolson, in his more populist style, has summed up the effects
on the islands as a whole as being extensive:
The shock waves that emanated from the collapse were felt for
several years as the whole economy of Shetland lay in ruins.
Hundreds of coopers, shipwrights and fish workers were out of
work in Lerwick and Scalloway and other districts...and a
promising era in Shetlands economic history came to a
premature end. 4
The effects of unemployment were mainly felt in the central belt
of the islands where Hay & Ogilvy had employed many in their
ships and fishing boats as well as onshore work. In Scalloway
there was destitution from lack of work. In Lerwick the result
was worse, for the labouring "population [were] out of
5
employment, and [it] affected almost every body". As early as
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June of 1842 the implications of the company being bankrupt were
seen; one local wrote to Andrew Hay (William's brother)
commenting on the position "in Lerwick:
In Lerwick particularly the distress must be very great for
there two thirds of the people were dependent on the House in
some way or other. 6
In 1843 the minister for Lerwick said that:
... in consequence of recent depressions, owing principally to
the failure of the principal mercantile establishment in
these islands, many of the labouring classes are now in a
very pinched condition. 7
This was certainly the case, although we need to go into more
detail on the reasons behind the collapse of the company and its
long term social as well as economic effects.
The company was sequestrated on 25 June 1842 on petition by
William Irvine (merchant in Lerwick) and the Richardson Brothers.
8
Irvine was only owed £152 and the Richardson Brothers only £176.
It is not entirely clear why they and not the Royal Bank were the
instigators of the proceedings. 12 days earlier William Hay and
Charles Ogilvy wrote to Henry Cheyne, his son-in-law and writer
to the signet in Edinburgh, that:
Finding that the affairs of the Shetland Bank and of Hay &
Ogilvy are embarrassed we hereby authorize you to apply for
Sequestration of our estates in terms of the Act 2 & 3
Victoria Cap 41. 9
Archibald Home, an Edinburgh accountant, was appointed as
interim factor, and the trustees were, besides Home, George
Thorborn merchant in Leith, Joseph Leask merchant in Lerwick, and
James Mouat Jnr. merchant in Lerwick. In October 1843 Alex
Berwick a brewer in Edinburgh replaced Joseph Leask. The
sequestration process never seems to have been concluded, and in
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April of 1865 James Howden another Edinburgh accounted replaced
Home as the main trustee. Although the process was never
completed both Hay and Ogilvy were cleared of bankruptcy.
Charles Ogilvy was discharged in July 1843, and William Hay in
10
November of 1843. That Hay was discharged after Ogilvy made
Hay even more bitter against his old partner whom he personally
blamed for the failure of the company.
The immediate reason for the failure of Hay & Ogilvy
(including the Shetland Bank) was the ending of credit facilities
by the Royal Bank in May, with the result that they could no
11
longer carry on trading. Between them the firm and the bank
had debts of some £60,000. This was only the culmination of
events stretching back to the founding of the company and the
methods that the partners had used to finance the development and
expansion of the company. The firm had also been in serious
financial problems from the mid-1830's and had been lucky to have
survived until 1842.
Hay & Ogilvy had been established in 1822 with an original
capital of £2,400, which was increased to £6,000 in 1825. As
early as 1828 the partners had financed the expansion of the
company's activities through money borrowed on the security of
their landed estates. At that time the Royal Bank provided
credit facilities of £14,400. In 1837 this had run out and a
further extension of £5,000 was granted on the security of the
life insurance policies on William Hay and Charles Ogilvy. By
the end of 1837 the company was on the verge of bankruptcy with
debts of at least £70,000, the single largest debtor being their
own bank. Table 1 shows the extent of the company's debt at the
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end of 1837, a year in which there were many bankruptcies
throughout the country.
TABLE 1
STATE OF HAY & OGILVY'S DEBTS: END OF 1837




estimated at least £17,133
total £70,000
source: NLS acc 3250 Hay of Hayfield
b.78 f.l
Therefore by as early as 1828 the company depended on credit
from the Royal Bank and from 1837 they were effectively bankrupt.
This suggests that much of the expansion of the 1820's and 1830's
was financed from borrowed capital. This was either borrowed
from the Shetlanders themselves through the depositers in the
Shetland Bank, or from the south through the Royal Bank and the
other creditors. Little has survived on the Shetland Bank, and
we do not know who placed their savings in its care, whether it
was a few of the wealthier locals or whether it was many hundreds
of small accounts from whalers and fishermen. There is some
internal evidence which suggests that much of the savings may
have come from Lerwick merchants and shopkeepers. It is
noteworthy the extent that the bank advanced to Hay & Ogilvy,
which at the very least is poor financial policy. One
particularly bad policy was the lending of money by the bank to
finance the buying of land by the partners, land which was then
to be used as security for loans from the Royal Bank. In June
of 1842 William Hay's personal debt to the bank was £6,974 and
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Charles Ogilvy's was £5,444. In 1842 the bank was owed £45,500,
and almost all of it had been advanced to Hay & Ogilvy either
individually or for the company.
The company may have been able to sustain such large debts
as those they had in 1837 if the fishing, particularly the
herring fishing, continued to expand. However the herring
fishing collapsed in 1838, and was at a low level for the
following years (see chpt.7). It was remarkable that they were
able to continue with such large debts up to 1842, and even at
the very end Hay was attempting to gain further credit on the
security of the property he had left which had not already been
put up as a bond. This ability to survive says a great deal for
the personal standing of the partners both locally and
nationally; and for their financial and commercial ability.
Still they could not stop the inevitable. The position of the
bank and of the commercial company need to be taken together
since they did not operate as separate businesses and because of
the extent of advances made by the bank to Hay & Ogilvy.
Although there was in 1843 a petition by some of the creditors
that they should be separated, this was rejected by the court.
Table 2 gives the state of the two businesses in May/June 1842.
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TABLE 2
STATE OF THE DEBTS OF HAY & OGILVY AND THE SHETLAND BANK 1842
(taken as one)





By interest bearing accounts
to Hay & Ogilvy £4,500
Sundries by Hay & Ogilvy £10,500
total £60,500
source: see Table 1
The debts of Hay & Ogilvy itself totalled some £48,000 made
up of the following: to the Shetland Bank £33,000, to creditors
in interest bearing accounts £4,500, and sundry accounts were
£10,500. The assets of the company only came to £31,000, which
was made up of: value of stock at shops and fishing stores
£18,100, value of fishing vessels £7,800, and debts due the
company of £5,000. William Hay claimed that the value of their
landed estates were in the region of £48,000 which meant that
they could easily cover the debts and that they actually had a
healthy surplus. His calculations were based on the value of
the annual rentals multiplied by a ratio of 20:1. The annual
rentals were: for Hay £1,616 (of which £801 was already part of a
bond to the Royal Bank), and for Charles Ogilvy it was £600, plus
a further £200 for land owned by the company itself. This
argument was not accepted and the estates were taken over by
trustees, and were put up for sale. Hay complained bitterly
that if sold off the estates would not receive their true value
and that the upset prices were far too low.
The estate of William Hay was by far the largest it had an
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upset value of £31,915, which meant that its true value was in
the region of £40,000. Of this over £13,000 (this and the
following values are the upset price unless stated otherwise) was
for property in Lerwick; his own house was valued at £1,300 and
the property of Hayfield a further £900. The total value of
houses and shops in Lerwick was £7,865 plus a further £4,500 for
the harbour and warehouse and shipbuilding complex at Freefield,
the annual rental of which was given as £400 which meant that it
was worth as much as £8,000. It is interesting that Freefield
continued to be owned by the Hays and was never transferred to
Hay & Ogilvy. The largest part of the estate was the lands in
Laxfirth (in Tingwall), where Hay had 477.5 merks at an annual
rent of £770 and an upset price of £17,250. His other lands
came to £1,380.
The estate of Charles Ogilvy was valued at £8,120, although
this is only a partial figure for some of the prices and values
are not given in the memorandum, and the true value of his estate
was probably in the region of 11 to £12,000. Like Hay he had
extensive property in Lerwick; his own house there was valued at
£850. Other property in the town came to £1,820 (there are
details missing for some of the houses and the value of one was
reduced from £238 to £85 because there was a liferent on it, so
the real upset prices should be approximately £2,200 and a true
value of nearly £3,000 which would rise to £4,000 if his own
house is included). Land and houses near to Lerwick came to a
further £2,160. Even his three shares in the Lerwick
Subscription rooms were up for sale for £15 reduced from their
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cost price of £30. There was also 147 merks of land in Yell
plus some houses and a wharf, some of which was part of a
liferent, and had an upset price of £3,250.
The estate of Hay & Ogilvy itself only came to £3,520,
mainly from property in Scalloway. The fishing and shipping
facilities at Blackness which rivalled Freefield in size and
scope, were put up for sale at £2,800. It was claimed that the
cost of developing them had been as high as £5,000 and that the
annual rental was worth £200. The rest of the value of the
estate came from some land in Weisdale (15.5 merks) and land and
the fishing booth in Fetlar, and 2 merks in Hascusay.
The bankruptcy did not prevent Hay from carrying on his
business activities although he could not do so in his own name
until he was discharged of bankruptcy. He also slowly managed
to get much of his estate back through the help of family and
friends. In March of 1843 Henry Cheyne put up £800 for Hay to
buy 8 boats and a half share in an other and a third share in a
further one. In December of that year Thomas Worthington of
Manchester, an old family friend, advanced Hay £1,000 which
helped him greatly. In the early years the single greatest help
came from Thomas Edmondston, who in 1845/46 bought the property
of Hayfield and extensive amounts of land in Tingwall and then
returned them to Hay on the security of the lands themselves; in
effect the lands were mortgaged. It was not until 1849 that
William's brother Andrew helped him by advancing £1,200 to buy
back property in Lerwick and a small amount of land in Tingwall
and Whiteness. It was not until 1853 that Hay was able to buy
back Freefield and Blackness, along with further property in
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Tingwall (and lesser amounts in Whiteness, Weisdale and Mid
Yell), on bond and disposition for £8,700 from the Royal bank of
Scotland. Throughout the 1850's Hay accumulated more land in
Tingwall and to a lesser extent in Lerwick, with help from Henry
Cheyne, Francis Heddel, Duncan McDougal, and Robert Jack.
The revival of his commercial fortunes were equally gradual,
and were built up slowly over the 1840's and 50's (for a full and
detailed description see Nicolson's history of Hay & Co.).
Charles Ogilvy having been cleared of bankruptcy before Hay set
up in business and for a while eclipsed Hay in the size and scope
of his operation and looked as if he would replace the old
company. However Ogilvy's untimely death in 1844 left the way
open for Hay to revive his fortunes. Like Hay & Ogilvy the new
firm of Hay & Co. were involved in all aspects of Shetland
commercial life; trade, fish, as factors and tacksmen. They
were factors for the Lordship estate which was a useful source of
income and involved them once more in the fish-curing business.
Although it grew to be the single largest establishment in the
islands it never came to monopolise the commerce and trade of
Shetland as Hay & Ogilvy had done. Hay & Co. had to compete
with several other family firms, all of whom operated in a
similar way, combining a large range of interests to spread risk
and secure returns.
The structure of the Shetland economy after the collapse of
Hay and Ogilvy is mainly dealt with in chapters 6, 7, and 8
dealing with the whaling, herring, and cod industries
respectively, However as numerous authorities have stated the
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haaf fishing remained the single most important form of
production. Indeed the herring fishing became little more than
an extension of the summer fishing. There was an increased
reliance on the subsistence economy after the failures of the
1830's. The 1840's were hard years in Shetland, with only a
small herring fishing, a struggling cod fishing only slowly
expanding and poor catches at the haaf. In such an economic
climate the old social relations came to the fore and once more
the need for the tenant to fish became imperative; indeed there
appears to have been an increase in the haaf fishing from the
1850's. There was increased geographical specialisation; in the
north the boats became even larger than before, in the south the
fishing concentrated on the saithe fishing, and in the centre
where most of the cod fishing was based there was an important
early and winter fishing.
SHETLAND SOCIETY IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY:
ARTHUR ANDERSON
Although slightly out of chronological sequence of the
structure of this chapter it is best to deal with the criticisms
made by Arthur Anderson of the social organisation of production
in the 1830's here rather than earlier. His astute criticisms
reveal that even at the height of the economic advances of the
1830's the old form of organisation was still dominant. As
such, these advances had failed to restructure the social
relations of the Islands.
.Arthur Anderson, one of the most successful of Shetland's
£migr£s, was the co-founder of the P. & 0. shipping company, and
became the M.P. for Orkney and Shetland. He retained a great
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interest in the islands, establishing a fishing company and later
providing the money for a school in Lerwick (which is now the
Anderson High School) and for a widows' home. In 1836 he
founded the islands' first proper newspaper The Shetland
14
Journal, which was written (mainly by Anderson), published and
distributed from London. In this paper he disseminated his
"radical" liberal economic/ political beliefs (the journal was
sub-titled "The Good of the People is the Supreme Law"). It was
likely that the Journal was to influence and inform those outside
Shetland as much as those within. He expressed the view that it
was only through the introduction of lassiz-faire capitalism that
the ordinary people of Shetland would be able to improve their
lot. Anderson stands with James Hay as being the only two true
defenders of "capitalism" in Shetland's history (up to this
time); their failure makes the history of the Islands all the
more poignant.
In the pages of the Journal Anderson heavily criticised the
economic and moral effects of the "Zetland Method", in a way-
reminiscent of that 30/40 years earlier. This was commonly
regarded as a time of economic expansion, and when the lairds
were supposedly no longer in control of the economy. His most
biting criticisms were in a series of polemics entitled Lectures
by the Schoolmaster. One can only feel that this reflects
Anderson's paternalistic attitude to the Shetland peasantry.
The following quote is taken from one of the "schoolmasters"
lectures called A Practical Illustration of the Nature and
Effects of Shetland Fishing Tenures:
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Finding, too, that you [the Shetland tenant/fisher] can never
get more then a bare hand to mouth subsistence,...and you do
not, in general, work half as hard as people do in the south.
And this dependent state, and lazy improvident disposition,
of a great many of you have been produced by the system of
fishing tenures...It has caused the people in Shetland to
multiply beyond the number for which employment can be
provided, and consequently there are more people wanting
farms and fishing boats than can be supplied with them, and
that enables the lairds and merchants to exact much more for
the hire of them then what is either just or reasonable. It
has therefore turned men, who might otherwise have been
tolerably liberal persons, into cunning, hard-hearted,
grasping oppressors; and it has turned people, who might have
been (like their neighbours the Norwegians) an independent,
industrious, well-lodged, and well-fed people, into an
abject, indolent, and half-starved race of slaves.(emphasis
mine) 15
This is no romantic view of rural life in Shetland. According
to Anderson little had changed in the islands over the previous
forty years. The Shetland that he describes was little different
from the one that he knew as a boy. He may have recognised that
the merchants were carrying out many of the operations that the
lairds once did, but the system remained the same, and it was
still based on "Fishing Tenures". He did attempt to improve the
position of the tenant-fisher; he established a fishing company,
operating from Vaila, to give encouragement to free fishers. He
also encouraged Shetlanders to join the merchant navy by giving
details in the Journal of employment in the service and he even
tried to recruit them for the Brazilian navy.
One area of political consensus in the islands was the Anti-
Corn Law movement, cheap food being in the interest of both laird
and tenant in Shetland. Anderson and his supporters in the
islands were active in organising opinion against the Corn Laws.
In 1839 a petition, with 7,000 signatures, was sent to Parliament
16
asking for the islands to be exempt from the laws. Before
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this, in 1837, Anderson had sent a personal petition against the
Corn-Laws, and even in this he felt it necessary to attack the
"Zetland Method". Point 4 of his petition states:
An injurious and oppressive system of local management, which,
by giving a monopoly of the labour of the fishing tenantry to
the proprietors of the soil and their assigns, tends to keep
the former in a state of poverty and debasement, deprives
them of a due stimulus to industry and improvement, and, by
destroying fair competition, impedes the due improvement of
the resources of the islands in their trade and
fisheries. 17
Assuming Anderson to be correct, the social organisation of
Shetland at the height of its indigenous economic development was
barely different from that of the previous century. At the
heart of this was the maintenance of the system of landholding
where the holdings were so small that they could not provide
enough food for the tenants never mind pay the rents from the
produce as well. Only by harvesting the sea could the Shetland
tenants feed themselves and pay their rent. That would have
been a harsh enough life in itself, but in Shetland the tenant
was further shackled by having to fish for his laird or tacksman.
In the nineteenth century personnel changed but the structure
remained remarkably similar, a system to which Anderson gave the
term the "Shetland Night-Mare", and that nightmare was now an
alliance of merchant and laird. The merchant had not brought
with him capitalist social relations, his interests lay with the
laird and those were not the interests of the Shetland tenantry.
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THE NEW STATISTICAL ACCOUNT
The period from bankruptcy of Hay & Ogilvy to the Truck
Commission, 1842 to 1872, saw a continuation of the nightmare, as
Brian Smith has put it:
It is a key period: the era when, against all expectations,
the "Shetland Method" survived and developed. 18
And as a contemporary wrote in 1841:
The eyes of most people are now open to the necessity of
resuming the principles of the old system. 19
That returning to the old principles are so well described by the
people themselves thirty years later in the Truck Commission on
Shetland.
The New (or Second) Statistical Account provides us with an
excellent desciption of Shetland in 1840/41 and can therefore
show to what extend there had been changes from the last account
in the 1790's. The central problems of small holdings and the
necessity to go to the haaf fish to pay the rent remained the
same, even if not enforced with the authoritarian vigour of the
previous century. There was also the same arguments put forward
in defence of the "Zetland Method". It was as if the islands
had barely moved in fifty years.
There were numerous references to the close relationship
between fishing and landholding. The tenants plots of land were
too small to provide food and rent and it was still necessary to
fish for the laird or his factor or nominated tacksman/fish-curer
to pay the rent, the developments in the cod and herring fishing
20
notwithstanding, both of which were in decline at this time.
Most commented that the haaf fishing remained the tenants main
21
employment outside their work on their crofts. Although, as
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one minister wrote, the disaster of 1832 "seems greatly to have
22
dampened the spirit of our fishers", the more analytical saw
that the size of the holdings were the result of the desire to
have as many tenant/fishers as possible, and as such prevented
agricultural improvement:
Perhaps the greatest drawback to the improvement of Yell and
it may be said of Shetland generally, and which, more than
any thing else, operate as a drag on the resources of the
landlord, is the the small parties into which the land is let
off to accommodate the present overgrown fishing
population. 23
another wrote in a similar vein:
Agriculture may justly be said to be in its infancy in the
parish; and as long as the landlords continue to reduce the
farms to the least possible size, no improvements can be
expected. 24
Only two years after this Captain Cameron Mouat was still
arguing that the combination of small holdings and fishing was
25
the only possible way to organise Shetland society. The result
of this was the continuation of the primitive and intensive
agricultural methods as described in chapter 4. The use of
ploughs continued to decline and the spade was virtually the only
26
instrument for working the land. In Unst the minister wrote
that:
In consequence of the reduction of the size of the farms
ploughs have entirely dis_jippered from amongst the
tenantry...The Old Zetland plough has now yielded to the
spade, and is nowhere to be seen. 27
Even where the plough was still in use, there were fewer, and the
old Shetland Plough had been replaced with more modern Scots
ploughs. In the parish of Sandsting & Aithsting there had been




The society described here was little different from that
described in the first Statistical Account. The agricultural
methods were the same, if not worse; and the haaf fishing
retained its grip on the islands and would continue to do so
until the link between rent and fishing was broken. In this
context the two unequivocal defences of the system are all the
more noteworthy. Whenever there was public interest in
conditions in Shetland some always felt the need to defend the
system from criticism. The defences were on the one hand that
such social relations rose from the particular conditions of
Shetlands environment, and on the other a call to the higher
qualities of the landlord which were separate from those of a
world in which the values were increasingly "capitalistic" and
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"materialistic". Their descriptions of the happy lot of the
Shetland tenants rests somewhat uneasily with the analysis put
forward by the majority in the Account. Also only one of the
defences was written by a clergyman, James Ingram of Unst, the
other was by Laurence Edmondston, a doctor and landowner.
According to James Ingram the critics of the lairds were
wrong for the Shetland tenants enjoyed conditions far superior to
any elsewhere in Britain. They needed to work less and received
greater rewards, all thanks to the exertions of their lairds who
only had the interest of tenants in mind:
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Much has been said, and much has been written, by men very
superficially acquainted with the state of the country, about
the wretchedness, the enslaved, and oppressed state of the
peseantary. They have had all this information from
hearsay, and have not given themselves the trouble to inquire
after the truth...They who have lived long amongst the
people, and are intimately acquainted with their ways and
means, and have seen the comforts they enjoy, can bear the
most ample testimony to the fact, that there are but few of
Her Majesty's subjects, of the same class, who are treated in
a more kindly and indulgent manner by their superiors; who
enjoy so much liberty; who pass through life with so little
labour or care; or who have reason to be contented with the
situation and circumstances a kind Providence has assigned
them. 29
Laurence Edmondston provides the most articulate defence of
the lairds and puts his argument in a rather fanciful historical
context. He keeps his comments vague with no individuals named
and no dates given but it can be assumed that he is referring to
the previous forty to fifty years. He begins with an idyllic
picture of the relationship between laird and tenant, a
relationship which was then disturbed through the intervention of
ideologouc; causing great hardship to the tenant. Only now
(1840) is the relationship returning to its rightful form:
...a close and kindly connexion between tenant and master
subsisted,- the one had all his necessary and reasonable
wants provided for, and the other had security for his rents,
and each had a near interest in the other's welfare...more
for the benefit of the tenant than the proprietor. Under
this system the people prospered and were contented,...but
individuals, who either could not or would not see the wisdom
of this arrangement, in a certain state of society,-
entertaining theoretical views of political economy, suited
to great capital and high commercial civilization,- were
unceasing in them' denunciations against the landlords... this
ad captandum argument was but too successful... several of the
lairds, seduced by the specious but spurious simplicity of
this free trade view, annoyed by incessant and unjust charges
of ignorance and oppression, or willing to be relieved from
the irksome details, consented, and the rest were soon
compelled to follow, or have their lands untenated. For a
few years all went on pretty smoothly; but the tenants had
now fallen into the hands of a set of small shopkeepers,
whose interests was not to secure their rents...Thus the
tenants fell into the habits of profussion and heavy arrears,
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arid bad seasons supervening, the hollowness of the scheme at
once became manifest. The shopkeepers (many of whom were
also ruined) could not furnish supplies, because the tenants'
substance and credit were exhausted; and the landlords, in
want of their rents were little able to relieve them. Some
of them did, however, interpose nobly; and, but for their
instrumentality, the tenants must in many instances have
starved. The eyes of most people are now opened to the
necessity of resuming the old system, which, in some
instances, has been done, and already the aspect of things
are improving... there appears to be no alternative of
extensive application except that of throwing their lands
into pasture, and ejecting the population from their native
country... The proprietors have never been absentees; and if
the nature of their possessions be such as to demand on their
part industrious and detailed superintendance, they may
console themselves with the reflection, that in few parts of
the kingdom is there a better field than in this, for
substantial improvement and active benevolence, or where the
lords of the soil have more ample power for the good of the
tenants entrusted by Providence to their care. 30
These at first appear to be quite extraordinary statements
to make given their ; more than likely public consumption, but they
highlight that in times of crisis Shetland returns to a form of
social relations that has existed in the islands for long, and
even in the face of the seeming victory of capitalist social
relations a reasoned argument can be put forward for the
superiority of those older forms. Edmondston was right in at
least one point and that was Shetland had returned to the old
ways, and those were described so well in the Truck Commission,
to which we now turn.
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THE TRUCK COMMISSION OF 1872.
The second report of the Truck Commission with its extensive
minutes of evidence is one of the most important social documents
on Shetland in the nineteenth century. It provides a
comprehensive picture of the social organisation of Shetland's
society and economy through the indepth examination of nearly 300
men and women from all sections of society, laird, merchant and
tenant. For the historian its timing is near perfect, after
the developments of the earlier part of the century, and before
the coming of the herring boom. Furthermore it can be compared
with the evidence presented before the Fishery Committee in 1785
(see chpt.2), and thus we can see what changes have occurred in
Shetland over this period.
In the first Report of the Commissioners Appointed to
Inquire into the Truck System (1871), evidence was taken from
four people on conditions in Shetland and also a letter from the
Board of Trade on the high degree of truck in the organisation of
the whaling industry. The latter was termed a "remarkable
31
report" by the commissioners. It was felt by the commissioners
that further investigation into the situation in Shetland was
required before they could comment on the system of truck in the
islands, and duly the commissioners were sent to the islands to
conduct a second report. From January 1872 they started to take
evidence in Lerwick. The first report covered all of Scotland,
England and Wales, and the minutes of evidence ran to some 45,000
questions within 900 pages. The second report only on Shetland
was 435 pages long and the commissioners asked more than 17,000
questions of nearly 300 people. This gives some idea of the
317
seriousness that the question of truck in Shetland was given by
the commission and by implication the state.
The commissioners were faced by more than the problem of
wages paid in goods rather then in cash, but by a form of social
organisation where the mass of the people were existing within a
tightly controlled "closed" system of social organisation. They
then addressed themselves to the problems not only of each branch
of the economy, but to the structure and organisation of the
economy as a whole. The hosiery trade operated on a fairly pure
form of truck. In the whaling there was the problem of debt and
advances securing the labour of seamen for particular merchants.
There was a similar problem in the cod fishery. In the haaf
fishery the problem was of an older and more complex nature.
Here a pernicious system of traditon and debt tied the tenant to
his laird (or laird's factor) or the tacksman, and this was
effectively an extension of the "Zetland Method" (see chpt.2) of
fishing tenures enforced by the lairds in the eighteenth century.
In 1872 the system had been tightened up because of the heavy-
advances made to tenants by laird, factor and tacksman in the
poor years of the late 1860's.
There certainly were some changes in the operation of this
system, and far fewer lairds ran their own estates. They more
often then not used the local merchant families as factors or
tacksmen. Many of the merchants were themselves landowners.
Some of the factors were not merchants and were openly critical
of the whole system, as in the case of John Walker who gave
evidence to the first report of the Truck Commission. There was
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no easy divide between merchant and laird, certainly not in the
sense of "merchant" representing "capitalism" and the "laird" of
"feudalism" (even within the peculiar history of Shetland). The
whole social system of the islands was sin unholy alliance of
"merchant" and "laird" who had created a form of social
organisation that was a combination of that of the eighteenth
century and the perceived needs of the diversified economy of the
nineteenth. This system was organised around the indebtedness
of the tenants through credits and long term advances, and where
they were enforced to fish for the supplier of the credit to the
exclusion of all others. All of this was tacitly understood
rather than explicity stated and had ingrained itself into the
very world view of the people. This will become clearer in the
following discussion.
Before going into detail on the fishing industries some
details on the hosiery trade will highlight the way in which new
developments in the economy are integrated into the existing form
OL
of organisation, and how women were as integral part of the
economy as men were. There has been little chance to look at
the position of women in this thesis due to the nature of the
sources and industries studied. Perhaps the following will go
some small way in improving this position. Women's labour was
necessary for the maintanance of all aspects of the Shetland
economy; they worked the farms not only when the men were at sea
but throughout the year, and in the nineteenth century they
provided much of the casual labour for the herring fishery.
Their lives were one of hard unrelenting toil as one (male)
delegate to the Napier Commission made clear:
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22109 Is everything carried on people's backs? -
Everything; and the poor women work a good deal harder than
many of the rich men's horses. No true gentleman would work
his horse so hard as our wives are wrought, and we must needs
do that to make a creditable living. 32
Economic activity in the islands were family based with an
internal sexual division of labour. The area of female labour
that concerned the commission was the hosiery trade. Knitting
was exclusively a female occupation:
I shall take them [the main occupations] in order, premising
that they are part of a family system... They are all
virtually combined in one family...If you take the hosiery
you take the female branch of the family. 33
Hosiery has had a long history in Shetland, and woollen
stockings were an important export since at least the seventeenth
century. In the nineteenth century Shetland woollens,
particularly shawls, became fashionable. This was a more
skilled and more profitable trade then that of stockings, which
had generally been of low quality and fetched low prices. By
the time of the commission a large pperportion of women knitted
for merchants and shopkeepers, who advanced them the wool and
then sent the goods south. The trade was organised on a
straight forward truck system, rarely if ever were the women paid
in cash; it was always in goods. They were often forced to take
luxury goods or clothing and the ubiquitous "sweeties" rather
then necessary provisions since the profits on such goods were
higher. Many commented on how well-dressed the Shetland women
were but how poor their diet and living conditions were. This
was particularly true of Lerwick where most of the women were
solely employed in the trade. The result of this system was
that the womens' work did little to improve the standard of
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living for themselves or their families.
In the fishing industries the system was less explicit and
formalised than it had been in the previous century. The
evidence in the commission is that of a tacit understanding which
required little covert enforcing. Basically the system was that
a tenant had to fish for those who made credits and advances
available to him. Also he generally had to buy at the store
belonging to the person whom he fished for. In some parts of
the islands the lairds where they carried out their own fishing
enforced this system themselves, and in others the factor or
tacksman operated the system. This was structured around the
need of the tenant to pay his rent and debts, something that he
could not do from his holding alone. This system then was
created out of the particular history of Shetland. In the
report it was recognised that it could not be separated from the
history of landholding in the islands, in particular the fishing
tenure system of the eighteenth century:
It is impossible to separate the question of Truck in
Shetland from the land question -(1) Because Truck, in the
form in which it chiefly exists, has arisen out of the old
relations between landlords and tenants in the times when the
landlords were the principal or the only purchasers and
curers of fish; and (2) because, to a very material extent
the relations between the fish-curer and the fishermen are
still subservient and ancillary to the landlord's security
for his rent. 34
The last point was particularly evident for the tenants of
Bruce of Sumburgh who were obliged to fish for the lairds' son,
and also tacksman of much of the estate, John Bruce Jnr., as
William Goudie from Toab in Dunrossness made clear in his
evidence:
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4.418 Do you mean that you have to pay part of your land
rent from the fishing? —Our rents depend solely on the
fishing. Some men may have a cow or a horse to sell, to
help them pay their rent; while there may be ten who would
have nothing of the kind to sell, except their fish. On Mr.
Bruce's property, so. far as I am aware, the bulk of the
tenants have to pay their rents from their fishing.
4.419 Do you mean that your farm does not pay its own rent
from the crops which it yields? —Yes; we cannot afford to
sell any crop with which to pay our rent. If we were to
sell the crop for that purpose, we would be deprived of what
we have to live upon. The farms are very small, and we
require the whole of the crops for our own use. In some
years they have not been sufficient to keep us for half the
year.
4.420 Then the state of matters is, that you live
principally by your fishing, and that your farm is an extra
source of employment, or an extra means of living for part of
the year? —Yes; some years, when there has been a good crop,
it may serve us almost or altogether for the whole of the
year; then the fishing pays the rent, and we may have some
balance over to help us otherwise. In a poor year I have
had experience of it, when crops could only serve us for six
months. In that case the fishing had to do the best it
could to pay both the land rent and the meal. 35
The above quote raises many important points about the operation
of the system in Shetland that need going into in greater detail.
First the historical development of the system from that of the
eighteenth century; here the merchants were taking over and
operating the old system since debt and credit were such deeply
ingrained aspects of Shetland society:
The present fish-curers and merchants have not created the
system; it existed before them, and they have taken it up as
a necessary evil. 36
Some presented a more sophisticated historical analysis,
arguing that the present system had its origin in the poverty
created by the sub-division of land in the eighteenth century
(see chpts. 2 & 4), which was itself a product of the lairds'
desire for more tenants to fish for them:
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Although the dividing and letting of farms may not be
considered relevant to the present inquiry into the truck
system, I hold a decidedly opposite opinion. No doubt
poverty is the foundation upon which the truck system has
been reared, and may justly be called its foster parent; and
the origin may be traced, very clearly too, to the
subdividing of farms, it being the interest of the landlord-
curer to accommodate as many fishermen as possible. *37
This analysis was presented by a parochial schoolmaster and shows
a critical mind on the structure and organisation of Shetland
society.
At this point in time many of the estates were run by
tacksmen and as far as they were concerned they required the
tenants to fish for them since the rents did not pay for the
tack. Spence & Co. had the tack of a large part of the lands in
Unst and Yell from several landowners. For the part of the
Cameron estate that they had on tack they paid £1,100, but rents
came to only £1,000 and scattald charges (paid by the tenant for
the right to graze animals etc. on the hill land) came to a
further £100. So by necessity they needed the tenants fish to
make a return. Similarly, T.M. Adie held the tack of Bruce of
Simbister's land in the Skerries, where the tenants were
"obliged" to fish for him. The tack payment was £110 and the
gross rental came to only £68. He admitted that the "I
38
virtually pay the difference for the [fishing] station". The
other aspect of this was that the tacksman/ curer/ merchant paid
the rents for many tenants direct to the laird, either in years
that the fishing was poor and the tenants were unable to make
enough to feed themselves from their crofts and fishing, or even
in good years when the rents would often be paid by a note not by
cash, although it was true that some did receive cash from the
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curer to pay. The actual workings of the system were as varied
as the number of people operating it; and local traditions were
often respected as regards the rituals by how rents were paid.
The obligation to fish took several forms. In all areas
there was a distinction made between the home or haaf fishery and
the cod and whale fisheries, and it appears that men were free to
go and to sign up for any ship, although there were some local
problems over the payment of liberty money. And there was
certainly pressure to go to the fisheries in the vessels of the
tenant's tacksman/ merchant. As far as the haaf was concerned,
if a tenant was to fish then it was generally enforced that it
had to be for the laird or the factor/ tacksman. In some areas
this was openly stated and imposed upon the tenants. In other
places it was more subtle than this and it was assumed that a
tenant would fish for the person he was in debt too, as well as
buy his goods from his shop. The problem was of debt enslaving
the fishermen to the advancer of credit. Both the creditor and
the debtor assumed that he (the tenant and debtor) would fish for
the creditor.
These credits were the main basis for the defence of the
system. The arguments advanced were that in bad years the laird/
merchant etc., would pay for rents and for foodstuffs, and in
return they needed the guarantee that they would receive the
tenants fish to pay of these debts. Alexander Sandison, one of
the partners in Spence and Co., gave details for the year 1868
which had been a very bad year for the fishing. In that year
they advanced food to the value of £1,824 (which he claimed was
the cost price), paid the tenants rents of £1,600, and paid for
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the cost of boats and curing which was a further £780, in total
39
£4,223. The fishing from nearly 400 men only came to £1,607.
Andrew Grierson put the position in somewhat more emotive terms:
...It is all very well to come down and see the country in a
year like this , when money has been flush; but if you had
seen a year as 1868 or 1869 or 1870 when the people were
coming to you in January starving, and wanting you to advance
them meal and other things, and a big debt in the merchant's
books, you would have seen that it was not a matter of plain
sailing then. 40
This was the standard argument put forward as a defence for
the system, and is probably the strongest there was for it
although it neglects the historical reasons as to why credit and
advances are necessary at all. In hard times like those of the
late 1860's the system was tightened up as advances were made and
repayment expected. It was used by many to support the existing
structure of social relations. This suggests a degree of
fluctuation in the system depending on a range of factors,, not
the least of which was the extent of indebtedness of tenants and
flucuations in the other fisheries/trades of the islands. For
John Bruce Jnr. of Sumburgh the whole problem was much simp lee
than this. The tenants were children and as such could not be
expected to look after themselves and required a parent to take
care of their needs:
...Many of the fishermen in this country (as indeed many of
the poorer classes everywhere) are unable, from the want of
thrift and care, to manage their own matters in a
satisfactory manner, and require to be thought for and acted
for, and generally treated like children 41
Then again Bruce had recently re-introduced fishing tenures into
the south of the island, the area which had been first in the
late eighteenth century to free the tenants. His tenants when
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called before the commission were among the most timid of all,
and if the above quote is representative of his character than it
is easy to understand why. One of Bruce's tenants was prepared
to take a stand to demand his liberty and he told the commission
why the tenants were so afraid to tell the truth:
...There is a population down that way of nearly 500, most of
whom are fishermen; and out of the whole lot of them there
was not a man who would come here and represent their case
except myself. Every man among them was frightened he would
get his warning if he came forward. 42
Warning here means that the tenant is told (warned) to leave his
holding, the laird had the right to evict tenants on forty days'
notice. This fear was also true of other parts of the isles;
one tenant from the Lunna estate gave the reasons for his fear
quite clearly if inadvertantly:
13,830 Are you a tenant of the estate of Lunna? —I do not
wish to give any statement before you at all, because the
proprietor may not look well upon me and perhaps may raise my
rent, or warn me. My name has been put to you privately
without my knowledge. I did not give it myself.
The position with the "merchants" were no better than that
with the lairds for the tenants, with the possible exception of
Bruce being the worst laird to be under.
Hay & Co. were factors for a significant amount of land in
Shetland, primarily (but not only) through the Lordship estate.
Arthur Hay claimed of Hay & Co.:
...I may state that as proprietors, land agents, and trustees
we have the management of property to the extent of about one
fourth of the gross rental of the islands. 44
They were therefore a major factor in the organisation of
Shetland and its landed society at this point in history.
Nicolson gives the impression that they were better than many
others and that they came out well in the report. His evidence
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is that their prices were generally good and quality of goods
were high compared to those in the country shops of others, and
45
this was recognised by the commission. However in the evidence
it is clear that they operated the system in the same way as
everyone else. In Burra, all the tenants of the Earl of Zetland
were required to fish for Hay & Co. One tenant said in his
evidence that he had been told by (the late) William Hay himself
that he must fish for Hay & Co. and since then this had been
confirmed by William Irvine (partner in Hay & Co.). He clearly
assumed that he would be evicted if the need be:
...we would be ejected from the place if we were not to
deliver our fish to them. 46
Others from Burra said that liberty money of 20/- was required if
a man was unwilling to fish or wished to go to the cod or whaling
47
fisheries. In 1883 Walter Williamson described conditions in
Burra at the time that Hay & Co. were factors for the island in
strong terms:
We were then in Burra island, under the thraldom of the truck
system, and we felt it very much, because we had no power
over our fishing. We had to fish to the tacksman, and we
never knew the price of the fish until we came to settle, and
the tacksman could give us just what he pleased. We felt
very much aggrieved, and had several meetings among ourselves
to see what plan or principle we might honestly and legally
decide upon to keep ourselves clear men, and free like
Englishmen. Englishmen have the boast of liberty; we could
boast of none although we were British men. We were in
bondage and slavery, and we had several meetings to get our
liberty - the thing desired by all men. 48
The Burra men had hoped to get the lease of the island for
themselves, but they were unable, and they claimed that the
Edinburgh lawyers were not willing to deal with "rude" fishermen,
and so Hay & Co. remained in place. In North Roe it was
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"usually understood" that the men fished for Hay & Co.; David
Green their manager there who had been with the company for
twenty three years believed that was the case:
7.111 I understand the fishermen hold their land subject to
the condition of fishing during summer for Hay & Co.? — It
is usually understood so.
7.112 And I persume that is the advantage which Hay & Co.
chiefly derive from their tack? — It was with a view to that
that they entered into it. 49
Like other tacks there were no profits in the rentals only in the
fishing and selling goods to the tenants. In Fetlar one of Hay &
Co.'s tenants did not even know if he was free to fish for
others:
8,862 Are you at liberty to fish for anyone you please? —
I don't know; we get as good a price from Messrs Hay as we
would get from anyone else, and we fish for them. 50
Hay & Co. therefore seem to be no different from any other factor
or tacksman in Shetland except in terms of the scale of their
dHe{
operation and that prices quality were generally good in their
✓\
country shops.
As the above quote suggests the price that the tenants
received for their fish was the same throughout the islands and
from whomsoever they had to deliver their fish to. This was
termed the "price of the country" or sometimes the "current
price". It was an attempt to eliminate forstalling and
competition between curers by agreeing on a united price. The
clandestine buying of fish from tenants had been a problem from
at least the early eighteenth century and as long as there were
those prepared to pay cash it would continue. When asked how
the price was arrived at the respondents were singularly vague
and uninformative and tried to give the impression that it was
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fixed by a form of osmosis.
The whole sense and impression from the evidence is that of
a quiet acceptance of the system that was deeply ingrained into
the outlook of the tenantry. This is close to the fatalism so
evident among peasants. Things were the way they had always
been. Many dozens of quotes can be given to show this, but
there is not space here for such a detailed investigation. The
following can be regarded as typical of the general feeling of
acceptance of the system:
5,401. Is it only because it is your custom to go, or is it
because you are in the way of delivering your fish to Mr
Adie, that you go to his store? - Mr Adie has been obliging
to me many a time, by helping me when I could not help
myself, and therefore I always felt a warm heart towards him,
and went to his store. 51
Another tenant who went to the cod fishing did not even know if
he would be free to fish if he went to the haaf fishing:
6.025 Do you consider that if you went to the home fishing
[the haaf fishing] you would be at liberty to engage with any
fish-merchant who offered you a good wage? - (no answer)
6.026 Why do you hesitate to answer that question? You
must have some idea about it? - I would not consider myself
at liberty until I inquired at my landmaster. 52
This man walked some thirteen miles to Mr Adie's store, yet there
was one only half a mile from his house. The very term
"Landmaster" gives a sense of inferior position of the tenant,
indeed it gives a feeling of the near feudal nature of Shetland
society.
The fishing tenure system also had moral effects upon the
people. The following are remarkably reminiscent of the
arguments against the "Zetland Method" at the end of the
eighteenth century (see chpt. 2), just as the arguments for the
system remained the same, reflecting how little had actually
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changed in Shetland society over a century. As before the main
criticisms came from the clergy, perhaps since they were the
least integrated into the truck system and were relatively
distanced from the lairds. The minister for North Mavine, one
of the greatest fishing parishes, put the problem in an
insightful "sociological" manner giving the relationship between
the social organisation of production and the consciousness of
it.
the people (although he perhaps would not have put in quite such
A
terms):
...I condemn the system altogether, apart from the men who
carry it on. I don't care who the men are; I defy men to be
better than what I find around me, but the system would make
them what they are on both sides. 53
It was the lack of independence (that most Victorian of
values) that was most commented on. In an age when wage labour
was regarded as free labour, with the emphasis on being free
with its related values of independence of spirit and moral
worth, then the burdens of debt were as much a moral problem as a
economic one. Again to quote the minister for North Mavine:
...I cannot conceive of any system which could be more
ruinous in a moral point of view, apart altogether from its
effects upon them in a pecuniary way. In my opinion, the
independence of the people is wholly destroyed. There is
scarcely a man I know, with very few exceptions, who is not
in terror, and terror I could scarcely describe, of the
merchant to whom he is indebted, and I believe that three-
fourths of the whole of my parishioners are in debt to some
merchant or other, and thoroughly under their control. 54
Any moral weakness will lead to character weakness, this was
particularly true of Shetland where the system had existed for so
long:
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...they are deficient in that sturdy independence, if I may
so express it, which characterizes thfi peasantry throughout
the rest of Scotland. The system fosters a dependent, time¬
serving, deceitful disposition, and it cripples
independence...it fosters a sort of low cunning. The system
having been continued; one might almost say, for centuries,
has fostered that element in their character. 55
The people were not entirely amoral, for they had some good
and "steady habits", as Dr Cowie termed them. In his position as
Admiral itv surgeon he had examined between 500 and 600
Shetlanders and he had never found one case of venereal
56
disease.
Given that the system had existed for so long and was such
an integral part of the Shetland society, economy, and even
character, how was it possible to remedy matters? The
commissioners put forward the idea that the system could be
broken by either paying the fishers a fixed price for their fish
(decided before the season began), or that they were to be paid
for their fish on a regular basis (monthly or even bi-weekly) at
the going market price. They argued that over a period of time
the people would grow to accept this new way and be able to live
without the credit and advances necessary at present and so
ruinous to them. However to those who actually operated the
system these alterations would merely result in mass pauperism in
an already poor island:
10,052 How would you provide for the transition from that
state of things to a system in which the payments would be
monthly? — I think that it would take a greater penetration
and wisdom than I can boast of, to solve such a ticklish
problem of political economy. I am afraid pauperism would
first increase. 57
This was a result that Bruce Jnr. of Sumburgh agreed with, given
that the existing system was such an integral part of Shetland
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society:
...There are, no doubt, many things in the Shetland system of
trade which might be improved, but the system has been of
long growth, and so engrained in the minds of the people,
that any change must be very gradual; a sudden and sweeping
change to complete free trade principles, but would produce
endless confusion, hardship, and increased pauperism. 58
We can compare the arguments supporting the "Truck" system
with those of nearly a century previously supporting the "Zetland
Method". Mouat wrote in 1785 that:
... it is evident and reasonable the Advancer of those
necessary Articles should have a preferance to the Purchase
of all the Tenant's Goods, at least in so far as to indemnify
his Creditor 59
In 1871 John Anderson, a fishcurer in Hillswick replied in a
similar vein to the commissions questions:
6,578 I suppose you would consider it fair that a man who
was in your debt should deliver his fish to you rather than
to another, in order that he might pay off your debt? —
Certainly.
6,579 And also that he should take his supplies from your
shop, so far as necessary? — Yes, I would expect that. 60
This assumption is echoed throughout the evidence in the report
by the tenants as well as the lairds/ factors/ tacksmen/ and
curers. And as Andrew Grierson claimed these advances were
necessary for the maintenance of the population when money and
food are short.
The Commission looked into the operation of the haaf and
61
provided comparative data for 1867 and 1871. For 1867 they
were presented with details of 1,913 fishers at the haaf from 19
different merchants/curers etc.; this represented 80% of the
total number at the haaf, therefore giving a total of between
2,250 and 2,300 fishermen, more than three times that at the cod
fishing. In 1871 they had details for 1,615 fishermen from 16
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merchants/curers representing a little less than 75% of the
total, which suggests a slight drop to approximately 2,150 at the
haaf. From the data presented to the Commission we can
calculate the average return from the fishing, and the extent of
indebtedness.
In 1867 the 1,913 fishermen were credited with: £16,899-14/8
for their fish plus a further £2,246-2/6 for stock; against this
they were charged £2,242-16/1 for fishing expences. This gives
an average return for the season of £8-19/- per man. In 1871
the 1,615 men were credited with: £18,643-9/1 for their fish and
£2,116-8/2 for stock, and charged £2,574-12/6. This gave an
improved return of approximately £11-5/-.
After the 1866 season there were 596 men in debt; by the end
of the 1867 season this had risen to 832 (out of the 1,913
fishermen). At the end of the 1870 season 644 men were in debt;
and by the end of the 1871 season this had been reduced slightly
to 614 (out of the total of 1,615). In 1866 total outstanding
debts had been £3,929-2/4; by the end of 1867 this had risen to
£5,560-12/-. Average debt per fisherman had risen from £6-11/-
in 1866 to £6-13/8 in 1867. In 1870 the total outstanding debt
stood at £5,026-19/2; at the end of the 1871 it was £4,437-1/3.
And average debt had gone from £7-13/4 in 1870 to £7-4/6 in 1871.
The fishermen received very little of their wages in money.
They received roughly half in goods: in 1867 this was £8,617-5/3
out of net income of £17,120-1/2, and in 1871 it was £6,352-10/4
out of net income of £18,185-4/10. The fishermen also received
substantial cash advances before the end of the season, £4,529-
16/9 in 1867 and £3,942-9/1 in 1871. Furthermore in 1867, 8 of
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the 19 merchant/curers paid the rents for the men and this was
included in the calculations for cash advances; for 1871 it was 8
out of the 16. This affected 1,148 out of the 1,913 fishermen
for 1867 and 994 out of the 1,615 for 1871. . The haaf was the
most advanced form of the problem of advances and debts, more so
than the other fisheries, as would be expected. The men were in
debt throughout the year and even at the end of the season
between a third and a half remained in debt.
In conclusion then it is clear that the the Zetland Method
was alive and well in the 1870's, and had proved itself versatile
enough to incorporate the new industries of whaling and cod.
Fishing tenures were enforced on estates throughout the Islands:
in the Sumburgh and Quendale estates in Dunrossness; the Lunna
estate in Nesting and Lunnasting; the Ollaberry estate in
Northmavine; the estates of Henderson, Budge, and Pole & Hoseason
in Yell; in the Skerries held by Adie from Bruce of Symbister;
and the following areas held by Hay & Co., Burra, Whalsay and Mrs
Robertson's land in Yell and Northmavine. Concerning the rest
of the Island the Commission conclude:
On other estates the tenants are nominally free, although it




Only ten years after the Truck Commission took its evidence
a new body arrived to listen to the Shetlanders, the Napier
Commission. The evidence for that commission provides us with a
different picture of a confident and in places articulate society
of tenants willing and able to criticise their "social
superiors". The Napier Commission was specifically concerned
with the rural problems of rent, security of tenure etc., and is
therefore less striking in its detail of Shetland life than the
evidence in the Truck Commission; however it still provides a
valuable picture of Shetland rural society at a time of important
social change.
The most striking difference with the earlier commission is
the open willingness of the tenants to criticise the lairds and
the factors and tacksmen. In most areas of the islands the
tenants met in groups to decide on the grievances that they would
present to the Commissioners, and to elect a delegate to speak
for them. Only twelve years previously only a handful were
prepared even to say that they were afraid to speak, in 1883 it
seemed as if few could be found not willing to voice criticism.
In case after the case the grievances were the same five: high
rents, lack of leases, no compensation for improvements, loss of
the common hill land for grazing, and the poor quality of houses.
There were some localised differences where particular factors
were added to this list but these were the most commonly
expressed and most deeply felt.
The rents of the tenants' small holdings which had been
relatively low until well into the nineteenth century had almost
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throughout the island been greatly raised over the previous ten
to thirty years. The Shetlanders had never, outside a few
isolated and special examples, written leases for the land they
worked; an annual verbal agreement was all they had and the laird
could remove a tenant with only forty days' warning. In the
Truck Commission it was said that the tenants themselves did not
want them, but in 1883 the demand was for leases of twenty years
or more to give the people security of tenure. It was common
for any tenants who improved their holding to have their rent
raised, and if they refused they could easily be evicted and a
new tenants willing to pay the higher rent found. A
particularly hard blow on the Shetland tenants was the enclosing
of the common hill land (generally referred to as the scattald)
used for grazing their animals. William Balfour recognised in
the late eighteenth century that the number of cattle and sheep a
tenant had made all the difference to their ability to pay their
rent and feed themselves. Take away the peoples right to graze
animals and the whole Shetland agricultural system from the
position of the tenant was further marginalised. This was
especially hurtful at a time of rising prices for animals which
had improved the conditions of many in the islands, and the
benefits were now going to the lairds as they enclosed the land
and created sheep farms. The final grievance of poor housing
highlighted the bad conditions that the majority lived in, small,
dark, damp, smoky, mainly one roomed hovels. Few had been
improved for decades, the tenants wanted the lairds to pay for
reasonable and decent accommodation to be build for them at the
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lairds' expence.
The feel and character of the evidence can be seen from the
following extract from the long statement given by John Spence,
the representative of the crofters from Nesting, who after
outlining their grievances went on to say:
...While we, thus make known the main grievances under which
we are kept down, - grievances not peculiar to ourselves in
particular, but to Shetland in general - grievances that we
have long and silently borne , and against which we have not
risen in rebellion nor taken the law in our own hands, as
those in more favoured parts of the country have done - we
have no personal ill-will against the landlord or his factor,
but against the one-sided land laws, which places us in the
power and at the mercy of the owner of the soil - depriving
us that feeling of independence and that freedom of thought
and action which is our birthright as loyal British subjects.
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This shows the stoicism of the Shetland character which if
anything was too reasonable given the people's history. It
clearly shows that the people were asking for liberty. Some
parts of Shetland had already received this liberty; Walter
Williamson the delegate from Burra after detailing the conditions
in the island under the truck system (see above) went on to
outline the islanders' present position, which he clearly
believes is one of liberty:
...Since the Truck Commission came we have little or no
complaint to make. It is the only time we have ever got
anything like the free liberty of free men.
22103 When did you get free from this truck yoke? - Just
shortly after the Truck Commission came. We were watching
it with a good deal of interest, and it is from that time
only the Burra people have had either a stitch of clothes on
their back or a morsel of food.
22104 Now you are at perfect liberty? - Yes, and a most
blessed thing it is. We can do anything we like - either go
to the merchant who gives the highest price, or cure our fish
ourselves. 65
To Williamson, and to many others things were generally
improving in the islands and that improvement was only recent, in
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the previous five to ten years. It was an economic improvement
as well as a social improvement, the rise in the prices of cattle
and sheep (now threatened by enclosure) and the coming of the
Scottish herring curers, who had assimilated the Shetland fishery
into the Scottish fishery. They gave the men higher prices for
the fish than they had got previously, prices agreed and fixed
before the start of the season, and many women and children were
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employed at the herring stations. But there were still great
hardships suffered by the tenants. In Bruce of Sumburgh's estate
in the south of the island things were still the same as they had
been since John Bruce Jnr. had taken over the running of the
estate. In Foula the tenants of Scott of Melby still had to
fish for the factors Garriock & Co., who also refused any other
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shop to be established on the island. It had only been three
years previously that the tenants on the land held by Hay & Co.
in Northmavine had been freed from their obligation to fish for
Hay & Co. The delegates from Whalsay complained that Hay & Co.
prvented any other shops from opening in the island and that they
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were the only curers there. The Sheriff Substitute, Charles
Rampini, claimed that many of the men lost in the 1881 disaster
had been in debt to merchants and that:
...the old and pernicious system of dealing still extant
between merchant and fisherman is one of the greatest
obstacles to his [the tenant/fisherman] attaining a higher
level either of comfort or of intelligence. 69
James Arthur Hay (of Hay & Co.) even made a half-hearted
attempt to defend the old method when answering a question on the
truck system:
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...I do not recognise it, as the truck system, as it is
understood in England - it is the necessity of the situation
which the poor fishermen are placed in, they must have
assistance of those who employ them to carry on their
occupations. 70
However there were few vocal defences of the old system, and
it is clear that Shetland society had greatly changed in the
previous ten to fifteen years. This new-found courage against
their once landmasters can be further seen in the tenants
readiness to apply to the crofters' commission for reduction in
rents. By 1888 there had been 1,209 applications from Shetland
compared to 483 from Sutherland, 550 from Orkney, 645 from
Argyll, 966 from Caithness, 1,729 from Ross & Cromarty, and 1,821
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from Inverness. By 1897 there had been 2,506 applications to
fix a fair rent in Shetland, twice as much as Orkney's 1,224 and
almost the same as Sutherland with 2,607, although below
Inverness' 5,235 or Ross & Cromarty's 5,611. The old rent of
£11,199 had been reduced to a fair rent of £8,012, and arrears
totalling £9,505 (out of the total arrears of £13,425) were
cancelled. The area covered was 32,489 acres of occupied land
and 210,784 of common land, this is out of a total area of
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352,000 acres. These are significant figures giving
Shetland's size and population compared with the more well known
crofting counties.
This was a dramatic change in the nature of the
relationship between tenant and laird and requires some
explanation. There took place in the mid-nineteenth century a
range of changes in the structure of rural Shetland society that
led to the breaking of the existing paternalistic system. The
previous chapters have outlined the economic developments in the
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whaling and fishing industries, and there remain the changes in
the organisation of landholding. Shetland society was based on
a particular form of landholding, where the tenant held a small
piece of land to cultivate and had access to the hill land for
the cutting of peat and the grazing of livestock. In the
nineteenth century there was a shift by the lairds to divide the
Scattalds, consisting of the farm township and the hill land,
between the proprietors, and enclose lands into farms, either for
cattle or more often for sheep. This broke the lairds' side of
the (unwritten) agreement and with eviction and/or poverty facing
the tenant they were more then willing to face their erstwhile
"landmasters".
This was a slow process and was the result of a series of
different factors in each locality which defined the nature and
form of division and enclosure, yet we can still come to a few
general statements. The vast majority of divisions were begun
in the 1860's, with a lesser number in the 1870's and 1880's.
Similarly the greatest number of divisions were completed in the
1860's and 1870's. There were some important precursors to
these; there was Nicolson's clearances in Fetlar (see chp. 6),
and in the 1840's and 50's the establishment by the Hay family of
a cattle farm at Laxfirth and sheep farms at Dale and Veensgarth
(in Tingwall and Weisdale); also John Walker the factor for the
Cameron of Garth estate established sheep farms in Delting, North
Unst and North Yell. Even these highlight how late the
divisions were made.
Knox argues that the move to divide the scattalds and to
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enclose land represented:
...a significant break with traditional communal ownership in
favour of private property... [and that]...In Shetland the
motive for change was primarily ideological, reflecting
notions of private property and ownership which had swept
through Britain during the previous century. 73
Although it is true that the language of the division was
formalised in the legal terms of private property then existent
in Britain, it was not the case that it was a shift from a pre¬
capitalist to a capitalist notion of private property. This
thesis has attempted to show, amongst other things, the
relationship between the forms of production and the social
organisation of that production. The lairds changed the
structure of landholding not because of an ideological shift on
their part but because of a change in the position of landholding
in the economic organisation of the islands; the role of land in
the economy had changed. For one thing the costs of divisions
were very large, and almost all the divisions were conducted
through the court of session and required a lengthy and expensive
legal procedure (although the act of 1695 meant that it was
easier than in England where an act of parliament was needed).
For example, the division of the the four scattalds in Belting
(total of 4,833 acres) took seven years and cost £1,306, and the
small scattald of Trebister (272 acres) in Lerwick took nine
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years to complete and cost £122. Few Shetland lairds were
going to go to such lengths for ide ological reasons; they were
concerned with their finances and security of future wealth.
They would only do such changes if the former way of securing
rent was no longer viable and alternatives were more attractive.
Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
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rents were low in Shetland and bore no relation to the cost of
purchase. In some areas, particularly the most important for
the haaf fishing the purchase price could be as much as 50 to 100
times the annual rental. Burdens on land also rose such that
the annual burden in the mid-nineteenth century was approximately
half of the islands rental. Under such conditions it was
necessary to raise rents. The ability of a tenant to pay the
rent had always depended on the sucess and availability of
alternative employment, primarily the in the haaf fishing. The
haaf fishing was severely affected by the disaster of 1832 and
the fishing depressions of the 1830's/40's. This combined with
the agricultural depression in the same period finally brought
home to the lairds the problems inherent in the structure of the
existing system. It is no coincidence that at this time they
were happy for others to take over the running of their estates,
the so-called merchants.
At the same time there were external factors that made
alternative land use more economically viable. There were the
growth of urban markets for meat, communications with which were
improving all the time. The first regular steam service was
established in 1858, giving easy and quick access to the Aberdeen
market and from there to the rest of Britain. The prices of
meat rose until well into the 1860's/70's. It appears somewhat
paradoxical that Shetland should export foodstuffs at a time when
it could not feed its own population. The concrete expression
of this was John Walker who "convinced" Cameron of Garth to
develop sheep farms.
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The Shetland lairds became more integrated into Scottish/
British middle class life. A short history of the main estates
in the islands in the nineteenth century will show that the
military and legal professions became the main concern of the
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Shetland lairds and their, male, children.
William Mouat was succeeded by his sister Margaret in 1836
who had married in 1809 Captain William Cameron of the 13th
Dragoons and 78th Highlanders, under whose "reign" John Walker
was factor for the estate. Their son and heir Major Thomas
Mouat Cameron served in the 55th Regiment of Bengal Native
Infantry before becoming Convenor of Zetland in 1874. His heir
the Reverand William Mouat Cameron followed a career in
education. Due to serious financial problems the estate of
Arthur Gifford of Busta was put in the hands of trustees. His
heir, Thomas Gifford, was a Lieutenant in the 25th Native
Infantry of the East India Company. The heir of Robert Bruce of
Symbister was William Arthur Bruce an advocate. Three of
Robert's other sons were officers in the armed forces, two in
India. Another son died in Australia. The heir to the estate
of Nicolson of Lochend was Arthur Nicolson who died at Norwood in
1863. His heir Arthur Bolt Nicolson was an officer in the
King's Own Regiment and later a resident in Australia, becoming a
Commissioner for the goldfields of Victoria in 1853, and died in
Melbourne in 1879. John Bruce Jnr. of Sumburgh took over the
running of the estate from his father (see above) and died in
Edinburgh in 1907. One of his sons was a Colonel in the Indian
Staff, another a Lieutenant in the Royal Navy, and another a
merchant at Amoy in China. The Scott of Scalloway estate was
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put in the hands of trustees in the 1850's and Gideon Scott moved
to Edinburgh and died in 1873. John Scott of Melby died in 1850
and was succeeded by a cousin Robert Scott who was Deputy
Inspector General of Hospitals and Fleets- and later became Deputy
Lieutenant of Orkney and Zetland. His heir sold the estate to
Herbert Anderton in 1893. Andrew Gierson's heir, James, had
married into a Leith mercantile family. One of his sons was an
officer in the Royal Navy, another a Lieuitenant General in the
Royal Engineers. James' heir Andrew John became a Deputy
Lieutenant of Zetland. Another of his son's became a Professor
of English Literature at the University of Aberdeen. This goes
some way in showing the shift in emphasis of the Shetland Lairds.
We do not know, as yet, enough about the detailed histories
of individual estates at this time to conclude if the
restructuring of the organisation of land in Shetland society was
due to pure "rational" economic reasons for maximum return on the
land or for greater security of rent, or merely to prevent the
payment of significant advances to tenants in poor years.
However we can see that the crucial period was the 1860's and
1870's, and it was likely that the hardships of the 1860's and
the Truck Commission had important roles to play in the decisions
made by many. Almost paradoxically the Napier Commission and
the Crofters Act ossified landholding and as such allowed the
conservative elements in Shetland rural society to come to the
fore and further concentrate economic development in the central
belt particularly in Lerwick and Scalloway.
The above are only one side of the equation; it is one thing
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for the laird to change the running of his estate to further his
own wealth; it is quite another for the tenantry after
generations of subjection to stand up against their landmaster.
Besides the laird breaking his side of the tacit agreement oh
landholding (in particular the clearances for sheep farms) there
were a number of other factors which helped this process of
increasing independence. The growth of external employment in
the merchant navy was certainly important, opening people's eyes
and minds. There was also the effect of state intervention; the
Truck Commission forced the lairds and their factors to defend
their actions in public and openly criticised their method of
organising virtually every aspect of the economy. In several
areas this led to the "freeing" of tenants. The physical
expression of this growing was the establishment of a weekly
newspaper The Shetland Times in 1872, the first independent paper
produced in the Islands. This "helped the Shetlanders to at
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least think their way out of the Shetland Method." As we have
already seen of central importance was the herring industry which
was now fully integrated into the Scottish industry more than
any single industry this shaped Shetland's society and economy at
this time (above and chpt.7).
POPULATION
At this point it is worthwhile giving a brief survey of the
changing population structure in the nineteenth century. The
changes in the social and economic structure and organisation in
nineteenth century Shetland (as described in the body of the
thesis) had a range of effects of the population of the Islands.
As the organisation of production, indeed as the form of
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production itself changes, so does the structure of population.
In Shetland the classic example of this is the clearing of
tenants to make way for sheep farms. Less dramatic but just as
relevant was the growth of external employment. This is not to
argue for a solely materialist analysis of historical demography,
but that in certain circumstances it is an important factor that
requires consideration within any adaquate analysis.
The historical demography of Shetland is, at present, the
weakest area in our knowledge of the social history of the
Islands. There is the need for work to be done on the
eighteenth and nineteenth century population changes. Until
than we can only make tentative statements on the general
directions of changes in the population structure of the Islands.
The following, based mainly on census data, relates these trends
to the social and economic changes dealt with in this thesis.
Table 3 shows the changes in the total population from the
mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth century.
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TABLE 3
POPULATION OF SHETLAND 1755-1911

















sources: Thomson, W."Population & Depopulation" Withrington (ed)
Shetland and the Outside World 1469-1969. Oxford: O.U.P. 1983,
Census 1801 to 1911.
This table reveals certain trends: the growth in population
up until 1861, followed by a decline; the small growth of 1801 to
1811, followed" by the rapid expansion of 1811 to 1821 reflecting
the large number of Shetlanders serving and being released from
the Royal Navy during the French wars. From 1831 the rate of
growth slowed as the economy stagnated after the decline of the
herring and cod fisheries. It is only from the 1870's that
there was a large drop in total numbers. From the 1880's and
the development of the herring fishery the population continued
to decline but at a reduced rate. The stability brought by the
Crofters Act increased the security of tenure but did not prevent
the continued emigration from the rural areas. Once the fishing
tenure system had been broken fewer people were willing, or
indeed able to continue life in the countryside.
However such crude figures on population changes hide as
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much as they show. And although it supports the somewhat
simplistic analysis given above it does not take into
consideration the more complex local factors. Shetland should
not be considered as a single unit, for there are important
internal differences in the demographic experience of the
Islands. These are shown in Table 4, where the population of
the Islands are given by the proportion in each area.
TABLE 4
CHANGES IN POPULATION STRUCTURE:
BY AREA (As Percentage of Total Population)1790-1911
AREA 1801 '11 '21 '31 '41 '51 '61 '71 '81 '91 1901 '11
North West 31 30 30 30 31 31 31 31 30 29 28 25
North East 32 31 30 29 28 28 28 28 27 26 26 25
Central 22 23 25 26 26 26 26 27 29 31
'
33 36
South 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 14 13 13 14
total 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 100 100
Source: Census 1801-1911
note :
North West: Northmavine, Delting, Walls & Sandness, Foula.
North East: Unst, Yell, Fetlar, Nesting
Central: Lerwick, Bressay, Burra and Quarff, Tingwall, Whiteness
and Weisdale.
South: Dunrossness, Sandwick, Fair Isle.
The most immediate point revealed by this table is the lack
of any major re-distribution within the Islands during the
nineteenth century. This is true both in times of rising as
well as declining total population. The population of the
central district has increased although it went through a long
stagnant period in the mid-century. What growth there was was
centred on Lerwick (and to a lesser degree Scalloway), the rural
parts of the district suffered clearences in the 1840's and 50's.
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The South's proportion remained nearly the same throughout the
century, reflecting the importance of farming and less need for
external employment. There was very little change in the North
West, for the haaf fishing was the main economic activity
throughout the century declining only towards the latter part.
The North East suffered from clearances in Fetlar and parts of
Unst which explains its decline in the mid-century, and towards
the end of the century Whalsay's population grew holding up the
area's total share. The changes at the turn of the century are
mainly due to the herring fishery, which was centred on Lerwick.
Within these general developments there were significant
localised changes which reveal that the population in some parts
of the islands was growing, while in others it was declining.
One of the most important of these was the increasing
urbanisation of Shetland. Table 5 shows the importance of
Lerwick and that the population was becoming increasingly
concentrated there. Figures are also given for Scalloway.
Although of minor importance compared with Lerwick, it
experienced significant growth in its own terms and was an





LERWICK AND SCALLOWAY 1790's -1911
% of total








1861 3,143 9.9 448
1871 3,655 9.7 525
1881 3,801 12.8 648
1891 4,216 14.7 732
1901 4,803 17.1 857
1911 5,533 19.8 824
notes: (1) percentage is of 1811 figure for population.
source: Census' 1821-1911
IRVINE, J.W. Lerwick: The Birth and Growth
of an Island Town. Lerwick: Lerwick
Community Council. 1983 pp.64-65
This confirms that there was a period of slow growth in the
town's population in the mid-century. It was not until the
social and economic changes which occurred from the 1870's
onwards that the town entered a new phase of rapid development.
Scalloway was never able to exploit its favourable position as
the centre for the important west-side cod and herring fisheries
to match the growth of Lerwick. Taken together, in 1911 almost
23 per cent of the total population lived in the "urban" centres.
A further valuable comparison can be made between the fates
of Fetlar and Whalsay, as given below in Table 6. These two
islands show a remarkable difference in fortune in the second
half of the century. Fetlar, one of the most fertile islands in
Shetland had one of the unhappiest histories of clearances and
population decline of any area. Whalsay however showed a
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dynamic resilience to changing pressures and developed a fishing















The above two tables reveal that even within a general
decline of population, some areas remain buoyant and become the
centres for population concentration.
These tell us much about the experience of some areas but
they do not reveal anything about the sex structure of the
population. Table 7 presents the sex ratio of males per 100
females by the same geographical regions as in table 1. the




CHANGES IN POPULATION STRUCTURE:
SEX RATIO BY AREA: 1801-1911
Males per 100 Females
1801 '11 '21 '31 '41 '51 '61 '71 '81 '91 1901 '11
North West 82 80 83 85 79 76 70 70 71 71 72 75
North East 81 79 82 82 71 71 70 70 71 78 78 87
Central 77 70 83 86 73 70 65 64 72 69 76 84
South 79 83 81 86 82 79 78 79 83 80 82 81
Scotland 85 84 89 89 90 93 90 91 93 93 95 94
sources: Census 1801-1911,
Flinn M.W. (ed) Scottish Population History
Cambridge: C.U.P. 1977 pp.317-318
These data indicate some valuable areas worthwhile of more
research. For example, the differences between the regions in
the 1801 to 1821 period suggest that the greatest demographic
effect of Shetlanders in the armed forces (and possibly also the
whaling.) were in the central region. At this time employment in
the merchant navy was slight and not significant enough to affect
the numbers. The high ratios of 1831 is related to the herring
fishing. The sharp drop after this reflects the need for men to
seek employment outwith the islands, and there was certainly a
shift in the structure from males to females. The continually
low figure in the central region is due to the high level of
external employment for males and the availability of employment
of women in the hosiery trade. The higher ratios towards the
end of the century show the effects of the herring fishing.
If we use the above table with the two below: Table 8 which
gives the sex ratios by age, and Table 9 which shows the general
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age structure of the population, than certain important
developments are revealed about the changing structure of the
population.
TABLE 8
POPULATION STRUCTURE SEX RATIO BY AGE: 1861-1911
Males per 100 Females
AGE
Year 0-14 15-64 65+
1861 106 57.7 57.6
1871 107.9 55.2 64.9
1881 106.4 63.7 59.3
1891 103.9 66.5 49.2
1901 107.9 74.9 47.4
1911 106 80.4 50.6
source Census 1861-1911
TABLE 9
POPULATION STRUCTURE BY AGE and SEX: 1861-1911
Male Female All
Year 0-14 15-64 65+ 0-14 15-64 65+ 0-14 15-64 65+
1861 38.8 53.5 7.7 25.7 65.0 9.9 31.0 60.2 8.6
1871 42.2 48.3 9.5 27.7 61.9 10.3 33.7 56.3 10.0
1881 37.0 53.6 9.3 25.9 62.5 11.6 30.6 58.7 10.6
1891 35.7 55.8 8.5 25.4 61.9 12.7 29.8 59.3 10.9
1901 33.6 57.9 8.5 24.5 61.4 14.1 28.5 59.9 11.6
1911 31.4 59.4 9.2 24.3 60.7 15.0 27.5 60.2 12.4
source: Census 1861--1911
Table 8 indicates a heavy sex imbalance among the
economically active age group (taken as 15 to 64 years ), but one
which improves towards the end of the century. Table 9 reveals
a low point in 1871 after which the proportion of men aged from
15 to 64 rose. Taking these two tables together it looks as if
the female structure was experiencing two shifts: one was an
ageing of the population structure, the other was a decline in
relationship to the number of men. Within a declining total
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population this suggests that there was a significant emigration
of women towards the end of the century, greater than the net
emigration of men. Therefore we can see that the decline of
population was due to a general reduction in the numbers of
children, a smaller proportion within a smaller total population,
and an exodus of women. Shetland; was also an ageing
population, but this was mainly due to a greater proportion of
elderly women in the population.
This short survey of population changes has been presented
to show the effects of the social and economic changes
experienced by the Shetland people and the changing demographic
structure. It shows that there are important correlations
between changes in the social organisation of production and the
route of demographic change. No social history of the Islands
is complete without some discussion of these changes. This has
been a very rudimentary analysis but, hopefully, it does indicate
some of the more important areas for future investigation.
CONCLUSION
The social history of nineteenth century Shetland is only
now in the process of being written and this chapter is only a
small part of one aspect of that history. The chapter has shown
the ways in which Shetland society was restructured in the light
of the crisis of the mid-century. This was the reforming of the
fishing tenure system, but, since history is not cyclical this
restructuring of the social organisation was very similar too but
not completely identical with that gone before. However, it
is clear that the economic advances of the 1820's and 30's were
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not matched by a social progress, if social progress is seen as
the development of free labour; i.e. capitalist social relations.
Behind the veil of development the form of organising production
in Shetland had barely changed. What had changed was the
structure of control which was a union of, so called-merchant
with the laird. As far as the tenants were concerned there was
no progress from the laird or merchant for the Shetland tenant.
From the 1860's there was a series of social and economic
changes which restructured the social relations within the
Islands. There was a shift towards the enclosure of the common
land and the introduction of sheep farms, undermining the
relationship between laird and tenant. There was state
intervention to regulate the systematic abuses of the Shetland
system which were now out of step with the perceived social
relations between classes befitting a civilised nation like
Britain. The Truck and Napier Commissions showed that the state
regarded Shetland as socially and economically primitive. The
Crofters Act confirmed this by allowing Shetland to remain a
peasant society. It is paradoxical that the history of Shetland
has been written and rewritten from the context of the sea, while
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We may believe in some doctrine of evolution
or some idea of progress and we may use this
in our interpretation of the history of
centuries; but what our history contributes is
not evolution but rather the realisation of
how crooked and perverse the ways of progress
are, 1
The Highlands were a very different story and
perhaps a classic illustration of the
inadequacy of any theory of economic growth
which suggests that rational organization and
efficiently enforced property rights are by
themselves adequate guarantees of long-term
development. 2
This thesis has examined the social and economic development
of the Shetland islands in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. It has attempted to come to terms with the complex
historical processes that were involved. It is clear that there
was no direct path, no route destined for the islands to follow.
Similarly the period saw little that could be called social
progress. As the quotation from Butterfield shows the ways of
progress are indeed "crooked and perverse". Similarly, the
quotation from Lenman implies (which is as relevant to Shetland
as it is to the Highlands) any theory that is based on commercial
relations and property rights is unable fully to explain the
route of social and economic development.
The thesis has argued that a materialist analysis informed
by a critical understanding of marxist theories of development is
the most productive way of understanding the social and economic
development of Shetland. Such an analysis emphasises the
importance of social relations and the complex nature of social
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processes. This is part of a growing awareness of the need to
understand the periphery as a part of wider historical processes,
but one in which the local is not regarded as necessary
subservient to the demands of these wider, and often external
forces. Shetland is an example of these external factors
reinforcing the conservative social organisation of production,
and thus perverting the "historical" route of progress.
By concentrating on the organisation of production it can be
seen that the important conjunctures in Shetland's history have
been at times of crises in production. At these historical
"moments" the existing form of organisation is open to
restructuring and there is no predestined route to this
restructuring. The balance of relations can quickly change,
given the outcome of divergent factors.
For Shetland, and indeed for all of the periphery, the form
and structure of internal social organisation needs to be
understood within the context of the islands' historical
relationship with the "external" world. It is well known that
the relationship between Shetland (and also the Highlands) with
the "external" world was primarily a commercial one. Therefore
a large part of the history of this relationship must be the
history of market conditions. However, these relations do not
necessarily lead to the creation of market conditions within the
islands in land or labour. It is the great paradox of
capitalism that it enables the survival of non-capitalist
relations, but in a changed form.
Such an analysis is a "dialectic" one, by which is meant the
complex interrelationship between many factors each working upon
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one another. The main thrust of post-war marxist historiography
has been towards such an appreciation of historical processes.
Similarly the shift in historical sociology has been towards such
am understanding. E. P. Thompson represents the former and
Philip Abrams the latter.
These issues have been addressed in terms of the present
orthodoxy of the move from lairds to merchants controlling the
economy of Shetland. This has been done through a detailed
study of the role of the Hay family in the economic development
of the Islands. They were the most important entrepreneurial
family for more than 60 years, from the 1780's until the 1840's.
Every development in the economy, every shift in control, either
originated from them or was most developed by them. Their
businesses included every commercial activity in the islands.
Rarely has one community been dominated by the economic
activities of one family over such a long period. They were at
the fore-front of the economic advances of the 1820's and 1830's.
Does this not support the thesis that a merchant class rose to
control Shetland?
Not only is this the wrong question but given the nature of
the question any answer will only confuse our understanding of
the historical development of Shetland. The question assumes
the existence of separate and opposed social groups based on
mutually hostile interests in relation to the organisation of
production. Furthermore is such a movement of control
meaningful for the social and economic development of Shetland?
Does it actually mean anything if merchants control external
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trade rather than lairds? Smith may believe that trade is the
economic dynamic in the history of Shetland, but there is little
evidence of conflict between merchant and laird over control of
trade. And this is when the term "merchant" actually applies to
the activities of that amorphous group. Using a materialist
analysis, and emphasising innovative and entrepreneurial activity
in the sphere of production, it would be expected that conflict
would arise in production, taking the form of attempts to control
the labour of the lairds' tenants. This is where we discover
the long dreamed of "class struggle" in Shetland.
Nowhere was this more evident than in the whaling industry;
and as such it highlights the relationship between external and
internal forces. The whaling was part of the industrial
development of Britain, responding to local and national market
demand for whale oil. Shetland was a source of labour for the
industry. The lairds resented the intrusion into their sphere
of control and at first attempted to maintain control over their
tenants' labour by proposing a scheme to deal directly with the
whaling ship owners. They failed and it was the agents based in
Lerwick who hired and paid the men. However conflict only arose
at times of labour shortage or in particular circumstances when
the numbers whaling undermined the viability of the haaf fishing.
The fishery was ultimately organised within the existing
structure of the social organisation of production. The result
was not the victory of a new modernising social class or of
continued social and economic progress, but of a restructuring of
the tight forms of social control of labour. This can also be
seen in the herring fishery.
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James Hay failed to establish a herring fishery based on
free labour in the 1780's. In the 1820's after a decade of
trying, the Shetland herring fishery began to expand, reaching
its height in the mid-1830's after which it slumped. Part of
this fishery was organised along the "semi-capitalistic" half-
catch system, but most was an extension of the existing haaf
fishery and as such within the "Zetland Method". The failure of
the fishery, one of the most significant events in the history of
Shetland, resulted in the reinforcing of the older forms of
fishing and the older forms of control. Similarly the cod
fishery when was at its height it was organised along the
existing method.
These experiences, so well described in the Truck
Commission, show how in Shetland the "merchant" and "laird" were
not mutually opposed but mutually parasitical on the Shetland
tenants. The so-called merchant was factor, curer, tacksmen,
often laird as well. He was as ruthless as any laird when it
came to exploiting tenants, and he was as dependent on the
maintenance of a system of cycles of debt and credit. The
important point is that the history of eighteenth and nineteenth
century Shetland is not one of "class struggle" between
"capitalist merchants" and "feudal lairds" but of a tenantry
controlled and exploited by those very people. It is not the
history of the success of "merchant" over "laird", since there
was no success. Why was it that when everything seemed to be
going so well in the 1820's and 1830's that the society and
economy regressed? These events cannot be explained either by
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evolutionary development or environmental determinism, but by
detailed social historical analysis. The real mystery and
problem of Shetlands' history is the stranglehold of the "Zetland
Method" which proved to be as beneficial to any "merchant" as it
was to any "laird".
This thesis has tried to add -to our knowledge of the social
history of Britain and Shetland in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries; however it still reveals how much more there is to
learn. We can comprehend the actions of the Hays and those like
them, but we can still only guess at the reasons behind the
lairds decline in the direct running of their estates, and some
tentative suggestions have been presented in chapter 9. The
experience of the people in the twentieth century has been a
similar tale of boom and bust.
The haaf fishing was slow to die for it lingered on in the
more peripheral parts of the Islands, out of step with the
herring boom. Others found ready employment in the merchant
navy, and the crews of some companies (such as the Ben Line)
seemed to be almost composed solely of Shetlanders. After the
First World War the herring declined, and with traditional
markets gone and a world depression Shetland suffered greatly.
There was a brief respite during the Second V/orld War; thousands
of troops were stationed waiting for the invasion, only to be
followed by further decline in the late forties and fifties, a
time when many hundreds of Shetlanders had to go to the Antarctic
whaling to ease their poverty, while others chose to emigrate
joining the thousands in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
Throughout this period Shetland's population continued to fall
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and the demographic structure to age. Then, from the late
fifties, things began to improve with investment in the fishing
and knitwear industries. The fishing industry expanded into the
processing of fish, adding value to the finished product. The
knitwear industry brought employment to thousands of women,
almost entirely on the "putting out system" and on low rates, but
it was successful. By the late fifties and early sixties the
economy was expanding; Whalsay and Burra fishermen were investing
in the most sophisticated vessels available; there was little
unemployment, and the population was rising as the young no
longer had to leave to find a job. The people were relatively
prosperous, certainly by the standards of the recent past. They
had council houses to live in and television to watch (even if it
was only BBC1 in black and white). It was within this context
that oil arrived, and shook the power of the local business
elite. Once more the world came flooding into Shetland to
exploit the resources near its shores. Forgotten for sixty
years, the Islands were now at the centre of the nation's
attention, and its hope for the future. The Shetlanders were
perhaps poorly equipped to tackle the problems facing them, but
at the time it appeared that they did remarkably well. Many of
the Islanders experienced unparalleled material improvement in
the seventies. And the Islands saw boom days once again, which
now appear to be slipping away as the price of oil remains low
3
and the council is in financial problems. Oil has transformed
Shetland, but it doesn't control it; the fishing industry has
continued to invest in new, better, and bigger vessels with
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experienced and skilled skippers and crews which have proven to
be successful. The Shetland experience of the twentieth
century has been as mixed as that of the nineteenth.
What then are the more general insights that this thesis can
offer to theories of development and social change? Firstly it
argues that there is no historical route which we are pre¬
destined to follow; history is for the making. Secondly it
argues that existing marxist theories are too deterministic in
their analysis of the position of the periphery in the historical
development of the modern world. Thirdly it points out that the
internal social organisation of production, which is itself the
construct of a specific historical process, should not be
underestimated in relation to the more "economic" forces of the
external world. As such it is an analysis that is more
sympathetic to that of the "internalists" over that of the
"externalists", although such divisions are really matters of
theoretical emphasis (and political polemic) than mutually
exclusive positions. Fourthly, wTe need to see entrepreneurs as
operating within a historically specific social environment, and
that mammon does not necessarily lead to the social and economic
freedom promised. Any theory must aid our understanding of the
social world; when theories obscure rather than illuminate then
they must be rejected. When social categories, such as
"merchant" and "laird", take on a life of their own and there is
a "tyranny of concepts" where reality must be made to fit the
theory, than it is time to reconsider those categories and have
the strength to strive towards a better explanation without them.
In the end this thesis has tried to give back to the
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Shetland people their history although that history has often
been an unhappy one. It has tried to do away with the
sentimentalism for a non-existent romantic past which separates
us from our history. In this age when Shetland is once more at
the centre of the mysterious workings of the capitalist' world
economy, it is perhaps of some comfort to understand our past
better and therefore what we are.
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